Author: Herbert Howland SargentPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Strategy
Languages : en
Pages : 300
Book Description
The Strategy on the Western Front (1914-1918)
Author: Herbert Howland SargentPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Strategy
Languages : en
Pages : 300
Book Description
Battle Tactics of the Western Front
Author: Paddy GriffithPublisher: Yale University Press
ISBN: 9780300066630
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 310
Book Description
Historians have portrayed British participation in World War I as a series of tragic debacles, with lines of men mown down by machine guns, with untried new military technology, and incompetent generals who threw their troops into improvised and unsuccessful attacks. In this book a renowned military historian studies the evolution of British infantry tactics during the war and challenges this interpretation, showing that while the British army's plans and technologies failed persistently during the improvised first half of the war, the army gradually improved its technique, technology, and, eventually, its' self-assurance. By the time of its successful sustained offensive in the fall of 1918, says Paddy Griffith, the British army was demonstrating a battlefield skill and mobility that would rarely be surpassed even during World War II. Evaluating the great gap that exists between theory and practice, between textbook and bullet-swept mudfield, Griffith argues that many battles were carefully planned to exploit advanced tactics and to avoid casualties, but that breakthrough was simply impossible under the conditions of the time. According to Griffith, the British were already masters of "storm troop tactics" by the end of 1916, and in several important respects were further ahead than the Germans would be even in 1918. In fields such as the timing and orchestration of all-arms assaults, predicted artillery fire, "Commando-style" trench raiding, the use of light machine guns, or the barrage fire of heavy machine guns, the British led the world. Although British generals were not military geniuses, says Griffith, they should at least be credited for effectively inventing much of the twentieth-century's art of war.
The Strategy on the Western Front
Author: Herbert Howland SargentPublisher:
ISBN: 9781331315810
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 282
Book Description
Excerpt from The Strategy on the Western Front: 1914-1918 Most of the chapters in this book were published in the North American Review in a series of articles beginning with the February issue of 1919 and ending with the October issue of the same year. They have been revised, certain omitted parts restored, and are now published in book form. For suggestions and criticisms in the English of the text my thanks are due to Lieutenant Raymond H. Fuller, United States National Army, who was one of my assistants while I was on duty in the War Plans Division of the General Staff, United States Army, at Army War College, Washington, D. C., during the summer and fall of 1918. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
The Strategy on the Western Front
Author: Herbert Howland SargentPublisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781499767674
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 274
Book Description
An excerpt from a review in the Naval Institute Proceedings, Volume 47, Issues 1: THE THREE ERRORS THERE were three great German offensives on the Western Front, we are told, in each of which Germany made a great strategical blunder: the first Marne, the Verdun campaign of 1916, and the offensive begun in March, 1918. The first alleged error was in attempting the strategical offensive on two fronts at the same time. The Western Front, only one hundred and fifty miles long, was protected by the Moselle and Metz, backed by the Rhine and Strassburg; it could not have been turned by France without violating the neutrality of Belgium or Switzerland. Had Germany held this line defensively with a small part of her combatant forces while she defeated her other enemies in detail, the war would not have lasted more than two years. Thus the Germans would have avoided violating the neutrality of Belgium and the consequential British and American hostility. The failure of the western offensive is attributed particularly to the strength of Belfort, which commands the narrow pass into France between the Vosges and Jura ranges. "Had the Germans been able to capture this fortress," Sargent says, "the way would have been opened for turning the Vosges and the fortresses of Épinal, Toul and Verdun and for the envelopment of the French right wing, which, with the left wing and the little British and Belgian armies already enveloped, would no doubt have resulted in the final surrender of the French army and the capture of Paris." The Second Error: After the battle of the Marne Germany remained on the defensive on the Western Front for about eighteen months, during which she was considerably outnumbered by the Allies. She assumed the offensive in other parts of the theatre of war with successful campaigns against the Russians and Serbians. But before she had entirely disposed of Russia, Serbia and Italy, she again assumed the offensive in the West by way of the Crown Prince's tremendous campaign for Verdun—one of the most formidable in history—which failed. This is charged as a mistake because with the same effort and less loss Germany could "have completed her victories in the Eastern Front, destroyed the army at Salonica, and captured that important seaport; then with greatly superior forces have struck and crushed the Italian army; and then, with all her enemies disposed of outside of France and Belgium, have returned to the Western Front with an enormous preponderance of forces." The Third Error: After the failure at Verdun the Germans again consigned the West to the defensive role, and resumed the offensive against Russia, Romania, and Italy. But here again the Germans were not persistent, for if they had massed their available forces in turn against Salonica and Italy, probably both would have been disposed of, the Germans would have occupied Greece and the valley of the Po, and would have advanced to the French and Maritime Alps for an invasion of France via Nice. Instead of following up her advantages in the Near East and in Italy, Germany precipitated her offense of 1918 in the West, beginning on March 21, with her powerful thrust at Amiens, followed by the attack against the British around Ypres and two attacks against the French between Reimes and Montdidier towards Chateau-Thierry, in none of which attacks was she able to make a sufficiently broad rupture in the line to allow resumption of a war of movement.
Christmas Truce
Author: Malcolm BrownPublisher: Pan Macmillan
ISBN: 1447216008
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 288
Book Description
‘Just you think,’ wrote one soldier to his family, ‘that while you were eating your turkey I was out talking with the very men I had been trying to kill a few hours before!’ Christmas, 1914. The first winter of the First World War. In a conflict infamous for its horror and brutality, enemy shook hands with enemy. Soldiers shared rations, exchanged souvenirs, and even played football on a frost-covered No Man's Land. This Christmas truce was not just a brief interlude in one place. The ceasefire between the trenches extended over at least two-thirds of the British line and there were similar ceasefires in the French and Belgian sectors of the Western Front. In some areas the peaceable mood lingered well into 1915. But behind the festive cheer and acceptance of shared experience, the inevitable renewal of hostilities loomed large. Malcolm Brown and Shirley Seaton have combed war diaries, talked to participants and consulted a wide range of contemporary letters, diaries and newspapers to produce this unique account.
From Boer War to World War
Author: Spencer JonesPublisher: University of Oklahoma Press
ISBN: 0806189614
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 383
Book Description
The British Expeditionary Force at the start of World War I was tiny by the standards of the other belligerent powers. Yet, when deployed to France in 1914, it prevailed against the German army because of its professionalism and tactical skill, strengths developed through hard lessons learned a dozen years earlier. In October 1899, the British went to war against the South African Boer republics of Transvaal and Orange Free State, expecting little resistance. A string of early defeats in the Boer War shook the military’s confidence. Historian Spencer Jones focuses on this bitter combat experience in From Boer War to World War, showing how it crucially shaped the British Army’s tactical development in the years that followed. Before the British Army faced the Boer republics, an aura of complacency had settled over the military. The Victorian era had been marked by years of easy defeats of crudely armed foes. The Boer War, however, brought the British face to face with what would become modern warfare. The sweeping, open terrain and advent of smokeless powder meant soldiers were picked off before they knew where shots had been fired from. The infantry’s standard close-order formations spelled disaster against the well-armed, entrenched Boers. Although the British Army ultimately adapted its strategy and overcame the Boers in 1902, the duration and cost of the war led to public outcry and introspection within the military. Jones draws on previously underutilized sources as he explores the key tactical lessons derived from the war, such as maximizing firepower and using natural cover, and he shows how these new ideas were incorporated in training and used to effect a thorough overhaul of the British Army. The first book to address specific connections between the Boer War and the opening months of World War I, Jones’s fresh interpretation adds to the historiography of both wars by emphasizing the continuity between them.
The Dynamics of Doctrine
Author: Timothy T. LupferPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electronic government information
Languages : en
Pages : 84
Book Description
This paper is a case study in the wartime evolution of tactical doctrine. Besides providing a summary of German Infantry tactics of the First World War, this study offers insight into the crucial role of leadership in facilitating doctrinal change during battle. It reminds us that success in war demands extensive and vigorous training calculated to insure that field commanders understand and apply sound tactical principles as guidelines for action and not as a substitute for good judgment. It points out the need for a timely effort in collecting and evaluating doctrinal lessons from battlefield experience. --Abstract.
Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front, 1914–18
Author: William J. PhilpottPublisher: Springer
ISBN: 1349245119
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 237
Book Description
This book is a study of Anglo-French relations and military policy making in the First World War, which considers the strategic policies and operational planning of the British and French armies in the joint campaign fought on the western front. It examines the influence of incompatible British and French strategic objectives, the role of the allies' military and political leaders and the institutional development of the military alliance, on the alliance relationship and military policy making.
Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front 1914-18
Author: William James PhilpottPublisher: Palgrave Macmillan
ISBN: 9780312129446
Category : France
Languages : en
Pages : 227
Book Description
This book is the first critical study of the Anglo-French political and military relationship in the First World War, focusing on joint military operations in the main theatre, the western front. It examines the strategic principles which lay behind military policy in this theatre in the context of a close alliance in which divergent strategies, institutional weaknesses and clashing personalities had a detrimental effect on the coordination of military policy. Within this context it looks at the problems of strategic coordination in the 'war of movement' in 1914, the planning of the costly Somme and Passchendale offensives, and the factors which finally led to the effective coordination of allied strategy and military effort by General Foch in 1918. By so doing it throws new light on the reasons why the allies failed to win a decisive military victory on the western front before 1918.
The Strategy on the Western Front (1914-1918)
Author: Herbert Howland SargentPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Strategy
Languages : en
Pages : 310
Book Description