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Author: Major Hervé Pierre Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing ISBN: 178625347X Category : History Languages : en Pages : 66
Book Description
If in a short-term perspective the battle of Algiers was an operational success since the terrorist attacks ended by the of fall 1957, the different methods used to gather intelligence proved to be strategically counterproductive and left an open wound on the French Society. In 1956, both internal and international political situations favored the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). In August, during a clandestine meeting in the Soummam valley (Kabylie), the FLN decided to direct the fighting against the European population in urban areas. Such an intensification of the conflict was aimed at winning a decisive battle: bringing the terror to Algiers was perceived as the last step before the independence. Facing a paralysis of regular courses of action, the French reacted to the terrorist wave by giving the military extraordinary police powers. Jacques Massu’s 10th Para Division implemented radical methods. From 20 January to 31 March 1957, it succeeded in disorganizing the whole insurgency (first battle). However, the tactical victory against terrorism was as blatant as it proved to be short-lived. Facing a resuming tactical threat, General Massu entrusted Colonel Yves Godard with the AOR of Algiers (second battle). If the first battle was fought using bloody swords, the second one, based on infiltration and disinformation operations, proved to be a surgical operation using scalpels. On 8 October 1957, the battle of Algiers ended. In a blurred conflict that belonged neither to police operations nor to conventional war, the legal black hole ineluctably led to the temptation of committing illegal acts. Paul Aussarresses and Yves Godard embodied the two opposite approaches that are distinguishable during the battle. Pushing the justification of illegal violence to the limit, Aussarresses represents the dark face of COIN operations while Godard repeatedly stated that there was no need to use torture.
Author: Major Hervé Pierre Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing ISBN: 178625347X Category : History Languages : en Pages : 66
Book Description
If in a short-term perspective the battle of Algiers was an operational success since the terrorist attacks ended by the of fall 1957, the different methods used to gather intelligence proved to be strategically counterproductive and left an open wound on the French Society. In 1956, both internal and international political situations favored the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). In August, during a clandestine meeting in the Soummam valley (Kabylie), the FLN decided to direct the fighting against the European population in urban areas. Such an intensification of the conflict was aimed at winning a decisive battle: bringing the terror to Algiers was perceived as the last step before the independence. Facing a paralysis of regular courses of action, the French reacted to the terrorist wave by giving the military extraordinary police powers. Jacques Massu’s 10th Para Division implemented radical methods. From 20 January to 31 March 1957, it succeeded in disorganizing the whole insurgency (first battle). However, the tactical victory against terrorism was as blatant as it proved to be short-lived. Facing a resuming tactical threat, General Massu entrusted Colonel Yves Godard with the AOR of Algiers (second battle). If the first battle was fought using bloody swords, the second one, based on infiltration and disinformation operations, proved to be a surgical operation using scalpels. On 8 October 1957, the battle of Algiers ended. In a blurred conflict that belonged neither to police operations nor to conventional war, the legal black hole ineluctably led to the temptation of committing illegal acts. Paul Aussarresses and Yves Godard embodied the two opposite approaches that are distinguishable during the battle. Pushing the justification of illegal violence to the limit, Aussarresses represents the dark face of COIN operations while Godard repeatedly stated that there was no need to use torture.
Author: David J. Clark Publisher: ISBN: Category : Counterinsurgency Languages : en Pages : 32
Book Description
An historical review of counterinsurgency warfare reveals one noteworthy constant -- none has been effectively carried out without a methodology for gathering and disseminating timely and accurate intelligence data, or in today's parlance, "actionable intelligence." Effective counterinsurgency warfare, by its nature, attains greater success through human intelligence vice intelligence gained through national technical means (e.g. signals, imagery, measurement and signature intelligence; SIGINT, IMINT and MASINT, respectively). While the latter disciplines can be used with great strategic effectiveness, the preponderance of data is gained through a counterinsurgency intelligence collection campaign designed to gather, collate, and exploit data to expose insurgency cells for attack. This study will examine the historical record in several noteworthy counterinsurgencies, focusing on coalition or government (including law enforcement) intelligence operations. The purpose of this paper is to mine important strategic lessons and to extrapolate them for current and future counterinsurgency campaigns.
Author: United States. Department of the Army Publisher: ISBN: 9781493006533 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Issued by the Department of the Army, this manual gives instructions on the structure, planning and management of human intelligence operations, the debriefing of soldiers, and the analysis of known relationships and map data. The largest and most updated section of the document details procedures for the screening and interrogation of prisoners of war and unlawful combatants--all of which was revised after the water-boarding controversy.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
The conclusion of World War II saw a number of colonial powers embroiled in counter-insurgency warfare in countries spread around the globe. These conflicts generated a great deal of research and analysis with respect to the critical elements of counter-insurgency warfare. The 1954-1962 French-Algerian War was one such conflict that offers valuable lessons for U.S. planners as they conduct operations in Iraq. There are four important aspects of French strategy that warrant closer examination. First, the French employed superb use of psychological operations at the unit level. Second, they were highly successful at gathering human intelligence. Third, they dispersed their forces through a strategy of quadrillage that separated the insurgents from the local population. Fourth, they conducted their operations using a measured response, avoiding reprisals and excessive use of force. This paper first highlights the significant events of the French-Algerian War. It then covers the four lessons mentioned above, analyzing the historical details and discussing salient points of application for U.S. military operations in Iraq. Finally, it concludes with some recommendations for consideration by current military planners. Though incorporation of these four elements will not guarantee military success in Iraq, they have significant applications for U.S. forces as they conduct counter-insurgency operations there. (10 refs.).
Author: John A. United States Army Publisher: University of Chicago Press ISBN: 0226841529 Category : Technology & Engineering Languages : en Pages : 474
Book Description
When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. It is fair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency. The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. An new introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, places the manual in critical and historical perspective, explaining the significance and potential impact of this revolutionary challenge to conventional U.S. military doctrine. An attempt by our military to redefine itself in the aftermath of 9/11 and the new world of international terrorism, The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual will play a vital role in American military campaigns for years to come. The University of Chicago Press will donate a portion of the proceeds from this book to the Fisher House Foundation, a private-public partnership that supports the families of America’s injured servicemen. To learn more about the Fisher House Foundation, visit www.fisherhouse.org.
Author: Anders McD Sookermany Publisher: Springer ISBN: 9783030272784 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This open access handbook is a major reference work in the field of Military Sciences. Its main purpose is to inform and enlighten those dealing with the military on the role and contributions of science in describing, understanding and explaining military life, knowledge and doings. The handbook provides a comprehensive thematic introduction to various sub-fields of Military Sciences. The handbook serves a broad audience in various capacities; academics studying the military and the broader defense and security sector, students at military and civilian schools preparing for service in the military, the government or other occupations with linkage to the military, professionals in the armed forces, decision makers in government, contractors who work alongside the military, NGOs whose work is influenced by military operations, journalists who write on matters concerning the sphere of the military or others with a particular interest towards the military as a phenomenon, organization or system of various kinds. About the Section EditorsLt. Col. Dr. Anders McD Sookermany, Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo, Norway (Section: Philosophy of Military Sciences)Lt. Col. Dr. Harald Høiback, Norwegian Armed Forces Museums, Oslo, Norway (Section: Military Operations) Dr. Niels Bo Poulsen, Royal Danish Defence College, Copenhagen, Denmark (Section: Military History)Prof. Dr. Patricia M. Shields, Texas State University, San Marcos, USA (Section: Military and Society)Dr. Carsten F. Rønnfeldt, Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo, Norway (Section: International Relations and the Military)Associate Professor David Last, Royal Military College of Canada, Canada (Section: Military Profession)Dr. Irina Goldenberg, Canadian Department of National Defence, Nepean, Canada (Section: Military Behavioural Sciences)Dr. Michael Holenweger, Military Academy at ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland (Section: Military Leadership)Prof. Dr. Martin Elbe, Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, Potsdam, Germany (Section: Military Leadership)Franz Kernic, MILAC at ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland (Section: Military Leadership)Joseph Soeters, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands (Section: Military Management, Economics and Logistics)Prof Margaret Kosal, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USA (Section: Military Technology)Dr. Ben Zweibelson, Joint Special Operations University, Tampa, USA (Section: Military Design)Ms. Aubrey Poe (Section: Military Design)
Author: Jamison Jo Medby Publisher: Rand Corporation ISBN: 0833033751 Category : Technology & Engineering Languages : en Pages : 178
Book Description
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the Army's traditional methodology for finding and analyzing relevant information for its operations, is not effective for tackling the operational and intelligence challenges of urban operations. The authors suggest new ways to categorize the complex terrain, infrastructure, and populations of urban environments and incorporate this information into Army planning and decisionmaking processes.
Author: Vanda Felbab-Brown Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield ISBN: 081570450X Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 292
Book Description
Most policymakers see counterinsurgency and counternarcotics policy as two sides of the same coin. Stop the flow of drug money, the logic goes, and the insurgency will wither away. But the conventional wisdom is dangerously wrongheaded, as Vanda Felbab-Brown argues in Shooting Up. Counternarcotics campaigns, particularly those focused on eradication, typically fail to bankrupt belligerent groups that rely on the drug trade for financing. Worse, they actually strengthen insurgents by increasing their legitimacy and popular support. Felbab-Brown, a leading expert on drug interdiction efforts and counterinsurgency, draws on interviews and fieldwork in some of the world's most dangerous regions to explain how belligerent groups have become involved in drug trafficking and related activities, including kidnapping, extortion, and smuggling. Shooting Up shows vividly how powerful guerrilla and terrorist organizations — including Peru's Shining Path, the FARC and the paramilitaries in Colombia, and the Taliban in Afghanistan — have learned to exploit illicit markets. In addition, the author explores the interaction between insurgent groups and illicit economies in frequently overlooked settings, such as Northern Ireland, Turkey, and Burma. While aggressive efforts to suppress the drug trade typically backfire, Shooting Up shows that a laissez-faire policy toward illicit crop cultivation can reduce support for the belligerents and, critically, increase cooperation with government intelligence gathering. When combined with interdiction targeting major traffickers, this strategy gives policymakers a better chance of winning both the war against the insurgents and the war on drugs.
Author: Us Army Special Operations Command Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform ISBN: 9781975970758 Category : Languages : en Pages : 396
Book Description
From the preface: "The 1966 'Human Factors' edition focused on the contemporary threat of Maoist insurgencies, particularly in Southeast Asia, and also drew extensively on World War II resistance movements in Europe. Much of this information is still relevant and has been retained and integrated. In the post-Cold War world, the most important insurgencies tend to be ethnic and religious. Long-simmering conflicts, sometimes with roots in colonial policies, have become prominent; examples include the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom or ETA) in Spain, the Hutu-Tutsi genocides, the Ushtia �lirimtare e Kosov�s (Kosovo Liberation Army, or KLA), and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). Battle lines in these conflicts are often drawn along ethnic lines, even when land or politics are the immediate issues in contention. The other important new category is extremist religious movements, most prominently Islamic groups, including regional insurgent movements like Hizbollah and Harakat al-Muqawamah al'Isla�miyyah (Islamic Resistance Movement, or HAMAS) and global movements like Al Qaeda. These present a different profile of ideology, organizational forms, and psychology than either Cold War Maoists or post-colonial ethnic insurgencies (although the Palestinian cause could be considered a post-colonial issue). Globalization has also changed underground operations in numerous ways. Insurgencies, enabled by low-cost transportation, Internet based communications, and other information technologies, can more easily recruit, communicate, and operate across borders. It is correspondingly much more difficult to contain an insurgency in a region. Global media has led to development of new tactics, in particular new types of terrorism, designed to capture worldwide attention. Compared with what was available in the 1960s, there are orders of magnitude more academic research available relevant to this study's topics. We were able to draw on more recent work in psychology, political science, economics, sociology, organizational studies, and communications studies. Readers of this edition will, over the course of eleven chapters, get a wide exposure to basic concepts from a number of disciplines".
Author: Major Hervé Pierre
Author: Major Hervé Pierre
Author: David J. Clark
Author: Roger Trinquier
Author: United States. Department of the Army
Author: 
Author: John A. United States Army
Author: Anders McD Sookermany
Author: Jamison Jo Medby
Author: Vanda Felbab-Brown
Author: Us Army Special Operations Command