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Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions

Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions PDF Author: Francisco Cabrillo
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1781003971
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 382

Book Description
This extensive book explores in detail a wide range of topics within the public choice and constitutional political economy tradition, providing a comprehensive overview of current work across the field. The expert contributions are underpinned by the notion of moving economic thinking away from the analysis of the logic of a situation given a set of well-established and well-enforced Ôrules of the gameÕ towards a deeper analysis of the logic behind the selection of the rules of the game themselves. Within this context, the theme of choice between rules (as well as the more conventional analysis within rules) across historical time and place, and in various thought experiments and conceptual situations, is explored in detail. Extensive case studies back theory with empirical evidence, and topics discussed include: the foundations of constitutional economics; constitutional political economy; political competition and voting; public choice and public policy; and extensions to public choice theory. This stimulating book will prove a thought-provoking read for academics and both under- and post-graduate students in the fields of economics (particularly public choice and Austrian economics), public policy and political science.

Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions

Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions PDF Author: Francisco Cabrillo
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1781003971
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 382

Book Description
This extensive book explores in detail a wide range of topics within the public choice and constitutional political economy tradition, providing a comprehensive overview of current work across the field. The expert contributions are underpinned by the notion of moving economic thinking away from the analysis of the logic of a situation given a set of well-established and well-enforced Ôrules of the gameÕ towards a deeper analysis of the logic behind the selection of the rules of the game themselves. Within this context, the theme of choice between rules (as well as the more conventional analysis within rules) across historical time and place, and in various thought experiments and conceptual situations, is explored in detail. Extensive case studies back theory with empirical evidence, and topics discussed include: the foundations of constitutional economics; constitutional political economy; political competition and voting; public choice and public policy; and extensions to public choice theory. This stimulating book will prove a thought-provoking read for academics and both under- and post-graduate students in the fields of economics (particularly public choice and Austrian economics), public policy and political science.

Constitutional Economics

Constitutional Economics PDF Author: Richard B. McKenzie
Publisher: Lexington Books
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 280

Book Description
Based on papers from a conference sponsored by the Heritage Foundation."A Heritage Foundation book"--Jacket. Includes bibliographical references.

Constitutional Economics

Constitutional Economics PDF Author: Stefan Voigt
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108486886
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 153

Book Description
This concise survey of the questions, methods, and empirical findings central to constitutional political economy fills a gap in the literature of political economy. Voigt, a pioneer of the field, demonstrates how constitutional rules affect political economy, appealing to both scholars of the field and readers with no familiarity of the topic.

Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective

Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective PDF Author: Charles Rowley
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401157286
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 324

Book Description
Constitutional political economy is a research program that directs inquiry to the working properties of rules and institutions within which individuals interact and to the processes through which these rules and institutions are chosen or come into being. This book makes the case for an approach to constitutional political economy that is grounded in consistent, hard-nosed public choice analysis. Effective institutional design is simply not feasible unless the designers build their structures to withstand rational choice pressures from the political market place. If mean, sensual man is here to stay, then let us, in our better moments, incorporate that knowledge into the institutions that must govern his behavior. A distinguished list of public choice scholars pursue this approach against a varying backcloth of constitutional issues relevant to the United States, Canada, Western Europe, the transition economies and the third world.

Public Choice and Constitutional Economics

Public Choice and Constitutional Economics PDF Author: James D. Gwartney
Publisher: JAI Press(NY)
ISBN: 9780892329359
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 448

Book Description
Five of the papers were originally developed at a symposium on government, the economy, and the constitution sponsored by the Policy Sciences Program of Florida State University in March 1986 and subsequently published in the Cato journal, fall 1987. Includes bibliographies and indexes.

The Reason of Rules

The Reason of Rules PDF Author: Geoffrey Brennan
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521070904
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
Societies function on the basis of rules. These rules, rather like the rules of the road, coordinate the activities of individuals who have a variety of goals and purposes. Whether the rules work well or ill, and how they can be made to work better, is a matter of major concern. Appropriately interpreted, the working of social rules is also the central subject matter of modern political economy. This book is about rules - what they are, how they work, and how they can be properly analysed. The authors' objective is to understand the workings of alternative political institutions so that choices among such institutions (rules) can be more fully informed. Thus, broadly defined, the methodology of constitutional political economy is the subject matter of The Reason of Rules. The authors have examined how rules for political order work, how such rules might be chosen, and how normative criteria for such choices might be established.

The Calculus of Consent

The Calculus of Consent PDF Author: James M. Buchanan
Publisher: Selected Works of Gordon Tullo
ISBN: 9780865975323
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
The Calculus of Consent, the second volume of Liberty Fund's The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, is a reprint edition of the ground-breaking economic classic written by two of the world's preeminent economists--Gordon Tullock and Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan. This book is a unique blend of economics and political science that helped create significant new subfields in each discipline respectively, namely, the public choice school and constitutional political economy. Charles K. Rowley, Duncan Black Professor of Economics at George Mason University, points out in his introduction, "The Calculus of Consent is, by a wide margin, the most widely cited publication of each coauthor and, by general agreement, their most important scientific contribution." The Calculus of Consent is divided into four parts, each consisting of several chapters. The introduction by Professor Rowley provides a short overview of the book and identifies key insights that permeated the bounds of economics and political science and created an enduring nexus between the two sciences. Part I of The Calculus of Consent establishes the conceptual framework of the book's subject; part II defines the realm of social choice; part III applies the logic developed in part II to describe a range of decision-making rules, most notably, the rule of simple majority; and part IV explores the economics and ethics of democracy. Gordon Tullock is Professor Emeritus of Law at George Mason University, where he was Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Study of Public Choice and University Professor of Law and Economics. He also taught at the University of South Carolina, the University of Virginia, Rice University, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, and the University of Arizona. In 1966 he founded the journal that became Public Choice and remained its editor until 1990. James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty of the twentieth century. He is also Professor Emeritus at George Mason and Virginia Tech Universities. Charles K. Rowley was Duncan Black Professor of Economics at George Mason University and a Senior Fellow of the James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy at George Mason University. He was also General Director of the Locke Institute.

Deliberation and Decision

Deliberation and Decision PDF Author: Anne van Aaken
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351945491
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 464

Book Description
Deliberation and Decision explores ways of bridging the gap between two rival approaches to theorizing about democratic institutions: constitutional economics on the one hand and deliberative democracy on the other. The two approaches offer very different accounts of the functioning and legitimacy of democratic institutions. Although both highlight the importance of democratic consent, their accounts of such consent could hardly be more different. Constitutional economics models individuals as self-interested rational utility maximizers and uses economic efficiency criteria such as incentive compatibility for evaluating institutions. Deliberative democracy models individuals as communicating subjects capable of engaging in democratic discourse. The two approaches are disjointed not only in terms of their assumptions and methodology but also in terms of the communication - or lack thereof - between their respective communities of researchers. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the recent debate between the two approaches and makes new and original contributions to that debate.

The Economic Constitution

The Economic Constitution PDF Author: Tony Prosser
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199644535
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 296

Book Description
This title examines the constitutional framework for management of the economy in the UK, including the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. It assesses the extent to which legal principles limit the policy choices available to government and the extent to which they permit a coherent approach to economic management across government.

The Economic Effects of Constitutions

The Economic Effects of Constitutions PDF Author: Torsten Persson
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262661928
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 324

Book Description
The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the "missing link" between constitutional systems and economic policy; the book is an uncompromisingly empirical sequel to their previous theoretical analysis of economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less targeted government spending and larger budget deficits. Moreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth.Persson and Tabellini's goal is to draw conclusions about the causal effects of constitutions on policy outcomes. But since constitutions are not randomly assigned to countries, how the constitutional system was selected in the first place must be taken into account. This raises challenging methodological problems, which are addressed in the book. The study is therefore important not only in its findings but also in establishing a methodology for empirical analysis in the field of comparative politics.