Base Development in South Vietnam PDF Download

Author: Carroll H. Dunn
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Languages : en
Pages : 180

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Author: Carroll H. Dunn
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Languages : en
Pages : 164

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Author: United States. Army Department
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 188

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Author: Lt. Carroll Dunn
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781517705817
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 178

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"Base Development in South Vietnam, 1965-1970" describes the tasks, accomplishments, and problems of Army engineers in the construction of ports, airfields, storage areas, ammunition dumps, housing, bridges, roads, and other conventional facilities in Vietnam from 1965 to 1970.

Author: Department of Department of the Army
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781505590111
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 174

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Book Description
The tasks, accomplishments, and problems of Army engineers in the construction of ports, airfields, storage areas, ammunition dumps, housing, bridges, roads, and other conventional facilities in Vietnam from 1965 to 1970.

Author: Carroll H. Dunn
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975
Languages : da
Pages : 0

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Book Description
En redegørelse for anvendelse og udnyttelse af den amerikanske base i Sydvietnam, hvis logistiske placering var en forudsætning for krigsførelsen her.

Author: Roger P. Fox
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Air bases
Languages : en
Pages : 292

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Author: Carroll H. Dunn
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military bases, American
Languages : en
Pages : 186

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Author: Andrew J. Gawthorpe
Publisher: Cornell University Press
ISBN: 1501712098
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 330

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Book Description
For years, the so-called better-war school of thought has argued that the United States built a legitimate and viable non-Communist state in South Vietnam in the latter years of the Vietnam War and that it was only the military abandonment of this state that brought down the Republic of Vietnam. But Andrew J. Gawthorpe, through a detailed and incisive analysis, shows that, in fact, the United States failed in its efforts at nation building and had not established a durable state in South Vietnam. Drawing on newly opened archival collections and previously unexamined oral histories with dozens of U.S. military officers and government officials, To Build as Well as Destroy demonstrates that the United States never came close to achieving victory in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Gawthorpe tells a story of policy aspirations and practical failures that stretches from Washington, D.C., to the Vietnamese villages in which the United States implemented its nationbuilding strategy through the Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support known as CORDS. Structural factors that could not have been overcome by the further application of military power thwarted U.S. efforts to build a viable set of non-Communist political, economic, and social institutions in South Vietnam. To Build as Well as Destroy provides the most comprehensive account yet of the largest and best-resourced nation-building program in U.S. history. Gawthorpe's analysis helps contemporary policy makers, diplomats, and military officers understand the reasons for this failure. At a moment in time when American strategists are grappling with military and political challenges in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, revisiting the historical lessons of Vietnam is a worthy endeavor.

Author: James L. Collins
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781780392417
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 176

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Book Description
First published in 1975. From the preface: ""In 1954 the Army of South Vietnam was a collection of former French colonial troops with little command experience and no support forces worthy of mention. Gradually and despite a considerable degree of political and social instability, the Army, with strong American assistance, was molded into an effective fighting force by the efforts of Vietnamese leaders. After 1960 the South Vietnamese Army also acquired a counterinsurgency capability, but by 1965 increased political turmoil had undermined its effectiveness and necessitated the intervention of strong US combat forces. From 1965 to 1968, while US forces bore the brunt of the fighting, the South Vietnamese slowly regrouped and, with increasing American advisory assistance and mat riel support, once again became an effective fighting force. During this period the military provided security for the civilian population and administration and, in schools and training centers, laid the basis for a larger and more responsive military force. The battles of the Tet offensive of 1968 were followed by the general mobilization of South Vietnam and, one year later, by the decision of the United States to begin troop redeployments. These moves set the stage for the third phase in the Army's development, Vietnamization. The years from 1968 to 1972 saw a great expansion of South Vietnam's territorial security forces and militia, and the continual improvement and modernization of the regular Army as it once again assumed complete responsibility for the war effort. This monograph, covering the three stages in the growth and development of the South Vietnamese Army, highlights the role of the US Army, especially the MACV advisory system. Most of the material presented is based on official historical summaries prepared on a regular basis by the major US military commands in South Vietnam. Special attention is given to the expansion of South Vietnam's training base and her increasingly sophisticated military school system. While such a study can do no more than survey these activities, it does reflect the deep and continuous commitment by thousands of American soldiers to make the South Vietnamese Army a self-sufficient force capable of defending itself with minimum outside assistance."