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Author: Major Hervé Pierre Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing ISBN: 178625347X Category : History Languages : en Pages : 66
Book Description
If in a short-term perspective the battle of Algiers was an operational success since the terrorist attacks ended by the of fall 1957, the different methods used to gather intelligence proved to be strategically counterproductive and left an open wound on the French Society. In 1956, both internal and international political situations favored the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). In August, during a clandestine meeting in the Soummam valley (Kabylie), the FLN decided to direct the fighting against the European population in urban areas. Such an intensification of the conflict was aimed at winning a decisive battle: bringing the terror to Algiers was perceived as the last step before the independence. Facing a paralysis of regular courses of action, the French reacted to the terrorist wave by giving the military extraordinary police powers. Jacques Massu’s 10th Para Division implemented radical methods. From 20 January to 31 March 1957, it succeeded in disorganizing the whole insurgency (first battle). However, the tactical victory against terrorism was as blatant as it proved to be short-lived. Facing a resuming tactical threat, General Massu entrusted Colonel Yves Godard with the AOR of Algiers (second battle). If the first battle was fought using bloody swords, the second one, based on infiltration and disinformation operations, proved to be a surgical operation using scalpels. On 8 October 1957, the battle of Algiers ended. In a blurred conflict that belonged neither to police operations nor to conventional war, the legal black hole ineluctably led to the temptation of committing illegal acts. Paul Aussarresses and Yves Godard embodied the two opposite approaches that are distinguishable during the battle. Pushing the justification of illegal violence to the limit, Aussarresses represents the dark face of COIN operations while Godard repeatedly stated that there was no need to use torture.
Author: Major Hervé Pierre Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing ISBN: 178625347X Category : History Languages : en Pages : 66
Book Description
If in a short-term perspective the battle of Algiers was an operational success since the terrorist attacks ended by the of fall 1957, the different methods used to gather intelligence proved to be strategically counterproductive and left an open wound on the French Society. In 1956, both internal and international political situations favored the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). In August, during a clandestine meeting in the Soummam valley (Kabylie), the FLN decided to direct the fighting against the European population in urban areas. Such an intensification of the conflict was aimed at winning a decisive battle: bringing the terror to Algiers was perceived as the last step before the independence. Facing a paralysis of regular courses of action, the French reacted to the terrorist wave by giving the military extraordinary police powers. Jacques Massu’s 10th Para Division implemented radical methods. From 20 January to 31 March 1957, it succeeded in disorganizing the whole insurgency (first battle). However, the tactical victory against terrorism was as blatant as it proved to be short-lived. Facing a resuming tactical threat, General Massu entrusted Colonel Yves Godard with the AOR of Algiers (second battle). If the first battle was fought using bloody swords, the second one, based on infiltration and disinformation operations, proved to be a surgical operation using scalpels. On 8 October 1957, the battle of Algiers ended. In a blurred conflict that belonged neither to police operations nor to conventional war, the legal black hole ineluctably led to the temptation of committing illegal acts. Paul Aussarresses and Yves Godard embodied the two opposite approaches that are distinguishable during the battle. Pushing the justification of illegal violence to the limit, Aussarresses represents the dark face of COIN operations while Godard repeatedly stated that there was no need to use torture.
Author: Major Michael J. Lackman Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing ISBN: 1782895124 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 69
Book Description
Military historical case studies provide insight for military planners. Military planners cannot afford to ignore history when planning in today’s complex environment. This thesis analyzes military doctrinal changes and adaptation during Britain’s Boer War and the French counterinsurgency war in Algeria. The Boer War serves as an example of doctrinal change during a counterinsurgency campaign. The French experience demonstrates the difficult task of fighting against an ambiguous enemy who uses terrorism as its primary tactic. A counterinsurgency comparison and analysis focuses on three issues present in both case studies: population control measures, operational tactics, and the civil military operations. The conclusion offers solutions to the military situation today based on the British and French counterinsurgency. This thesis argues history provides US military planners with the background to develop a successful counterinsurgency strategy for today’s environment.
Author: Terrence G. Peterson Publisher: ISBN: 9781501776960 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
"Examines the origins, development, and impact of the French Army's strategy of Pacification during the Algerian War of independence from France, 1954-1962. It illuminates how French efforts to counter decolonization in Algeria shaped modern counterinsurgency by placing civilians and armed social reform at the center of modern warfare"--
Author: Beatrice Heuser Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 1107135044 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 399
Book Description
A study of the evolving 'national styles' of conducting insurgencies and counter-insurgency, as influenced by transnational trends, ideas and practices.
Author: David Galula Publisher: Rand Corporation ISBN: 0833041088 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 325
Book Description
When Algerian nationalists launched a rebellion against French rule in November 1954, France was forced to cope with a varied and adaptable Algerian strategy. In this volume, originally published in 1963, David Galula reconstructs the story of his highly successful command at the height of the rebellion. This groundbreaking work, with a new foreword by Bruce Hoffman, remains relevant to present-day counterinsurgency operations.
Author: Martin S. Alexander Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1135317100 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 176
Book Description
The French Army's war in Algeria has always aroused passions. This book does not whitewash the atrocities committed by both sides; rather it focuses on the conflict itself, a perspective assisted by the French republic's official admission in 1999 that what happened in Algeria was indeed a war.
Author: Neil Macmaster Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA ISBN: 0198860218 Category : Algeria Languages : en Pages : 529
Book Description
This book studies the peasantry during the Algerian War of Independence to uncover the long-term ability of this community to sustain an autonomous political culture.
Author: Martin S. Alexander Publisher: Springer ISBN: 0230500951 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 273
Book Description
The Algerian War 1954-62 was one of the most prolonged and violent examples of decolonization. At times horribly savage, it was an undeclared war in the sense that no formal declaration of hostilities was ever made. Bringing to an end one hundred and thirty two years of French rule, the Algerian struggle caused the fall of six French prime ministers, the collapse of the Fourth Republic and expulsion of one million French settlers. This volume, bringing together leading experts in the field, focuses on one of the key actors in the drama - the French army. They show that the Algerian War was just as much about conflicts of ideas, beliefs and loyalties as it was about simple military operations. In this way, the collection goes beyond polemic and recrimination to explore the many and varied nuances of what was one of the historically most important of the grand style colonial wars.
Author: Major Hervé Pierre
Author: Major Hervé Pierre
Author: Roger Trinquier
Author: Paul X. Kelley
Author: Major Michael J. Lackman
Author: Terrence G. Peterson
Author: Beatrice Heuser
Author: David Galula
Author: Martin S. Alexander
Author: Neil Macmaster
Author: Martin S. Alexander