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Author: Jeffrey R. Campbell Publisher: ISBN: Category : Employment (Economic theory) Languages : en Pages : 58
Book Description
There are significant differences in the dynamics of employment over the business cycle between young and old manufacturing plants. Young plants are more sensitive to aggregate disturbances, and they respond to them along different margins. We interpret these differences as reflecting greater organizational flexibility at young plants due to the changing nature of a plant's environment as it ages. In the presence of aggregate uncertainty, differences between young and old plants' organizational flexibility allows the model to reproduce their distinct cyclical characteristics. Previous empirical studies show that small firms generally respond by more to aggregate shocks than do large firms. To the extent that small firms tend to operate young plants, our analysis suggests an alternative to conventional explanations of this evidence which appeal to imperfections in credit markets.
Author: Jeffrey R. Campbell Publisher: ISBN: Category : Employment (Economic theory) Languages : en Pages : 58
Book Description
There are significant differences in the dynamics of employment over the business cycle between young and old manufacturing plants. Young plants are more sensitive to aggregate disturbances, and they respond to them along different margins. We interpret these differences as reflecting greater organizational flexibility at young plants due to the changing nature of a plant's environment as it ages. In the presence of aggregate uncertainty, differences between young and old plants' organizational flexibility allows the model to reproduce their distinct cyclical characteristics. Previous empirical studies show that small firms generally respond by more to aggregate shocks than do large firms. To the extent that small firms tend to operate young plants, our analysis suggests an alternative to conventional explanations of this evidence which appeal to imperfections in credit markets.
Author: Cheng Wang Publisher: ISBN: Category : Bank loans Languages : en Pages : 54
Book Description
This paper develops a model of the credit market where the equilibrium lending mechanism, as well as the economy's aggregate investment and output, are endogenously determined. It focuses on two crucial elements. One is the micro theory of optimal lending mechanism. Instead of imposing a particular lending contract form exogenously, we solve for the optimal contract between a borrower and a lender designed to circumvent adverse-selection and moral-hazard problems in the model environment. The other important element is the effect of credit market condition on the lending mechanism. We embed the micro model of the two-agent contracting problem into a competitive credit market. Hence, we are able to study the interaction among credit market tightness, equilibrium financing mechanism and aggregate economic activity. On the optimal contract, the paper provides a formal theory that explains why some firms choose to borrow from banks, while others decide to issue bond to finance their investment. It postulates that the optimal contract is one of two kinds: either with intensive monitoring by the lender to overcome borrower's incentive problems, such as most of intermediated financing (bank or venture-capital financing), or with heavy reliance on the borrower, such as market financing. The model predicts that intermediated financing is optimal when investment returns are high, cost of lender monitoring is low, investment's liquidation value is low, and credit market is tight for the borrowers. On the general equilibrium effect, we show that the observation that bank lending falls relative to corporate bond issuance during recessions can be explained by movements in the economy's real factors, such as the decline in the average investment returns (which is considered as a contributing factor to the "credit crunch" occurred during 1990-91 recession), and paradoxically, the increase of investment demand which worsens credit market condition and hence intensifies the incentive problems. It can also be explained by the drop of credit supply, possibly brought about by a contractionary monetary policy in the short run.
Author: Torsten Persson Publisher: ISBN: Category : Comparative government Languages : en Pages : 60
Book Description
We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian -- as opposed to proportional -- elections increase competition between parties by focusing it into some key marginal districts. This leads to less public goods, less rents for politicians, more redistribution and larger government. A model of legislative bargaining and backward-looking voting indicates that presidential -- as opposed to parliamentary -- regimes increase competition between both politicians and voters. This leads to less public goods, less rents for politicians redistribution, and smaller government. We confront these predictions with cross-country data from around 1990, controlling for economic and social determinants of government spending. We find strong and robust support for the prediction that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes, and weaker support for the prediction that majoritarian elections are associated with less public goods.
Author: Edward L. Glaeser Publisher: ISBN: Category : Businesspeople Languages : en Pages : 40
Book Description
Entrepreneurs who start new firms may choose not-for-profit status as a means of committing to soft incentives. Such incentives protect donors, volunteers, consumers and employees from ex post expropriation of profits by the entrepreneur. We derive conditions under which completely self-interested entrepreneurs opt for not-for-profit status, despite the fact that this status limits their ability to enjoy the profits of their enterprises. When entrepreneurs have a taste for producing high quality products, the incentives are even softer, and, moreover, non-profit status can serve as a signal of that taste. We also show that even in the absence of tax advantages, unrestricted donations would flow to non-profits rather than for-profit firms because donations have more significant influence on the decisions of the non-profits.
Author: Ricardo J. Caballero Publisher: ISBN: Category : Asset-backed financing Languages : en Pages : 62
Book Description
Although internal policy mismanagements can be cited in most recent emerging market crises, they seldom account fully for the severity of these crises. The reluctance of international investors to provide the resources that would limit the extent of the reversal almost invariably plays a key role in bringing a previously (over?)-heated economy to a costly halt. Domestic assets experience dramatic depreciation and otherwise solvent investment projects and production, especially in the nontradeables sector, find no financiers and are wastefully shutdown. Ultimately, the reason for this breakdown of a country's access to international capital markets must lie in the inadequacy (real or perceived) of its international collateral. We build a framework where this insufficiency and its consequences stem from microeconomic contractual problems. Fire sales of domestic assets naturally arise as a result of desperate competition for scarce international collateral. This begs the question of why the private sector does not take steps to ensure sufficient international collateral when crises are likely. The answer lies in the presence of a pecuniary externality. We show that contractual problems also lead to a problem of insufficient domestic collateral, which restricts the transfer of surplus arising from the use of international collateral between the users and providers of this international collateral. The interaction between domestic and international collateral also sheds light on when pre-crisis capital flows ought to be regulated and on whether there is scope for currency support measures during the crisis or not.
Author: Sita Vanka Publisher: Springer Nature ISBN: 9811556563 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 314
Book Description
This book provides a multi-stakeholder perspective on sustainable HRM for the policymakers, managers and academics, addressing issues, approaches, research studies/frameworks and emerging patterns relating to the subject. It discusses various aspects of sustainability, such as making HR more responsible for ensuring sustainability focusing on the triple bottom line, characteristics of sustainable HRM, psychological contracts, emotional intelligence, and psychological capital. The book also explores organizational citizenship behavior, employment relations, employee engagement, sustainable leadership, disruptive HR practices, sustaining employee motivation, educational sustainability, sustainable career management, sustainable environment, employer and employee branding, sustainable organizations, organization culture, training for sustainability, sustainable employee performance, business sustainability and sustainable employability. It provides an update on the concept, processes, issues and emerging paradigms from multidimensional and cross-country perspectives to showcase sustainable HR practices, and appeals to the academics, practitioners and policymakers in the area of HRM.
Author: Jeffrey R. Campbell
Author: Jeffrey R. Campbell
Author: 
Author: Daniel Aaronson
Author: National Bureau of Economic Research
Author: Meredith A. Crowley
Author: Cheng Wang
Author: Torsten Persson
Author: Edward L. Glaeser
Author: Ricardo J. Caballero
Author: Sita Vanka