Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria PDF Download

Author: Eric van Damme
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 364296978X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 331

View

Book Description
The last decade has seen a steady increase in the application of concepts from noncooperative game theory to such diverse fields as economics, political science, law, operations research, biology and social psychology. As a byproduct of this increased activity, there has been a growing awareness of the fact that the basic noncooperative solution concept, that of Nash equilibrium, suffers from severe drawbacks. The two main shortcomings of this concept are the following: (i) In extensive form games, a Nash strategy may prescribe off the equilibrium path behavior that is manifestly irrational. (Specifically, Nash equilibria may involve incredible threats), (ii) Nash equilibria need not be robust with respect to small perturbations in the data of the game. Confronted with the growing evidence to the detriment of the Nash concept, game theorists were prompted to search for more refined equilibrium notions with better properties and they have come up with a wide array of alternative solution concepts. This book surveys the most important refinements that have been introduced. Its objectives are fourfold (i) to illustrate desirable properties as well as drawbacks of the various equilibrium notions by means of simple specific examples, (ii) to study the relationships between the various refinements, (iii) to derive simplifying characterizations, and (iv) to discuss the plausibility of the assumptions underlying the concepts.

Author: Eric van Damme
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642582427
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 354

View

Book Description
I have been pleased with the favourable reception of the first edition of this book and I am grateful to have the opportunity to prepare this second edition. In this revised and enlarged edition I corrected some misprints and errors that occurred in the first edition (fortunately I didn't find too many) and I added a large number of notes that give the reader an impression of what kind of results have been obtained since the first edition was printed and that give an indication of the direction the subject is taking. Many of the notes discuss (or refer to papers discussing) applications of the refinements that are considered. Of course, it is the quantity and the quality of the insights and the applications that lend the refinements their validity. Although the guide to the applications is far from complete, the notes certainly allow the reader to form a good judgement of which refinements have really yielded new insights. Hence, as in the first edition, I will refrain from speculating on which refinements of Nash equilibria will survive in the long run. To defend this position let me also cite Binmore [1990] who compares writing about refinements to the Herculean task of defeating the nine-headed Hydra which grew too heads for each that was struck off. It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to thank my secretary, Marjoleine de Wit, who skilfully and, as always, cheerfully typed the manuscript and did the proofreading.

Author: Guilherme Carmona
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814390658
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 153

View

Book Description
The book aims at describing the recent developments in the existence and stability of Nash equilibrium. The two topics are central to game theory and economics and have been extensively researched. Recent results on existence and stability of Nash equilibrium are scattered and the relationship between them has not been explained clearly. The book will make these results easily accessible and understandable to researchers in the field. Book jacket.

Author: E. van Damme
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642499708
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 161

View

Book Description
In this monograph, noncooperative games are studied. Since in a noncooperative game binding agreements are not possible, the solution of such a game has to be self enforcing, i. e. a Nash equilibrium (NASH [1950,1951J). In general, however, a game may possess many equilibria and so the problem arises which one of these should be chosen as the solution. It was first pointed out explicitly in SELTEN [1965J that I not all Nash equilibria of an extensive form game are qualified to be selected as the solution, since an equilibrium may prescribe irrational behavior at unreached parts of the game tree. Moreover, also for normal form games not all Nash equilibria are eligible, since an equilibrium need not be robust with respect to slight perturba tions in the data of the game. These observations lead to the conclusion that the Nash equilibrium concept has to be refined in order to obtain sensible solutions for every game. In the monograph, various refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept are studied. Some of these have been proposed in the literature, but others are presented here for the first time. The objective is to study the relations between these refine ments;to derive characterizations and to discuss the underlying assumptions. The greater part of the monograph (the chapters 2-5) is devoted to the study of normal form games. Extensive form games are considered in chapter 6.

Author: John Eatwell
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1349201812
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 275

View

Book Description
This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. It concentrates on the topic of game theory.

Author: Larry Samuelson
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262692199
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 332

View

Book Description
The author examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.

Author: Martin J. Osborne
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262650403
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 374

View

Book Description
A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.

Author: Econometric Society. World Congress
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521484596
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 342

View

Book Description
This book gives the reader a unique survey of advances in economic theory.

Author: John C. Harsanyi
Publisher: Mit Press
ISBN: 9780262582384
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378

View

Book Description
The authors, two of the most prominent game theorists of this generation, have devoted a number of years to the development of the theory presented here, and to its economic applications. They propose rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfect equilibrium point as the solution of any noncooperative game. And, because any cooperative game can be remodelled as a noncooperative bargaining game, their theory defines a one-point solution for any cooperative game as well.By providing solutions - based on the same principles of rational behavior - for all classes of games, both cooperative and noncooperative, both those with complete and with incomplete information, Harsanyi and Selten's approach achieves a remarkable degree of theoretical unification for game theory as a whole and provides a deeper insight into the nature of game-theoretic rationality.The book applies this theory to a number of specific game classes, such as unanimity games; bargaining with transaction costs; trade involving one seller and several buyers; two-person bargaining with incomplete information on one side, and on both sides. The last chapter discusses the relationship of the authors' theory to other recently proposed solution concepts, particularly the Kohberg-Mertens stability theory.John C. Harsanyi is Flood Research Professor in Business Administration and Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley. Reinhard Selten is Professor of Economics Institute of Social and Economic Sciences: University of Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany.

Author: Angelo Geraci
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030624765
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 150

View

Book Description
This open access book presents thirteen outstanding doctoral dissertations in Information Technology from the Department of Electronics, Information and Bioengineering, Politecnico di Milano, Italy. Information Technology has always been highly interdisciplinary, as many aspects have to be considered in IT systems. The doctoral studies program in IT at Politecnico di Milano emphasizes this interdisciplinary nature, which is becoming more and more important in recent technological advances, in collaborative projects, and in the education of young researchers. Accordingly, the focus of advanced research is on pursuing a rigorous approach to specific research topics starting from a broad background in various areas of Information Technology, especially Computer Science and Engineering, Electronics, Systems and Control, and Telecommunications. Each year, more than 50 PhDs graduate from the program. This book gathers the outcomes of the thirteen best theses defended in 2019-20 and selected for the IT PhD Award. Each of the authors provides a chapter summarizing his/her findings, including an introduction, description of methods, main achievements and future work on the topic. Hence, the book provides a cutting-edge overview of the latest research trends in Information Technology at Politecnico di Milano, presented in an easy-to-read format that will also appeal to non-specialists.