Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military research
Languages : en
Pages : 1084
Book Description
Proceedings for the United States Army Operations Research Symposium, 24-26 May 1967
Author: Operations Research Symposium. U.S. Army Research Office-Durham, Durham, North Carolina. 20-22 May 1970
Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 448
Book Description
Proceedings of the United States Army Operations Research Symposium
Author: History of Operations Research in the United States Army, Volume 2: 1961-1973, 2008
Author: History of Operations Research in the United States Army
Author: Charles R. ShraderPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
'History of Operations Research in the United States Army, ' a comprehensive 3-volume set with each volume covering a different time span, offers insights into the natural tension between military leaders and civilian scientists, the establishment and growth of Army Operations Research (OR) organizations, the use of OR techniques, and the many contributions that OR managers and analysts have made to the growth and improvement of the Army since 1942.
History of Operations Research in the United States Army, V. 1, 1942-1962
Author: Charles R. ShraderPublisher: Department of the Army
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Operations research (OR) emerged during World War II as an important means of assisting civilian and military leaders in making scienti?cally sound improvements in the design and performance of weapons and equipment. OR techniques were soon extended to address questions of tactics and strategy during the war and, after the war, to matters of high-level political and economic policy. Until now, the story of why and how the U.S. Army used OR has remained relatively obscure, surviving only in a few scattered o?cial documents, in the memories of those who participated, and in a number of notes and articles that have been published about selected topics on military operations research. However, none of those materials amounts to a comprehensive, coherent history. In this, the ? rst of three planned volumes, Dr. Charles R. Shrader has for the ?rst time drawn together the scattered threads and woven them into a well-focused historical narrative that describes the evolution of OR in the U.S. Army, from its origins in World War II to the early 1960s. He has done an admirable job of ferreting out the surviving evidence, shaping it into an understandable narrative, and placing it within the context of the overall development of American military institutions. Often working with only sparse and incomplete materials, he has managed to provide a comprehensive history of OR in the U.S. Army that o?ers important insights into the natural tension between military leaders and civilian scientists, the establishment and growth of Army OR organizations, the use (and abuse) of OR techniques, and, of course, the many important contributions that OR managers and analysts have made to the growth and improvement of the Army since 1942. In this volume, Dr. Shrader carries the story up to 1962, the beginning of the McNamara era and of America’s long involvement in Vietnam. The subsequent volumes will cover Army OR during the McNamara era; its application in support of military operations in Vietnam; and its significant contributions to the Army’s post–Vietnam recovery and reorganization, ultimately leading to a victory (after only 100 hours of combat) in the first Gulf War in 1991 and the emergence of the U.S. Army as second to none in modern weaponry, tactical prowess, and strategic vision.
History of operations research in the United States Army, V. I: 1942-62
Author: Publisher: Government Printing Office
ISBN: 9780160873379
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Operations research (OR) emerged during World War II as an important means of assisting civilian and military leaders in making scienti?cally sound improvements in the design and performance of weapons and equipment. OR techniques were soon extended to address questions of tactics and strategy during the war and, after the war, to matters of high-level political and economic policy. Until now, the story of why and how the U.S. Army used OR has remained relatively obscure, surviving only in a few scattered o?cial documents, in the memories of those who participated, and in a number of notes and articles that have been published about selected topics on military operations research. However, none of those materials amounts to a comprehensive, coherent history. In this, the ? rst of three planned volumes, Dr. Charles R. Shrader has for the ?rst time drawn together the scattered threads and woven them into a well-focused historical narrative that describes the evolution of OR in the U.S. Army, from its origins in World War II to the early 1960s. He has done an admirable job of ferreting out the surviving evidence, shaping it into an understandable narrative, and placing it within the context of the overall development of American military institutions. Often working with only sparse and incomplete materials, he has managed to provide a comprehensive history of OR in the U.S. Army that o?ers important insights into the natural tension between military leaders and civilian scientists, the establishment and growth of Army OR organizations, the use (and abuse) of OR techniques, and, of course, the many important contributions that OR managers and analysts have made to the growth and improvement of the Army since 1942. In this volume, Dr. Shrader carries the story up to 1962, the beginning of the McNamara era and of America’s long involvement in Vietnam. The subsequent volumes will cover Army OR during the McNamara era; its application in support of military operations in Vietnam; and its significant contributions to the Army’s post–Vietnam recovery and reorganization, ultimately leading to a victory (after only 100 hours of combat) in the first Gulf War in 1991 and the emergence of the U.S. Army as second to none in modern weaponry, tactical prowess, and strategic vision.
History of operations research in the United States Army, V. 3, 1973-1995
Author: Publisher: Government Printing Office
ISBN: 9780160872365
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 380
Book Description
Army Weapon Systems Analysis
Author: United States. Army Materiel Development and Readiness CommandPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 506
Book Description
History of Operations Research in the United States Army, V. 2: 1961-1973 (Paperback)
Author: Publisher: Government Printing Office
ISBN: 9780160872853
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 400
Book Description
NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT--OVERSTOCK SALE -- Significantly reduced list price This second of three volumes on the history of operations research identifies, describes, and evaluates the ideas, people, organizations, and events that influenced the development of ORSA in the Army from the inauguration of President Kennedy in 1961 to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam in 1973. Related products: History of Operations Research in the United States Army, V. I: 1942-62 -- Print Paperback format --can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00433-0 History of Operations Research in the United States Army, V. 3, 1973-1995 --Print Paperback format -- can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00473-9"