Author: Douglas J. MacEachinPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Intelligence service
Languages : en
Pages : 228
Book Description
US Intelligence and the Polish Crisis
Author: Douglas J. MacEachinPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Intelligence service
Languages : en
Pages : 228
Book Description
United States Intelligence and the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981
Author: Douglas J. MacEachinPublisher:
ISBN: 9780160617294
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 223
Book Description
US Intelligence and the Polish Crisis
Author: Douglas J. MacEachinPublisher:
ISBN: 9781929667062
Category : Intelligence service
Languages : en
Pages : 211
Book Description
US Intelligence and the Polish Crisis
Author: J. Douglas MaceachinPublisher:
ISBN: 9781839310959
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 224
Book Description
U. S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland, 1980-1981
Author: Douglas J. MacEachinPublisher: Penn State Press
ISBN: 9780271046525
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 268
Book Description
Despite the U.S. government's sophisticated intelligence capabilities, policy makers repeatedly seemed to be caught off guard when major crises took place during the Cold War. Were these surprises the result of inadequate information, or rather the use made of the information available? In seeking an answer to this question, former CIA analyst Douglas MacEachin carefully examines the crisis in Poland during 1980-81 to determine what information the U.S. government had about Soviet preparations for military intervention and the Polish regime's plans for martial law, and what prevented that information from being effectively employed Drawing on his experience in intelligence reporting at the time, as well as on recently declassified U.S. documents and materials from Soviet, Polish, and other Eastern European archives, MacEachin contrasts what was known then with what is known now, and seeks to explain why, despite the evidence available to them, U.S. policy makers did not take the threat of a crackdown seriously enough to prevent it. It was the mind-set of those who processed the information, not the lack or accuracy of information, that was the fundamental problem, MacEachin argues. By highlighting this cognitive obstacle, his analysis points the way toward developing practices to overcome it in the future.
US Intelligence and the Polish Crisis
Author: J. Douglas MaceachinPublisher: www.Militarybookshop.CompanyUK
ISBN: 9781780393766
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 224
Book Description
From Solidarity to Martial Law
Author: Andrzej PaczkowskiPublisher: Central European University Press
ISBN: 9789637326967
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 604
Book Description
Presents 95 documents on the months between Au. 1980 when Solidarity was founded and Dec. 1981 when Polish authorities declared martial law and crushed the opposition movement.
U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland, 1980-81
Author: Douglas J. MacEachinPublisher: Penn State University Press
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 280
Book Description
Despite the U.S. government's sophisticated intelligence capabilities, policy makers repeatedly seemed to be caught off guard when major crises took place during the Cold War. Were these surprises the result of inadequate information, or rather the use made of the information available? In seeking an answer to this question, former CIA analyst Douglas MacEachin carefully examines the crisis in Poland during 1980-81 to determine what information the U.S. government had about Soviet preparations for military intervention and the Polish regime's plans for martial law, and what prevented that information from being effectively employed Drawing on his experience in intelligence reporting at the time, as well as on recently declassified U.S. documents and materials from Soviet, Polish, and other Eastern European archives, MacEachin contrasts what was known then with what is known now, and seeks to explain why, despite the evidence available to them, U.S. policy makers did not take the threat of a crackdown seriously enough to prevent it. It was the mind-set of those who processed the information, not the lack or accuracy of information, that was the fundamental problem, MacEachin argues. By highlighting this cognitive obstacle, his analysis points the way toward developing practices to overcome it in the future.
Preparing for Martial Law
Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cold War
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
Between July 1980 and December 1981, Poland stumbled through the most serious political crisis faced by a Warsaw Pact member since the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The resolution of this crisis through the declaration of martial law by the Polish authorities provided only a temporary respite. The rise and suppression of the trade union Solidarity, followed by the inability of Polish communist authorities to restore political credibility or economic activity, were key developments that created the conditions that led to the eventual collapse of the Warsaw Pact by the end of the decade. In 1972, Ryszard Kuklinski, a senior officer on the Polish General Staff, volunteered his services to the United States at a time of increased friction between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World. During the Polish crisis, from the initial outbreak of labor unrest in July 1980, until the declaration of martial law in December 1981, Col. Kuklinski provided periodic reporting and commentary on the chaotic progression of events. He focused on the increasing refinement of the plans for introducing martial law, the internal political debates surrounding these preparations, and the almost constant pressure from Moscow for the Poles "to do something" to contain and destroy Solidarity.
Preparing for Martial Law: Through the Eyes of Col. Ryszard Kuklinski
Author: Central Intelligence AgencyPublisher: Independently Published
ISBN: 9781090423924
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 40
Book Description
Between July 1980 and December 13, 1981, Poland stumbled through the most serious political crisis faced by a Warsaw Pact member since the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The resolution of this crisis through the declaration of martial law by the Polish authorities provided only a temporary respite. The rise and suppression of the trade union Solidarity, followed by the inability of Polish communist authorities to restore political credibility or economic activity, were key developments that created the conditions that led to the eventual collapse of the Warsaw Pact by the end of the decade. On one side was a Polish society deeply disenchanted with its political system and the mismanagement of its economy that resulted in increased deprivation in the late 1970's. Initial strikes in July and August 1980 protesting relatively mild increases in meat prices escalated as workers vowed not to accept near-term promises by the authorities. For the first time in post-war Poland, workers were joined by intellectuals bent on changing the broader political system. The meteoric and chaotic rise of Solidarity resulted in a mass movement with increasing determination to pursue fundamental change. Facing this unprecedented development was a communist party apparatus with limited support, even from its members, and one that was lulled into lethargy by the vain hope of restoring calm with the time-tested tactic of buying off the opposition. Senior political and military authorities were averse to using force in the early months because of the memories of the deaths of shipyard workers during the uprisings in the Gdansk shipyards in December 1970. As events spiraled out of control during the 18 months of the crisis, powers that be engaged in lengthy discussions of whether, when, and how Polish authorities could impose order through martial law. This discussion was strongly influenced by the hard line taken by Soviet political and military leaders who continually and arrogantly pushed Polish authorities to immediately resort to force. Soviet officials not so subtly tried to intimidate Polish authorities by implying that they would use both their own forces in addition to other Warsaw Pact forces to restore order (if necessary). Partly out of consideration for self-preservation and partly as a result of intense Soviet pressure, Polish authorities slowly and sometimes grudgingly proceeded with operational planning to introduce martial law. These plans, including all the required legal documentation, were essentially completed by the fall of 1981. In 1972, Ryszard Kuklinski, a senior officer on the Polish General Staff, volunteered his services to the United States at a time of increased friction between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World. Over the coming years, Kuklinski provided the CIA with thousands of pieces of key information regarding the Warsaw Pact. During the Polish crisis he continued to provide such information and also provided information and commentary regarding internal Polish developments and Soviet pressures.