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Author: D. Roderick Kiewiet Publisher: University of Chicago Press ISBN: 9780226435299 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 312
Book Description
Why do majority congressional parties seem unable to act as an effective policy-making force? They routinely delegate their power to others—internally to standing committees and subcommittees within each chamber, externally to the president and to the bureaucracy. Conventional wisdom in political science insists that such delegation leads inevitably to abdication—usually by degrees, sometimes precipitously, but always completely. In The Logic of Delegation, however, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins persuasively argue that political scientists have paid far too much attention to what congressional parties can't do. The authors draw on economic and management theory to demonstrate that the effectiveness of delegation is determined not by how much authority is delegated but rather by how well it is delegated. In the context of the appropriations process, the authors show how congressional parties employ committees, subcommittees, and executive agencies to accomplish policy goals. This innovative study will force a complete rethinking of classic issues in American politics: the "autonomy" of congressional committees; the reality of runaway federal bureaucracy; and the supposed dominance of the presidency in legislative-executive relations.
Author: D. Roderick Kiewiet Publisher: University of Chicago Press ISBN: 9780226435299 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 312
Book Description
Why do majority congressional parties seem unable to act as an effective policy-making force? They routinely delegate their power to others—internally to standing committees and subcommittees within each chamber, externally to the president and to the bureaucracy. Conventional wisdom in political science insists that such delegation leads inevitably to abdication—usually by degrees, sometimes precipitously, but always completely. In The Logic of Delegation, however, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins persuasively argue that political scientists have paid far too much attention to what congressional parties can't do. The authors draw on economic and management theory to demonstrate that the effectiveness of delegation is determined not by how much authority is delegated but rather by how well it is delegated. In the context of the appropriations process, the authors show how congressional parties employ committees, subcommittees, and executive agencies to accomplish policy goals. This innovative study will force a complete rethinking of classic issues in American politics: the "autonomy" of congressional committees; the reality of runaway federal bureaucracy; and the supposed dominance of the presidency in legislative-executive relations.
Author: Neil J. Mitchell Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0190904224 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 224
Book Description
Why Delegate? moves beyond the standard economic accounts of delegation to offer a fresh take on a wide variety of issues and shows how essential the act of delegating is to our society. From mundane tasks like choosing a plumber to weightier ones like running a country, the world turns on delegation. We delegate particular tasks to people we believe have more expertise than we do. When it is successful, delegation improves efficiency, expands the range of responsible actors, and even increases happiness. When delegation fails, though, it brings conflict, corruption, and an absence of accountability. In Why Delegate?, Neil J. Mitchell investigates the incentives to delegate and the risks we take in doing so. He demonstrates how a new, modified understanding of the simple structure of the delegation relationship-the principal-agent relationship, as economists have described it-simplifies a myriad of important and seemingly disparate problems in private and public life. Using real-world case studies including child abuse in the Catholic Church, the Volkswagen pollution scandal, and FIFA corruption, Mitchell illustrates the broad functionality of delegation logic and the wide range of incentives at work in these relationships. Diverse examples reveal the opportunism of both the leaders and the led and show how accepted accounts of the principal-agent relationship are incomplete. By drawing on multidisciplinary research to address complex questions of motivation, control, responsibility, and accountability, the book builds a broader, more useful logic of delegation. Why Delegate? moves beyond the standard economic accounts of delegation to offer a fresh take on a wide variety of issues and shows how essential the act of delegating is to our society. Mitchell's comprehensive account of the contexts, causes, and effects of delegation develops a new way to understand both the theory and practice of this critical relationship.
Author: Alec Stone Sweet Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 113576896X Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 257
Book Description
There is a growing interest in delegation to non-majoritarian institutions in Europe, following both the spread of principal-agent theory in political science and law and increasing delegation in practice. During the 1980s and 1990s, governments and parliaments in West European nations have delegated powers and functions to non-majoritarian bodies - the EU, independent central banks, constitutional courts and independent regulatory agencies. Whereas elected policymakers had been increasing their roles over several decades, delegation involves a remarkable reversal or at least transformation of their position. This volume examines key issues about the politics of delegation: how and why delegation has taken place; the institutional design of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions; the consequences of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions; the legitimacy of non-majoritarian institutions. The book addresses these questions both theoretically and empirically, looking at central areas of political life - central banking, the EU, the increasing role of courts and the establishment and impacts of independent regulatory agencies.
Author: Samuel Kernell Publisher: C Q Press College ISBN: 9780872893535 Category : United States Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This is a shrink-wrapped, discounted packaged for the introduction to American government course. The books included are: Kernell and Jacobson's 'The Logic of American Politics, 3rd ed.'; Kernell and Smith's 'Principles and Practice of American Politics, 3rd ed.'
Author: Matthew Flinders Publisher: OUP Oxford ISBN: 0191570443 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 1008
Book Description
The study of British politics has been reinvigorated in recent years as a generation of new scholars seeks to build-upon a distinct disciplinary heritage while also exploring new empirical territory and finds much support and encouragement from previous generations in forging new grounds in relation to theory and methods. It is in this context that The Oxford Handbook of British Politics has been conceived. The central ambition of the Handbook is not just to illustrate both the breadth and depth of scholarship that is to be found within the field. It also seeks to demonstrate the vibrancy and critical self-reflection that has cultivated a much sharper and engaging, and notably less insular, approach to the terrain it seeks to explore and understand. In this emphasis on critical engagement, disciplinary evolution, and a commitment to shaping rather than re-stating the discipline The Oxford Handbook of British Politics is consciously distinctive. In showcasing the diversity now found in the analysis of British politics, the Handbook is built upon three foundations. The first principle that underpins the volume is a broad understanding of 'the political'. It covers a much broader range of topics, themes and issues than would commonly be found within a book on British politics. This emphasis on an inclusive approach also characterises the second principle that has shaped this collection - namely, diversity in relation to commissioned authors. The final principle focuses on the distinctiveness of the study of British politics. Each chapter seeks to reflect on what is distinctive- both in terms of the empirical nature of the issue of concern, and the theories and methods that have been deployed to unravel the nature and causes of the debate. The result is a unique volume that: draws-upon the intellectual strengths of the study of British politics; reflects the innate diversity and inclusiveness of the discipline; isolates certain distinctive issues and then reflects on their broader international relevance; and finally looks to the future by pointing towards emerging or overlooked areas of research.
Author: Adrienne Héritier Publisher: OUP Oxford ISBN: 0191652644 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 192
Book Description
With each legislative issue, legislators have to decide whether to delegate decision-making to the executive and/or to expert bodies in order to flesh out the details of this legislation, or, alternatively, to spell out all aspects of this decision in legislation proper. The reasons why to delegate have been of prime interest to political science. The debate has concentrated on principal-agent theory to explain why politicians delegate decision-making to bureaucrats, to independent regulatory agencies, and to others actors and how to control these agents. By contrast, Changing Rules of Delegation focuses on these questions: Which actors are empowered by delegation? Are executive actors empowered over legislative actors? How do legislative actors react to the loss of power? What opportunities are there to change the institutional rules governing delegation in order to (re)gain institutional power and, with it influence over policy outcomes? The authors analyze the conditions and processes of change of the rules that delegate decision-making power to the Commission's implementing powers under comitology. Focusing on the role of the European Parliament the authors explain why the Commission, the Council, and increasingly the Parliament, delegated decision-making to the Commission. If they chose delegation, they still have to determine under which institutional rule comitology should operate. These rules, too, distribute power unequally among actors and therefore raise the question of how they came about in the first place and whether and how the "losers" of a rule change seek to alter the rules at a later point in time.
Author: Neil James Mitchell Publisher: ISBN: 9780197565445 Category : Delegation of authority Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
"Why Delegate? investigates the incentives to delegate and the risks that one takes in doing so. From mundane interactions like choosing a plumber to weightier tasks like the running of a country, and from recreational enjoyments to the protection of human rights, the world turns on delegation. Where it is successful, delegation brings efficiency, shared responsibility, and even happiness. Where it is not, it brings conflict, corruption, and an absence of accountability. One may hear of Saudi hit squads loose in Istanbul, rogue software engineers creating pollution scandals at Volkswagen, and individuals at FIFA selling the rights to host the World Cup, but one may question whether these individuals were out of control. One wonders about the chronic indifference of the Catholic Church to child abusers, and why those in charge ignore the misbehavior of security officials and even the war crimes of their soldiers. Is it can't control, or won't control? An understanding of the simple structure of the delegation relationship, more or less as economists have described it, simplifies a myriad of important and seemingly disparate problems in private and public life. Yet in the collision of principal-agent theory with the practice of delegation, there are further important insights to be found where the principal behaves in ways that are unexpected and puzzling to a rational-choice eye. A broader, more descriptively useful logic of delegation offers a fresh take on a wide variety of issues, whether corruption in sports organizations, war crimes, or the church's child abuse scandal"--
Author: Darren G. Hawkins Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 1139458817 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 425
Book Description
Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at international level than at domestic level and, drawing on principal-agent theory, help explain the variations that exist in the extent to which states are willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political masters.
Author: Fabrizio Gilardi Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1134261411 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 280
Book Description
Delegation is an ubiquitous social phenomenon linked to the growing differentiation of modern societies. Delegation is one of several different modes of organisation that exist to make collective action successful, but has been overlooked and under-researched. Using a rational choice institutional analysis and principal agent models, this book brings literature on delegation to bureaucracy, electorate to legislature to government within representative democracy together with literature on new forms of delegation such as non-majoritarian institutions, to provide a more complete and synthetic analysis of delegation in political systems. With a broad and comparative approach, this is an important volume for advanced students, researchers and professionals concerned with delegation in the areas of public policy, public administration and democratic theory.
Author: Torbjorn Bergman Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1136332804 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 186
Book Description
Analyzing the effects of the European Union on national decision-making and the chain of delegation and accountability, the authors look at Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Iceland and Norway. The analyses are based on principal-agent perspective.
Author: D. Roderick Kiewiet
Author: D. Roderick Kiewiet
Author: Neil J. Mitchell
Author: Alec Stone Sweet
Author: Samuel Kernell
Author: Matthew Flinders
Author: Adrienne Héritier
Author: Neil James Mitchell
Author: Darren G. Hawkins
Author: Fabrizio Gilardi
Author: Torbjorn Bergman