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Author: Robert A. Katzmann Publisher: Brookings Institution Press ISBN: 9780815707332 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 192
Book Description
What role should the Senate play in the selection and confirmation of judges? What criteria are appropriate in evaluating nominees? What kinds of questions and answers are appropriate in confirmation hearings? How do judges interpret laws enacted by Congress, and what problems do they face? And what kinds of communications are proper between judges and legislators? These questions go to the heart of the relationship between the federal judiciary and Congress—a relationship that critically shapes the administration of justice. The judiciary needs an environment respectful of its mission; and the legislative branch seeks a judicial system that faithfully construes its laws and efficiently discharges justice. But the judicial-congressional relationship is hindered by an array of issues, including an ever-rising judicial caseload, federalization of the law, resource constraints, concerns about the confirmation process, increasing legislative scrutiny of judicial decisionmaking and the administration of justice, and debates about how the courts should interpret legislation. Drawing on the world of scholarship and from personal experience, Robert A. Katzmann examines governance in judicial-congressional relations. After identifying problems, he offers ways to improve understanding between the two branches. Copublished with the Governance Institute
Author: Robert A. Katzmann Publisher: Brookings Institution Press ISBN: 9780815707332 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 192
Book Description
What role should the Senate play in the selection and confirmation of judges? What criteria are appropriate in evaluating nominees? What kinds of questions and answers are appropriate in confirmation hearings? How do judges interpret laws enacted by Congress, and what problems do they face? And what kinds of communications are proper between judges and legislators? These questions go to the heart of the relationship between the federal judiciary and Congress—a relationship that critically shapes the administration of justice. The judiciary needs an environment respectful of its mission; and the legislative branch seeks a judicial system that faithfully construes its laws and efficiently discharges justice. But the judicial-congressional relationship is hindered by an array of issues, including an ever-rising judicial caseload, federalization of the law, resource constraints, concerns about the confirmation process, increasing legislative scrutiny of judicial decisionmaking and the administration of justice, and debates about how the courts should interpret legislation. Drawing on the world of scholarship and from personal experience, Robert A. Katzmann examines governance in judicial-congressional relations. After identifying problems, he offers ways to improve understanding between the two branches. Copublished with the Governance Institute
Author: Edward Keynes Publisher: ISBN: Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 432
Book Description
Since the early 1960s the Supreme Court and its congressional critics have been locked in a continuing dispute over the issues of school prayer, busing, and abortion. Although for years the Court's congressional foes have introduced legislation designed to curb the powers of the federal courts in these areas, they have until now failed to enact such proposals. It is likely that these legislative efforts and the present confrontation with the Court will continue. Edward Keynes and Randall Miller argue that Congress lacks the constitutional power to legislate away the powers of the federal courts and to prevent individuals from seeking redress for presumed infringements of their constitutional rights in these areas. They demonstrate that neither the framers nor ratifiers of the Constitution intended the Congress to exercise plenary power over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Throughout its history the Court has never conceded unlimited powers to Congress; and until the late 1950s Congress had not attempted to gerrymander the Court's jurisdiction in response to specific decisions. But the authors contend this is just what the sponsors of recent legislative attacks on the Court intend, and they see such efforts as threatening the Court's independence and authority as defined in the separation of powers clauses of the Constitution.
Author: Charles Gardner Geyh Publisher: University of Michigan Press ISBN: 0472024566 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 345
Book Description
"This is quite simply the best study of judicial independence that I have ever read; it is erudite, historically aware, and politically astute." ---Malcolm M. Feeley, Claire Sanders Clements Dean's Professor, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley "Professor Geyh has written a wise and timely book that is informed by the author's broad and deep experience working with the judicial and legislative branches, by the insights of law, history and political science, and by an appreciation of theory and common sense." ---Stephen B. Burbank, David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law School With Congress threatening to "go nuclear" over judicial appointments, and lawmakers accusing judges of being "arrogant, out of control, and unaccountable," many pundits see a dim future for the autonomy of America's courts. But do we really understand the balance between judicial independence and Congress's desire to limit judicial reach? Charles Geyh's When Courts and Congress Collide is the most sweeping study of this question to date, and an unprecedented analysis of the relationship between Congress and our federal courts. Efforts to check the power of the courts have come and gone throughout American history, from the Jeffersonian Congress's struggle to undo the work of the Federalists, to FDR's campaign to pack the Supreme Court, to the epic Senate battles over the Bork and Thomas nominations. If legislators were solely concerned with curbing the courts, Geyh suggests, they would use direct means, such as impeaching uncooperative judges, gerrymandering their jurisdictions, stripping the bench's oversight powers, or slashing judicial budgets. Yet, while Congress has long been willing to influence judicial decision-making indirectly by blocking the appointments of ideologically unacceptable nominees, it has, with only rare exceptions, resisted employing more direct methods of control. When Courts and Congress Collide is the first work to demonstrate that this balance is governed by a "dynamic equilibrium": a constant give-and-take between Congress's desire to control the judiciary and its respect for historical norms of judicial independence. It is this dynamic equilibrium, Geyh says, rather than what the Supreme Court or the Constitution says about the separation of powers, that defines the limits of the judiciary's independence. When Courts and Congress Collide is a groundbreaking work, requiring all of us to consider whether we are on the verge of radically disrupting our historic balance of governance. Charles Gardner Geyh is Professor of Law and Charles L. Whistler Faculty Fellow at Indiana University at Bloomington. He has served as director of the American Judicature Society's Center for Judicial Independence, reporter to the American Bar Association Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence, and counsel to the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives.
Author: William J. Quirk Publisher: Transaction Publishers ISBN: 1412813573 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 331
Book Description
It's often said, confirmed by survey data, that the American people are losing confidence in their government. But the problem may be the reverse--the government has lost confidence in the people. Increasingly the power to make decisions in our democracy has been shifted from Congress to the court system, forcing non-elected officials to make decisions which affect the lives of Americans. In a society which is based on the democratic elections of its officials, this is clearly backwards. Quirk maintains that what he calls "The Happy Convention," an informal and unwritten rearrangement of "passing the buck" of government powers, is done to avoid blame and approval ratings becoming lower for a particular person or party. For example, The Happy Convention assigns the power to declare and make war to the President. Congress and the Court play a supporting role--Congress, when requested, gives the President a blank check to use force--the Court throws out any challenges to the legality of the war. Everyone wins if the war avoids disaster. If it turns out badly, the President is held accountable. His ratings fall, reelection is out of the question, congressmen say he lied to them; his Party is likely to lose the next election. In this way, Quirk reminds us that The Happy Convention is not what the Founders intended for us. For democracy to work properly, the American people have to know what options they have. Courts and Congress argues the case for reestablishing the balance of powers between the courts, the Congress, and the Presidency.
Author: Mark C. Miller Publisher: University of Virginia Press ISBN: 0813928214 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 264
Book Description
The View of the Courts from the Hill explores the current interactions and relationship between the U.S. Congress and federal courts using a "governance as dialogue" approach, which argues that constitutional interpretation in the United States is a continuous and complex conversation among all the institutions of government. Expanding on his previous work on this important theme, Mark C. Miller has interviewed numerous key players specifically for this book. His subjects include members of Congress, federal judges, congressional staff, employees of the judicial branch, lobbyists, and others with an interest in the courts. Their candid and thorough comments provide an invaluable resource for students and scholars eager to explore the dynamics between congressional and judicial forces as they have evolved over the past two decades. The book examines customary interactions between Congress and the federal courts—especially the U.S. Supreme Court—as well as extraordinary conflicts between the two branches of government both today and throughout American history. Miller gives special attention to recent attempts by social conservatives in Congress to silence the voice of the courts in the inter-institutional dialogue through the use of court-stripping measures, threats of impeachment of federal judges, and a proposal for an inspector general for the courts. Particular focus is placed on the interactions between the courts and the House Judiciary Committee under Republican control, as well as the approach taken by the Religious Right toward federal judges and the federal courts in general. The book concludes with a call for the protection of judicial independence in order to preserve the voice of the federal courts in the constitutional interpretation dialogue.
Author: Linda Camp Keith Publisher: Peter Lang ISBN: 9780820488806 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 220
Book Description
This book examines, from a behavioral perspective, the U.S. Supreme Court's exercise of the power of judicial review over Congress across two hundred years of the Court's history, testing the major competing theories in political science - the attitudinal model and the strategic approach - through systematic empirical analysis. Exploring the major trends in the Court's use of this power over time, the book examines a broad range of questions concerning the countermajoritarian nature of this power, and provides an analysis of each of the individual justices' behavior along several dimensions of the power, such as the use of judicial review to protect minority rights against majority intrusion. The book concludes that the Court has shown a high level of deference to Congress, with notable historic highs and lows, and generally that the exercise of the power has been less countermajoritarian than is usually assumed. Its analyses find the strongest level of support for the attitudinal approach to judicial decision making, but also concludes that strategic concerns cannot be dismissed, especially for the more recent Courts.
Author: Robert A. Katzmann
Author: Robert A. Katzmann
Author: Edward Keynes
Author: Charles Gardner Geyh
Author: Felix Frankfurter
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary
Author: William J. Quirk
Author: Raoul Berger
Author: Mark C. Miller
Author: Linda Camp Keith