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Performance-based Contracting for Health Services in Developing Countries

Performance-based Contracting for Health Services in Developing Countries PDF Author: Benjamin Loevinsohn
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 0821375377
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 226

Book Description
Despite the existence of effective interventions, there are many developing countries which are not on track to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for health. In many countries the delivery of health services is inadequate and one way of improving the situation is to contract with non-state providers. Contracting is a mechanism for a financing entity to procure a defined set of services from a non-state provider. Performance-based contracting is a type of contracting with: (a) a clear set of objectives and indicators; (b) systematic efforts to collect data to judge contractor performance; and (c) some consequences for the contractor, either rewards or sanctions, based on performance. Effective contracting for health services can be facilitated by using a systematic approach, described in this toolkit, that addresses key issues, including how to: 1. have a constructive dialogue with all stakeholders; 2. define the health services in terms of what services are to be delivered, where, the quantity of beneficiaries to be served, equity, and quality of care; 3. design the monitoring and evaluation to judge the performance of contractors; 4. select the contractors in a fair and transparent way; 5. arrange for effective contract management; 6. draft the contract and bidding documents; and 7. carry out the bidding process and successfully manage the contracts. The toolkit also includes a review of 14 evaluated examples of contracting in developing countries which concludes that the current weight of evidence indicates that contracting improves the coverage and quality of services rapidly. The six cases with controlled, before and after evaluations demonstrated large impact with themedian double difference (follow-up minus baseline in the experimental group minus follow-up minus baseline in the control) ranging from 9 to 26 percentage points.

Performance-based Contracting for Health Services in Developing Countries

Performance-based Contracting for Health Services in Developing Countries PDF Author: Benjamin Loevinsohn
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 0821375377
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 226

Book Description
Despite the existence of effective interventions, there are many developing countries which are not on track to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for health. In many countries the delivery of health services is inadequate and one way of improving the situation is to contract with non-state providers. Contracting is a mechanism for a financing entity to procure a defined set of services from a non-state provider. Performance-based contracting is a type of contracting with: (a) a clear set of objectives and indicators; (b) systematic efforts to collect data to judge contractor performance; and (c) some consequences for the contractor, either rewards or sanctions, based on performance. Effective contracting for health services can be facilitated by using a systematic approach, described in this toolkit, that addresses key issues, including how to: 1. have a constructive dialogue with all stakeholders; 2. define the health services in terms of what services are to be delivered, where, the quantity of beneficiaries to be served, equity, and quality of care; 3. design the monitoring and evaluation to judge the performance of contractors; 4. select the contractors in a fair and transparent way; 5. arrange for effective contract management; 6. draft the contract and bidding documents; and 7. carry out the bidding process and successfully manage the contracts. The toolkit also includes a review of 14 evaluated examples of contracting in developing countries which concludes that the current weight of evidence indicates that contracting improves the coverage and quality of services rapidly. The six cases with controlled, before and after evaluations demonstrated large impact with themedian double difference (follow-up minus baseline in the experimental group minus follow-up minus baseline in the control) ranging from 9 to 26 percentage points.

The Design of Incentives for Health Care Providers in Developing Countries

The Design of Incentives for Health Care Providers in Developing Countries PDF Author: Jeffrey S. Hammer
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Medical care
Languages : en
Pages : 22

Book Description
Whatever the theoretical attractiveness of certain policy options, the fact that public employees are people who make independent decisions about their careers and lifestyles can set bounds on how well government agencies can deliver promised services, such as universal health care, including in rural areas. Hammer and Jack examine the design and limitations of incentives for health care providers to serve in rural areas in developing countries. Governments face two problems: it is costly to compensate well-trained urban physicians enough to relocate to rural areas, and it is difficult to ensure quality care when monitoring performance is costly or impossible.

Performance Incentives for Global Health

Performance Incentives for Global Health PDF Author: Rena Eichler
Publisher: CGD Books
ISBN: 1933286296
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 290

Book Description
Health systems in most low-income countries are under-resourced and underused, failing to meet the needs of those who need health care the most. But what if health service providers-or even patients-were rewarded partially on the basis of their performance? Based on a review of experiences to date, the authors of this volume argue that performance incentives have great potential to improve health care for the world's poor. They are one way to use funding dedicated to individual diseases or interventions to strengthen core health system functions. In Part I, Eichler and Levine provide clear guidance about how to design, implement, and evaluate such programs, whether they target health care providers, patients, or both. Part II comprises a set of case studies that examine the use of such incentives to address a range of health conditions and challenges in diverse countries. Performance Incentives for Global Health: Potential and Pitfalls will help policymakers and program managers in developing countries and in the donor community improve health care systems through the strategic use of performance incentives. Book jacket.

The Design of Incentives for Health Care Providers in Developing Countries: Contracts, Competition, and Cost Control

The Design of Incentives for Health Care Providers in Developing Countries: Contracts, Competition, and Cost Control PDF Author: Jeffrey Hammer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Book Description
February 2001 Whatever the theoretical attractiveness of certain policy options, the fact that public employees are people who make independent decisions about their careers and lifestyles can set bounds on how well government agencies can deliver promised services, such as universal health care, including in rural areas. Hammer and Jack examine the design and limitations of incentives for health care providers to serve in rural areas in developing countries. Governments face two problems: it is costly to compensate well-trained urban physicians enough to relocate to rural areas, and it is difficult to ensure quality care when monitoring performance is costly or impossible. The goal of providing universal primary health care has been hard to meet, in part because of the difficulty of staffing rural medical posts with conscientious caregivers. The problem is providing physicians with incentives at a reasonable cost. Governments are often unable to purchase medical services of adequate quality even from civil servants. Using simple microeconomic models of contracts and competition, Hammer and Jack examine questions about: * The design of rural service requirements and options for newly trained physicians. * The impact of local competition on the desirable level of training for new doctors. * The incentive power that can be reasonably expected from explicit contracts. One problem a government faces is choosing how much training to give physicians it wants to send to rural areas. Training is costly, and a physician relocated to the countryside is outside the government's direct control. Should rural doctors face a ceiling on the prices they charge patients? Can it be enforced? Hammer and Jack discuss factors to consider in determining how to pay rural medical workers but conclude that we might have to set realistic bounds on our expectations about delivering certain kinds of services. If we can identify reasons why the best that can be expected is not particularly good, it might lead us to explore entirely different policy systems. Maybe it is too hard to run certain decentralized systems. Maybe we should focus on less ambitious but more readily achievable goals, such as providing basic infrastructure. This paper--a product of Public Economics, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to analyze service delivery in the social sectors. The authors may be contacted at [email protected] or [email protected].

The Design of Incentives for Health Care Providers in Developing Countries

The Design of Incentives for Health Care Providers in Developing Countries PDF Author: Jeffrey S. Hammer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 17

Book Description
Whatever the theoretical attractiveness of certain policy options, the fact that public employees are people who make independent decisions about their careers and lifestyles can set bounds on how well government agencies can deliver promised services, such as universal health care, including in rural areas. Hammer and Jack examine the design and limitations of incentives for health care providers to serve in rural areas in developing countries. Governments face two problems: It is costly to compensate well-trained urban physicians enough to relocate to rural areas, and it is difficult to ensure quality care when monitoring performance is costly or impossible.The goal of providing universal primary health care has been hard to meet, in part because of the difficulty of staffing rural medical posts with conscientious caregivers. The problem is providing physicians with incentives at a reasonable cost. Governments are often unable to purchase medical services of adequate quality even from civil servants. Using simple microeconomic models of contracts and competition, Hammer and Jack examine questions about:The design of rural service requirements and options for newly trained physicians.The impact of local competition on the desirable level of training for new doctors.The incentive power that can be reasonably expected from explicit contracts.One problem a government faces is choosing how much training to give physicians it wants to send to rural areas. Training is costly, and a physician relocated to the countryside is outside the government's direct control. Should rural doctors face a ceiling on the prices they charge patients? Can it be enforced?Hammer and Jack discuss factors to consider in determining how to pay rural medical workers but conclude that we might have to set realistic bounds on our expectations about delivering certain kinds of services. If we can identify reasons why the best that can be expected is not particularly good, it might lead us to explore entirely different policy systems. Maybe it is too hard to run certain decentralized systems. Maybe we should focus on less ambitious but more readily achievable goals, such as providing basic infrastructure.This paper - a product of Public Economics, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to analyze service delivery in the social sectors.

Disease Control Priorities in Developing Countries

Disease Control Priorities in Developing Countries PDF Author: Dean T. Jamison
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 0821361805
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 1449

Book Description
Based on careful analysis of burden of disease and the costs ofinterventions, this second edition of 'Disease Control Priorities in Developing Countries, 2nd edition' highlights achievable priorities; measures progresstoward providing efficient, equitable care; promotes cost-effectiveinterventions to targeted populations; and encourages integrated effortsto optimize health. Nearly 500 experts - scientists, epidemiologists, health economists,academicians, and public health practitioners - from around the worldcontributed to the data sources and methodologies, and identifiedchallenges and priorities, resulting in this integrated, comprehensivereference volume on the state of health in developing countries.

Manual de pago por desempeño

Manual de pago por desempeño PDF Author: György Bèla Fritsche
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 1464801290
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 361

Book Description
Los enfoques de Pago por Desempeño (PPD) se han expandido con rapidez en los países de ingresos bajos y medios en todo el mundo. El número de países ha crecido de 3 en 2006 a 32 en 2013. Los esquemas de PPD están floreciendo y crean una demanda considerable de asistencia técnica a fin de ejecutar estas reformas sanitarias en una forma racional y responsable. Tres pioneros internacionales del PPD se han unido para dar una respuesta a esta demanda internacional. Ellos son: György Fritsche, MD, MSc (Banco Mundial, Washington); Robert Soeters, MD, PhD (SINA Health, La Haya); y Bruno Meessen, MA, PhD (Instituto de Medicina Tropical, Amberes). Su trabajo vuelca sus 40 años de experiencia total en el diseño e implementación de esquemas de PPD en un manual de PPD de vanguardia, dirigido a implementadores y hacedores de políticas. Se unió al equipo Godelieve van Heteren (MD; Erasmus University Rotterdam Global Health Initiative (RGHI)), quien realizó la co-edición a fin de darle al manual consistencia, contenido y formato. Cedric Ndizeye, MD, MPH (MSH, Ruanda), redactó las partes principales del capítulo sobre desarrollo de competencias, y Caryn Bredenkamp, PhD (Banco Mundial, Washington) contribuyó con el capítulo 5 sobre equidad. Actualmente, existe poco conocimiento entre muchos de los que ejecutan reformas sanitarias sobre cómo implementar proyectos piloto de pago por desempeño y cómo ampliarlos a nivel nacional en forma inteligente. En un contexto de gran demanda de un diseño sólido y experiencia en la implementación, y dada la rápida expansión de los programas de Financiación Basada en Resultados, existe una necesidad urgente de desarrollar competencias para el diseño e implementación de programas de FBR. Hasta el momento, ha habido poco interés en combinar las enseñanzas de esas experiencias en un solo volumen y, más aún, en un formato que sirva como guía a los implementadores. Este manual es una respuesta a las preguntas más urgentes sobre programas de FBR del lado de la oferta, del cual el PPD es parte. Este manual estará disponible en una versión on-line, que será actualizada en forma regular, y una versión impresa en 3 idiomas (inglés, francés y español).

Strategic Contracting for Health Systems and Services

Strategic Contracting for Health Systems and Services PDF Author: Eric de Roodenbeke
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351487981
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 631

Book Description
Until the start of the new century, efforts to strengthen health systems focused solely on the public sector and health programs overseen by public bodies. The private sector was sidelined in certain countries and even banned in others. At the same time, some private-sector stakeholders readily adapted themselves to this special situation so as to avoid becoming part of a structured health system.This volume notes profound changes in health care around the world in two areas. The stakeholders involved in the health sector are increasing in number and diversifying as a result of the development of the private sector. They are also responding to a process of democratization and decentralization. These developments have been paralleled by greater functional differentiation. Various stakeholders are increasingly specializing in particular areas of the health system: service delivery, procurement, management, financing, and regulation.The interdependence of health stakeholders becomes more evident along with the increased complexity of delivery systems as these respond to changing demand. There is a compelling need to forge relationships. Such relationships are in fact emerging in developed countries and, more recently, in developing countries. They may be informal, but are increasingly organized and structured.

Performance-Based Financing Toolkit

Performance-Based Financing Toolkit PDF Author: György Bèla Fritsche
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 1464801282
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 361

Book Description
Performance-based financing (PBF) is a comprehensive health systems approach that is expanding in regions around the world. Based on first-hand experience of PBF pioneers, this toolkit provides the state-of-art knowledge, methods, and tools for setting up an effective PBF approach in lower-and middle income settings.

Paying for Performance in Healthcare: Implications for Health System Performance and Accountability

Paying for Performance in Healthcare: Implications for Health System Performance and Accountability PDF Author: Cheryl Cashin
Publisher: McGraw-Hill Education (UK)
ISBN: 0335264395
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 338

Book Description
Health spending continues to grow faster than the economy in most OECD countries. In 2010, the OECD published a study of strategies to increase value for money in health care, in which pay for performance (P4P) was identified as an innovative tool to improve health system efficiency in several OECD countries. However, evidence that P4P increases value for money, boosts quality of processes in health care, or improves health outcomes is limited.This book explores the many questions surrounding P4P such as whether the potential power of P4P has been over-sold, or whether the disappointing results to date are more likely rooted in problems of design and implementation or inadequate monitoring and evaluation. The book also examines the supporting systems and process, in addition to incentives, that are necessary for P4P to improve provider performance and to drive and sustain improvement. The book utilises a substantial set of case studies from 12 OECD countries to shed light on P4P programs in practice.Featuring both high and middle income countries, cases from primary and acute care settings, and a range of both national and pilot programmes, each case study features: Analysis of the design and implementationdecisions, including the role of stakeholders Critical assessment of objectives versus results Examination of the of 'net' impacts, includingpositive spillover effects and unintended consequences The detailed analysis of these 12 case studies together with the rest of this critical text highlight the realities of P4P programs and their potential impact on the performance of health systems in a diversity of settings. As a result, this book provides critical insights into the experience to date with P4P and how this tool may be better leveraged to improve health system performance and accountability. This title is in the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies Series.