Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Designing Economic Mechanisms PDF full book. Access full book title Designing Economic Mechanisms by Leonid Hurwicz. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Leonid Hurwicz Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 113945434X Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 321
Book Description
A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.
Author: Leonid Hurwicz Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 113945434X Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 321
Book Description
A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.
Author: Rakesh V. Vohra Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 1139499173 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 185
Book Description
Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design.
Author: Guillaume Haeringer Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 0262345099 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 393
Book Description
A broad overview of market mechanisms, with an emphasis on the interplay between theory and real-life applications; examples range from eBay auctions to school choice. This book offers an introduction to market design, providing students with a broad overview of issues related to the design and analysis of market mechanisms. It defines a market as a demand and a supply, without specifying a price system or mechanism. This allows the text to analyze a broad set of situations—including such unconventional markets as college admissions and organ donation—and forces readers to pay attention to details that might otherwise be overlooked. Students often complain that microeconomics is too abstract and disconnected from reality; the study of market design shows how theory can help solve existing, real-life problems. The book focuses on the interplay between theory and applications. To keep the text as accessible as possible, special effort has been made to minimize formal description of the models while emphasizing the intuitive, with detailed explanations and resolution of examples. Appendixes offer general reviews of elements of game theory and mechanism design that are related to the themes explored in the book, presenting the basic concepts with as many explanations and illustrations as possible. The book covers topics including the basics of simple auctions; eBay auctions; Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions; keyword auctions, with examples from Google and Facebook; spectrum auctions; financial markets, with discussions of treasury auctions and IPOs; trading on the stock market; the basic matching model; medical match; assignment problems; probabilistic assignments; school choice; course allocation, with examples from Harvard and Wharton; and kidney exchange.
Author: Tilman Borgers Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0190244682 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 288
Book Description
What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
Author: Lisa Ann Mandle Publisher: ISBN: 1642830038 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 334
Book Description
Rapid economic development has been a boon to human well-being, but comes at a significant cost to the fertile soils, forests, coastal marshes, and farmland that support all life on earth. If ecosystems collapse, so eventually will human civilization. One solution is inclusive green growth--the efficient use of natural resources. Its genius lies in working with nature rather than against it. Green Growth That Works is the first practical guide to bring together pragmatic finance and policy tools that can make investment in natural capital both attractive and commonplace. Pioneered by leading scholars from the Natural Capital Project, this valuable compendium of proven techniques can guide agencies and organizations eager to make green growth work anywhere in the world.
Author: Tilman Börgers Publisher: ISBN: 9780190244699 Category : Game theory Languages : en Pages : 263
Book Description
What is the best auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organise themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organised? These questions are the subject of the economic theory of mechanism design. Tilman Börgers' book presents this theory carefully and rigorously. Advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics will find an exposition of the classic theory of mechanism design, followed by chapters that take the reader to the frontiers of current research in the area.
Author: Alvin E. Roth Publisher: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt ISBN: 0544291131 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 275
Book Description
A Nobel laureate reveals the often surprising rules that govern a vast array of activities -- both mundane and life-changing -- in which money may play little or no role. If you've ever sought a job or hired someone, applied to college or guided your child into a good kindergarten, asked someone out on a date or been asked out, you've participated in a kind of market. Most of the study of economics deals with commodity markets, where the price of a good connects sellers and buyers. But what about other kinds of "goods," like a spot in the Yale freshman class or a position at Google? This is the territory of matching markets, where "sellers" and "buyers" must choose each other, and price isn't the only factor determining who gets what. Alvin E. Roth is one of the world's leading experts on matching markets. He has even designed several of them, including the exchange that places medical students in residencies and the system that increases the number of kidney transplants by better matching donors to patients. In Who Gets What -- And Why, Roth reveals the matching markets hidden around us and shows how to recognize a good match and make smarter, more confident decisions.
Author: Dirk Bergemann Publisher: World Scientific ISBN: 9814452165 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 472
Book Description
Foreword writer Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007) This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers. The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction. Sample Chapter(s) Foreword writer Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007) (33 KB) Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction (252 KB) Chapter 12: Robust Monopoly Pricing (174 KB) Introductory slides Contents:Robust Mechanism DesignEx Post ImplementationRobust Implementation in Direct MechanismsRobust Implementation in General MechanismsThe Role of the Common Prior in Robust ImplementationAn Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic UncertaintyRobust Virtual ImplementationMultidimensional Private Value AuctionsThe Robustness of Robust ImplementationRationalizable ImplementationPricing without PriorsRobust Monopoly Pricing Readership: Graduate students and researchers who are interested in Economic Theory. Keywords:Mechanism Design;Game Theory;Auction Theory;Implementation;Private Information;First and Higher-Order Belief;BayesNash Equilibrium;Ex Post Equilibrium;Rationalizability;Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms;Private Value;Interdependent Value;Common Value;Belief-Free MechanismsKey Features:This volume is written by well-known researchers in economic theoryIt presents the main themes and results of the research on “robust mechanism design” and “robust implementation” through promiment examplesIt includes a new introductory essay that provides the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers. The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, the single unit auction with interdependent valueReviews: “Equilibrium robustness in informational variables is critical, if one wants to use results from the mechanism design literature in real life applications. The papers included in the Bergemann and Morris book describe state of the art progress in this direction of research. The book is an excellent resource for established game theorists, who want to learn more about this subject; and for PhD students, who look for exciting problems to investigate.” Ehud Kalai Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University “This book collects together a series of papers on mechanism design written by Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris. It is their response to the challenge set by Robert Wilson in his eponymous doctrine: Only by repeated weakening of common knowledge assumptions will the theory approximate reality. Many scholars responded by arguing for solution concepts robust to the beliefs of the agents. The approach taken by Bergemann and Morris was radically different. They hitched their wagon to Harsany's observation that relaxing the common knowledge assumption was equivalent to enlarging the type space. Then, they proceed to develop the properties of mechanisms that would emerge. For this reason, this collection is essential reading for any student interested in taking up the challenge of the Wilson doctrine. The introduction by itself is worth the price of admission!” Rakesh Vohra Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University “Mechanism design has been one of the great successes of economic theory in the last 30 years. Robust mechanism design, the study of optimal mechanisms in settings where the designer has less information about the beliefs of the agents, is the natural next step in the evolution of this field. Bergemann and Morris are two of the leading figures in developing this new theory, and this book combines many of their papers with an excellent introduction that overviews the field and explains how their papers fit together. Highly recommended to all students and practitioners of economic theory, and essential reading for would-be mechanism designers.” Drew Fudenberg Department of Economics, Harvard University “The question of the design of institutions has been at the center of some of the most important economic theory in the past four decades. Bergemann and Morris have made seminal contributions to the understanding of how uncertainty can and should be incorporated into mechanism design, and this volume reproduces a collection of their most important work in the area. The volume will be an important reference for those working in the area and those who wish to apply the ideas in economic models.” Andrew Postlewaite Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
Author: Christopher B. Barrett Publisher: University of Chicago Press ISBN: 022657430X Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 425
Book Description
What circumstances or behaviors turn poverty into a cycle that perpetuates across generations? The answer to this question carries especially important implications for the design and evaluation of policies and projects intended to reduce poverty. Yet a major challenge analysts and policymakers face in understanding poverty traps is the sheer number of mechanisms—not just financial, but also environmental, physical, and psychological—that may contribute to the persistence of poverty all over the world. The research in this volume explores the hypothesis that poverty is self-reinforcing because the equilibrium behaviors of the poor perpetuate low standards of living. Contributions explore the dynamic, complex processes by which households accumulate assets and increase their productivity and earnings potential, as well as the conditions under which some individuals, groups, and economies struggle to escape poverty. Investigating the full range of phenomena that combine to generate poverty traps—gleaned from behavioral, health, and resource economics as well as the sociology, psychology, and environmental literatures—chapters in this volume also present new evidence that highlights both the insights and the limits of a poverty trap lens. The framework introduced in this volume provides a robust platform for studying well-being dynamics in developing economies.
Author: Tilman Borgers Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA ISBN: 9781336280434 Category : Game theory Languages : en Pages : 263
Book Description
What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Borgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Borgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
Author: Leonid Hurwicz
Author: Leonid Hurwicz
Author: Rakesh V. Vohra
Author: Guillaume Haeringer
Author: Tilman Borgers
Author: Lisa Ann Mandle
Author: Tilman Börgers
Author: Alvin E. Roth
Author: Dirk Bergemann
Author: Christopher B. Barrett
Author: Tilman Borgers