FM 100-5 Operations PDF Download

Author: United States. Department of the Army
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Command of troops
Languages : en
Pages : 188

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Author: Robert A. Doughty
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 68

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Author: Paul H. Herbert
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428915591
Category : Tactics
Languages : en
Pages : 139

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Beskriver udviklingen af den amerikanske hærs doktriner efter Vietnam-krigen.

Author: John L. Romjue
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Europe
Languages : en
Pages : 148

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Author: Headquarters Department of the Army
Publisher: Lulu.com
ISBN: 035994695X
Category : Reference
Languages : en
Pages : 100

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Book Description
ADP 3-0, Operations, constitutes the Army's view of how to conduct prompt and sustained operations across multiple domains, and it sets the foundation for developing other principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate doctrine publications. It articulates the Army's operational doctrine for unified land operations. ADP 3-0 accounts for the uncertainty of operations and recognizes that a military operation is a human undertaking. Additionally, this publication is the foundation for training and Army education system curricula related to unified land operations. The principal audience for ADP 3-0 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force (JTF) or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will use this publication as well.

Author: United States. Department of the Army
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Command of troops
Languages : en
Pages : 200

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Author: Department Army
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781481131124
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 318

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Book Description
Information is an element of combat power. Commanders conduct information operations (IO) to apply it. Focused IO-synchronized with effective information management and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance-enable commanders to gain and maintain information superiority. IO is a prime means for achieving information superiority. Users of FM 3-13 must be familiar with the military decision making process established in FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production; the operations process, established in FM 3-0, Operations; and commander's visualization, described in FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. As the Army's key integrating manual for IO, this manual prescribes IO doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). It also establishes doctrine and TTP for the IO elements of operations security and military deception. This manual implements joint IO doctrine established in JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations; JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security; and JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception. This manual establishes the following as the definition of IO used by Army forces: Information operations is the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decision making. This definition supersedes the definition of IO in FM 3-0. It is consistent with joint initiatives.

Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 140

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The single most important origin of today's AirLand Battle doctrine was the establishment of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973 and the writing of a wholly new Field Manual (FM) 100-5, "Operations," under the supervision of the first TRADOC commander, General William E. DePuy. Between 1973 and the manual's publication in 1976, DePuy gave the Army a mighty shove that rolled it out of its preoccupation with the Vietnam War and on the road to the 21st century. The 1976 edition of FM 100-5 was unlike any of its several predecessors. First, it represented a new role for military doctrine as a key integrating medium for an increasingly complex military bureaucracy. The manual attempted to present an over-arching concept of warfare that would rationalize everything the Army did, from training recruits to designing tanks, in terms of how the Army intended to fight. Central to this attempt was the hope that the manual would provide the convincing arguments the Army needed to preserve its investment in new weapons systems. Second, FM 100-5 heralded dramatic changes within the Army. Its authors intended that it play a major role in expunging the bitter Vietnam War experience; shift the Army's attention away from the problems inherent in establishing a volunteer army and onto the battlefield; address the twin issues of a renewed threat to NATO Europe and the increased lethality brought on by the spread of advanced weapons systems; and change the Army's focus from dismounted infantry operations to armored operations. Third, FM 100-5 was an attempt to demystify doctrine. It discarded the abstractions of earlier manuals in favor of specifics on "how to fight." Fourth, the manual was the personal project of General DePuy and his subordinate generals. But despite its importance and high-level authorship, FM 100-5 caused a controversy within the Army that quickly led to the manual's displacement, an event DePuy neither anticipated nor intended.

Author: John L. Romjue
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 0788129589
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 171

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Between 1991 and 1993, the Army formulated a fighting doctrine recast to fit the power demands of a new strategic world. This new power-order replaced the Army's earlier "AirLand Battle" doctrine, first issued in 1982. This monograph addresses several questions revolving around the rapid replacement, less than 2 years after its success in the desert war, of a recognized and successful fighting doctrine. Discusses the roots of U.S. Army doctrine and the antecedent developments leading to the Army's recasting of its key battle doctrine. Examines the mechanism of the process of change, the effects of the new doctrine and how it was implemented.

Author: Michael Dale Doubler
Publisher: Fort Leavenworth, Kan. : U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
ISBN:
Category : Bocage normand (France)
Languages : en
Pages : 92

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