Institutions and monetary policy : credibility, flexibility and central bank independence PDF Download

Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Banks and banking, Central
Languages : en
Pages : 249

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Author: Francesco Lippi
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781782542971
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 180

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Book Description
This book integrates new political and economic elements into the analysis of monetary policy credibility and central bank independence. The author considers imperfect monetary control, rational voters, distributional issues and uncertainty about future policy objectives in his welfare analysis of central banking. The role played by the different institutional elements that contribute to the making of an independent central bank is also assessed. A distinction is made between central bank independence and targets offering new insights into how a more inflation averse monetary policy may actually be achieved. Finally, explanations for the variation of central bank independence and conservatism across different countries are provided. This book will appeal to researchers, academics and policy makers in the fields of monetary policy, financial economics, money and banking and political economy.

Author: Mr.Timo Valila
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451841744
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 17

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Book Description
The specific role of central bank independence in determining the overall credibility of monetary policy is addressed in this paper. It is argued that the credibility of delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank is endogenous to the credibility of the inflation target because a “conservative” inflation target may not be compatible with the fiscal policy stance. Also, lack of transparency in designing the institutional set-up is shown to be welfare-reducing.

Author: Philip Keefer
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Anti-inflationary policies
Languages : en
Pages : 46

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Book Description
In economically volatile conditions in which it is more difficult for the public to distinguish inflation deliberately generated by government from inflation created by unanticipated economic shocks, the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence will be unchanged but the effectiveness of exchange rate pegs will be significantly improved. Keefer and Stasavage develop and test several new hypotheses about the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence and exchange rate pegs in the context of different institutions and different degrees of citizen information about government policies.

Author: Alex Cukierman
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262031981
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 532

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Book Description
This book brings together a large body of Cukierman's research and integrates it with recent developments in the political economy of monetary policy.

Author: International Monetary Fund
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451966423
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 59

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Book Description
There has been growing interest recently in the scope for promoting monetary stability through the establishment of independent central banks. This paper reviews the issues involved in central bank independence against the background of arrangements in nine countries. The analysis suggests that detailed institutional arrangements would need to be carefully designed if the potential benefits of central bank independence are to be delivered. Particularly important are the nature of arrangements to resolve various types of conflicts involving monetary policy, and arrangements to promote accountability and public monitoring of monetary policy performance.

Author: Philip Keefer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electronic books
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
February 2001 In economically volatile conditions in which it is more difficult for the public to distinguish inflation deliberately generated by government from inflation created by unanticipated economic shocks, the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence will be unchanged but the effectiveness of exchange rate pegs will be significantly improved. Keefer and Stasavage develop and test several new hypotheses about the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence and exchange rate pegs in the context of different institutions and different degrees of citizen information about government policies. Theory provides strong reason to believe that while central bank independence will prove more effective as a commitment mechanism in countries where multiple players in government have veto power (checks and balances), the number of veto players will have no effect on the credibility of exchange rate pegs. Conversely, Keefer and Stasavage argue that central bank independence does not solve problems of commitment that arise when citizens are imperfectly informed about the contribution of government policy to inflation. Exchange rate pegs, however, mitigate these problems. The authors present extensive evidence from cross-country tests using newly developed data that provide strong support for their propositions. This paper--a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the institutional conditions for policy reform and success. The authors may be contacted at [email protected] or [email protected].

Author: Clive Briault
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Anti-inflationary policies
Languages : en
Pages : 46

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Book Description

Author: Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger
Publisher: International Finance Section Department of Econ Ton Univers
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 100

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Book Description

Author: International Monetary Fund
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1498344062
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 74

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Book Description
Over the past two decades, many low- and lower-middle income countries (LLMICs) have improved control over fiscal policy, liberalized and deepened financial markets, and stabilized inflation at moderate levels. Monetary policy frameworks that have helped achieve these ends are being challenged by continued financial development and increased exposure to global capital markets. Many policymakers aspire to move beyond the basics of stability to implement monetary policy frameworks that better anchor inflation and promote macroeconomic stability and growth. Many of these LLMICs are thus considering and implementing improvements to their monetary policy frameworks. The recent successes of some LLMICs and the experiences of emerging and advanced economies, both early in their policy modernization process and following the global financial crisis, are valuable in identifying desirable features of such frameworks. This paper draws on those lessons to provide guidance on key elements of effective monetary policy frameworks for LLMICs.