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Author: Jun Tanimoto Publisher: ISBN: 9789811327704 Category : Engineering economy Languages : en Pages : 221
Book Description
Recent applications of evolutionary game theory in the merging fields of the mathematical and social sciences are brilliantly portrayed in this book, which highlights social physics and shows how the approach can help to quantitatively model complex human-environmental-social systems. First, readers are introduced to the fundamentals of evolutionary game theory. The two-player, two-strategy game, or the 2 × 2 game, is presented as an archetype to help understand the difficulty of cooperating for survival against defection in common social contexts. Subsequently, the book explains the theoretical background of the multi-player, two-strategy game, which may be more widely applicable than the 2 × 2 game for social dilemmas. The latest applications of 2 × 2 games are also discussed to explore how integrated reciprocity mechanisms can solve social dilemmas. In turn, the book describes two practical areas in which evolutionary game theory has been applied. The first concerns traffic flow analysis. In conventional interpretations, traffic flow can be understood by means of fluid dynamics, in which the flow of vehicles is evaluated as a continuum body. Such a simple idea, however, does not work well in reality, particularly if a drivers decision-making process is considered. Various dilemmas involve complex structures that depend primarily on traffic density, a revelation that should help establish a practical solution for reducing traffic congestion. Second, the book provides keen insights into how powerful evolutionary game theory can be in the context of epidemiology. Both approaches, quasi-analytical and multi-agent simulation, can clarify how an infectious disease such as seasonal influenza spreads across a complex social network, which is significantly affected by the public attitude toward vaccination. A methodology is proposed for the optimum design of a public vaccination policy incorporating subsidies to efficiently increase vaccination coverage while mi nimizing the social cost.
Author: Jun Tanimoto Publisher: ISBN: 9789811327704 Category : Engineering economy Languages : en Pages : 221
Book Description
Recent applications of evolutionary game theory in the merging fields of the mathematical and social sciences are brilliantly portrayed in this book, which highlights social physics and shows how the approach can help to quantitatively model complex human-environmental-social systems. First, readers are introduced to the fundamentals of evolutionary game theory. The two-player, two-strategy game, or the 2 × 2 game, is presented as an archetype to help understand the difficulty of cooperating for survival against defection in common social contexts. Subsequently, the book explains the theoretical background of the multi-player, two-strategy game, which may be more widely applicable than the 2 × 2 game for social dilemmas. The latest applications of 2 × 2 games are also discussed to explore how integrated reciprocity mechanisms can solve social dilemmas. In turn, the book describes two practical areas in which evolutionary game theory has been applied. The first concerns traffic flow analysis. In conventional interpretations, traffic flow can be understood by means of fluid dynamics, in which the flow of vehicles is evaluated as a continuum body. Such a simple idea, however, does not work well in reality, particularly if a drivers decision-making process is considered. Various dilemmas involve complex structures that depend primarily on traffic density, a revelation that should help establish a practical solution for reducing traffic congestion. Second, the book provides keen insights into how powerful evolutionary game theory can be in the context of epidemiology. Both approaches, quasi-analytical and multi-agent simulation, can clarify how an infectious disease such as seasonal influenza spreads across a complex social network, which is significantly affected by the public attitude toward vaccination. A methodology is proposed for the optimum design of a public vaccination policy incorporating subsidies to efficiently increase vaccination coverage while mi nimizing the social cost.
Author: Jun Tanimoto Publisher: Springer ISBN: 9811327696 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 221
Book Description
Recent applications of evolutionary game theory in the merging fields of the mathematical and social sciences are brilliantly portrayed in this book, which highlights social physics and shows how the approach can help to quantitatively model complex human–environmental–social systems. First, readers are introduced to the fundamentals of evolutionary game theory. The two-player, two-strategy game, or the 2 × 2 game, is presented as an archetype to help understand the difficulty of cooperating for survival against defection in common social contexts. Subsequently, the book explains the theoretical background of the multi-player, two-strategy game, which may be more widely applicable than the 2 × 2 game for social dilemmas. The latest applications of 2 × 2 games are also discussed to explore how integrated reciprocity mechanisms can solve social dilemmas. In turn, the book describes two practical areas in which evolutionary game theory has been applied. The first concerns traffic flow analysis. In conventional interpretations, traffic flow can be understood by means of fluid dynamics, in which the flow of vehicles is evaluated as a continuum body. Such a simple idea, however, does not work well in reality, particularly if a driver’s decision-making process is considered. Various dilemmas involve complex structures that depend primarily on traffic density, a revelation that should help establish a practical solution for reducing traffic congestion. Second, the book provides keen insights into how powerful evolutionary game theory can be in the context of epidemiology. Both approaches, quasi-analytical and multi-agent simulation, can clarify how an infectious disease such as seasonal influenza spreads across a complex social network, which is significantly affected by the public attitude toward vaccination. A methodology is proposed for the optimum design of a public vaccination policy incorporating subsidies to efficiently increase vaccination coverage while minimizing the social cost.
Author: Jun Tanimoto Publisher: Springer ISBN: 4431549625 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 214
Book Description
This book both summarizes the basic theory of evolutionary games and explains their developing applications, giving special attention to the 2-player, 2-strategy game. This game, usually termed a "2×2 game” in the jargon, has been deemed most important because it makes it possible to posit an archetype framework that can be extended to various applications for engineering, the social sciences, and even pure science fields spanning theoretical biology, physics, economics, politics, and information science. The 2×2 game is in fact one of the hottest issues in the field of statistical physics. The book first shows how the fundamental theory of the 2×2 game, based on so-called replicator dynamics, highlights its potential relation with nonlinear dynamical systems. This analytical approach implies that there is a gap between theoretical and reality-based prognoses observed in social systems of humans as well as in those of animal species. The book explains that this perceived gap is the result of an underlying reciprocity mechanism called social viscosity. As a second major point, the book puts a sharp focus on network reciprocity, one of the five fundamental mechanisms for adding social viscosity to a system and one that has been a great concern for study by statistical physicists in the past decade. The book explains how network reciprocity works for emerging cooperation, and readers can clearly understand the existence of substantial mechanics when the term "network reciprocity" is used. In the latter part of the book, readers will find several interesting examples in which evolutionary game theory is applied. One such example is traffic flow analysis. Traffic flow is one of the subjects that fluid dynamics can deal with, although flowing objects do not comprise a pure fluid but, rather, are a set of many particles. Applying the framework of evolutionary games to realistic traffic flows, the book reveals that social dilemma structures lie behind traffic flow.
Author: Daniel Friedman Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0199981167 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 320
Book Description
Over the last 25 years, evolutionary game theory has grown with theoretical contributions from the disciplines of mathematics, economics, computer science and biology. It is now ripe for applications. In this book, Daniel Friedman---an economist trained in mathematics---and Barry Sinervo---a biologist trained in mathematics---offer the first unified account of evolutionary game theory aimed at applied researchers. They show how to use a single set of tools to build useful models for three different worlds: the natural world studied by biologists; the social world studied by anthropologists, economists, political scientists and others; and the virtual world built by computer scientists and engineers. The first six chapters offer an accessible introduction to core concepts of evolutionary game theory. These include fitness, replicator dynamics, sexual dynamics, memes and genes, single and multiple population games, Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable states, noisy best response and other adaptive processes, the Price equation, and cellular automata. The material connects evolutionary game theory with classic population genetic models, and also with classical game theory. Notably, these chapters also show how to estimate payoff and choice parameters from the data. The last eight chapters present exemplary game theory applications. These include a new coevolutionary predator-prey learning model extending rock-paper-scissors; models that use human subject laboratory data to estimate learning dynamics; new approaches to plastic strategies and life cycle strategies, including estimates for male elephant seals; a comparison of machine learning techniques for preserving diversity to those seen in the natural world; analyses of congestion in traffic networks (either internet or highways) and the "price of anarchy"; environmental and trade policy analysis based on evolutionary games; the evolution of cooperation; and speciation. As an aid for instruction, a web site provides downloadable computational tools written in the R programming language, Matlab, Mathematica and Excel.
Author: Josef Hofbauer Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 9780521625708 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 356
Book Description
Every form of behaviour is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of evolution. Since the work of Maynard Smith and others, it has been realised how game theory can model this process. Evolutionary game theory replaces the static solutions of classical game theory by a dynamical approach centred not on the concept of rational players but on the population dynamics of behavioural programmes. In this book the authors investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the self-regulation of social and economic behaviour, and of the closely related interactions between species in ecological communities. Replicator equations describe how successful strategies spread and thereby create new conditions which can alter the basis of their success, i.e. to enable us to understand the strategic and genetic foundations of the endless chronicle of invasions and extinctions which punctuate evolution. In short, evolutionary game theory describes when to escalate a conflict, how to elicit cooperation, why to expect a balance of the sexes, and how to understand natural selection in mathematical terms.
Author: Eric Smith Publisher: ISBN: 9780750311397 Category : Electronic books Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Evolutionary game theory has the potential to provide an integrated framework to model many aspects of evolution, development, and ecology. The reliable use of game models, however, requires an understanding of their behaviour when the number of players becomes very large, resulting in the emergence of thermodynamic limits. This behaviour is controlled by the symmetries that characterize the game, and the approach to the thermodynamic limit is governed by collective fluctuations in the actions of the players. In this book, the authors present methods to derive large-deviations limits for population processes, and apply these to game models illustrating the many roles of symmetry and collective fluctuations in evolutionary dynamics.
Author: Larry Samuelson Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 9780262692199 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 332
Book Description
The author examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.
Author: Jun Tanimoto Publisher: Springer Nature ISBN: 9813364815 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 289
Book Description
This book presents the fundamentals of evolutionary game theory and applies them to the analysis of epidemics, which is of paramount importance in the aftermath of the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic. The primary objective of this monograph is to deliver a powerful tool to model and analyze the spread of an infectious disease during a pandemic as well as the human decision dynamics. The book employs a variant of the “vaccination game,” in which a mathematical epidemiological model dovetails with evolutionary game theory. From a social physics standpoint, this book introduces an extended concept of the vaccination game starting from the fundamental issues and touching on the newest practical applications. The book first outlines the fundamental basis of evolutionary game theory, in which a two-player and two-strategy game, the so-called 2 × 2 game, and a multi-player game are concisely introduced, and the important issue of how social dilemmas are quantified is highlighted. Subsequently, the book discusses various recent applications of the extended concept of the vaccination game so as to quantitatively evaluate provisions other than vaccination, including practical intermediate protective measures such as mask-wearing, efficiency of quarantine compared with that of isolation policies for suppressing epidemics, efficiency of preemptive versus late vaccination, and optimal subsidy policies for vaccination.
Author: Ross Cressman Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 9780262033053 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 346
Book Description
Evolutionary game theory attempts to predict individual behavior (whether of humans or other species) when interactions between individuals are modeled as a noncooperative game. Most dynamic analyses of evolutionary games are based on their normal forms, despite the fact that many interesting games are specified more naturally through their extensive forms. Because every extensive form game has a normal form representation, some theorists hold that the best way to analyze an extensive form game is simply to ignore the extensive form structure and study the game in its normal form representation. This book rejects that suggestion, arguing that a game's normal form representation often omits essential information from the perspective of dynamic evolutionary game theory.
Author: Marco Alberto Javarone Publisher: Springer ISBN: 331970205X Category : Science Languages : en Pages : 74
Book Description
This book presents an introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) which is an emerging field in the area of complex systems attracting the attention of researchers from disparate scientific communities. EGT allows one to represent and study several complex phenomena, such as the emergence of cooperation in social systems, the role of conformity in shaping the equilibrium of a population, and the dynamics in biological and ecological systems.Since EGT models belong to the area of complex systems, statistical physics constitutes a fundamental ingredient for investigating their behavior. At the same time, the complexity of some EGT models, such as those realized by means of agent-based methods, often require the implementation of numerical simulations. Therefore, beyond providing an introduction to EGT, this book gives a brief overview of the main statistical physics tools (such as phase transitions and the Ising model) and computational strategies for simulating evolutionary games (such as Monte Carlo algorithms on lattices). This book will appeal to students and researchers in this burgeoning field of complex systems.
Author: Jun Tanimoto
Author: Jun Tanimoto
Author: Jun Tanimoto
Author: Jun Tanimoto
Author: Daniel Friedman
Author: Josef Hofbauer
Author: Eric Smith
Author: Larry Samuelson
Author: Jun Tanimoto
Author: Ross Cressman
Author: Marco Alberto Javarone