Counter-Insurgency Lessons from the French-Algerian War PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Counter-Insurgency Lessons from the French-Algerian War PDF full book. Access full book title Counter-Insurgency Lessons from the French-Algerian War by . Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
The conclusion of World War II saw a number of colonial powers embroiled in counter-insurgency warfare in countries spread around the globe. These conflicts generated a great deal of research and analysis with respect to the critical elements of counter-insurgency warfare. The 1954-1962 French-Algerian War was one such conflict that offers valuable lessons for U.S. planners as they conduct operations in Iraq. There are four important aspects of French strategy that warrant closer examination. First, the French employed superb use of psychological operations at the unit level. Second, they were highly successful at gathering human intelligence. Third, they dispersed their forces through a strategy of quadrillage that separated the insurgents from the local population. Fourth, they conducted their operations using a measured response, avoiding reprisals and excessive use of force. This paper first highlights the significant events of the French-Algerian War. It then covers the four lessons mentioned above, analyzing the historical details and discussing salient points of application for U.S. military operations in Iraq. Finally, it concludes with some recommendations for consideration by current military planners. Though incorporation of these four elements will not guarantee military success in Iraq, they have significant applications for U.S. forces as they conduct counter-insurgency operations there. (10 refs.).
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
The conclusion of World War II saw a number of colonial powers embroiled in counter-insurgency warfare in countries spread around the globe. These conflicts generated a great deal of research and analysis with respect to the critical elements of counter-insurgency warfare. The 1954-1962 French-Algerian War was one such conflict that offers valuable lessons for U.S. planners as they conduct operations in Iraq. There are four important aspects of French strategy that warrant closer examination. First, the French employed superb use of psychological operations at the unit level. Second, they were highly successful at gathering human intelligence. Third, they dispersed their forces through a strategy of quadrillage that separated the insurgents from the local population. Fourth, they conducted their operations using a measured response, avoiding reprisals and excessive use of force. This paper first highlights the significant events of the French-Algerian War. It then covers the four lessons mentioned above, analyzing the historical details and discussing salient points of application for U.S. military operations in Iraq. Finally, it concludes with some recommendations for consideration by current military planners. Though incorporation of these four elements will not guarantee military success in Iraq, they have significant applications for U.S. forces as they conduct counter-insurgency operations there. (10 refs.).
Author: Major Hervé Pierre Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing ISBN: 178625347X Category : History Languages : en Pages : 66
Book Description
If in a short-term perspective the battle of Algiers was an operational success since the terrorist attacks ended by the of fall 1957, the different methods used to gather intelligence proved to be strategically counterproductive and left an open wound on the French Society. In 1956, both internal and international political situations favored the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). In August, during a clandestine meeting in the Soummam valley (Kabylie), the FLN decided to direct the fighting against the European population in urban areas. Such an intensification of the conflict was aimed at winning a decisive battle: bringing the terror to Algiers was perceived as the last step before the independence. Facing a paralysis of regular courses of action, the French reacted to the terrorist wave by giving the military extraordinary police powers. Jacques Massu’s 10th Para Division implemented radical methods. From 20 January to 31 March 1957, it succeeded in disorganizing the whole insurgency (first battle). However, the tactical victory against terrorism was as blatant as it proved to be short-lived. Facing a resuming tactical threat, General Massu entrusted Colonel Yves Godard with the AOR of Algiers (second battle). If the first battle was fought using bloody swords, the second one, based on infiltration and disinformation operations, proved to be a surgical operation using scalpels. On 8 October 1957, the battle of Algiers ended. In a blurred conflict that belonged neither to police operations nor to conventional war, the legal black hole ineluctably led to the temptation of committing illegal acts. Paul Aussarresses and Yves Godard embodied the two opposite approaches that are distinguishable during the battle. Pushing the justification of illegal violence to the limit, Aussarresses represents the dark face of COIN operations while Godard repeatedly stated that there was no need to use torture.
Author: Major Michael J. Lackman Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing ISBN: 1782895124 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 69
Book Description
Military historical case studies provide insight for military planners. Military planners cannot afford to ignore history when planning in today’s complex environment. This thesis analyzes military doctrinal changes and adaptation during Britain’s Boer War and the French counterinsurgency war in Algeria. The Boer War serves as an example of doctrinal change during a counterinsurgency campaign. The French experience demonstrates the difficult task of fighting against an ambiguous enemy who uses terrorism as its primary tactic. A counterinsurgency comparison and analysis focuses on three issues present in both case studies: population control measures, operational tactics, and the civil military operations. The conclusion offers solutions to the military situation today based on the British and French counterinsurgency. This thesis argues history provides US military planners with the background to develop a successful counterinsurgency strategy for today’s environment.
Author: David Galula Publisher: Rand Corporation ISBN: 0833041088 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 325
Book Description
When Algerian nationalists launched a rebellion against French rule in November 1954, France was forced to cope with a varied and adaptable Algerian strategy. In this volume, originally published in 1963, David Galula reconstructs the story of his highly successful command at the height of the rebellion. This groundbreaking work, with a new foreword by Bruce Hoffman, remains relevant to present-day counterinsurgency operations.
Author: Beatrice Heuser Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 1107135044 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 399
Book Description
A study of the evolving 'national styles' of conducting insurgencies and counter-insurgency, as influenced by transnational trends, ideas and practices.
Author: Martin S. Alexander Publisher: Springer ISBN: 0230500951 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 273
Book Description
The Algerian War 1954-62 was one of the most prolonged and violent examples of decolonization. At times horribly savage, it was an undeclared war in the sense that no formal declaration of hostilities was ever made. Bringing to an end one hundred and thirty two years of French rule, the Algerian struggle caused the fall of six French prime ministers, the collapse of the Fourth Republic and expulsion of one million French settlers. This volume, bringing together leading experts in the field, focuses on one of the key actors in the drama - the French army. They show that the Algerian War was just as much about conflicts of ideas, beliefs and loyalties as it was about simple military operations. In this way, the collection goes beyond polemic and recrimination to explore the many and varied nuances of what was one of the historically most important of the grand style colonial wars.
Author: Assistant Professor Terrence G Peterson Publisher: ISBN: 9781501776960 Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Revolutionary Warfare investigates how efforts to counter a revolution could also be revolutionary. The Algerian War fractured the French Empire, destroyed the legitimacy of colonial rule, and helped launch the Third Worldist movement for the liberation of the Global South. By tracing how French generals, officers, and civil officials sought to counter Algerian independence with their own project of radical social transformation, Terrence G. Peterson reveals that the conflict also helped to transform the nature of modern warfare. The French war effort was never defined solely by repression. As Terrence G. Peterson details, it also sought to fashion new forms of surveillance and social control that could capture the loyalty of Algerians and transform Algerian society. Hygiene and medical aid efforts, youth sports and education programs, and psychological warfare campaigns all attempted to remake Algerian social structures and bind them more closely to the French state. In tracing the emergence of such programs, Peterson reframes the French war effort as a project of armed social reform that sought not to preserve colonial rule unchanged, but to revolutionize it in order to preserve it against the global challenges of decolonization. Revolutionary Warfare demonstrates how French officers' efforts to transform warfare into an exercise in social engineering not only shaped how the Algerian War unfolded from its earliest months, but also helped to forge a paradigm of warfare that dominated strategic thinking during the Cold War and after: counterinsurgency.
Author: Martin S. Alexander Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1135317100 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 176
Book Description
The French Army's war in Algeria has always aroused passions. This book does not whitewash the atrocities committed by both sides; rather it focuses on the conflict itself, a perspective assisted by the French republic's official admission in 1999 that what happened in Algeria was indeed a war.
Author: 
Author: 
Author: Major Hervé Pierre
Author: Roger Trinquier
Author: Paul X. Kelley
Author: Major Michael J. Lackman
Author: David Galula
Author: Beatrice Heuser
Author: Martin S. Alexander
Author: Assistant Professor Terrence G Peterson
Author: Martin S. Alexander