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Author: Michael J. Courts Publisher: U.S. Government Accountability Office ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 47
Book Description
What GAO Found The Department of State (State) conducts a range of activities to assess risks to residences overseas. For instance, State tracks information on overseas residences in its property database, establishes threat levels at overseas posts, develops security standards for different types of residences and threat levels, and requires posts to periodically conduct residential security surveys. However, 17 of the 68 surveys for residences GAO reviewed were untimely or missing. Without up-to-date security surveys of all its overseas residences, State's ability to identify and address vulnerabilities or make informed decisions about where to allocate resources for security upgrades is limited. State has taken steps to update its residential security standards; however, these updates have not been timely, and the standards are difficult to use. According to State officials, updating residential security standards should take about 75 days, but all three updates since 2005 took more than 3 years each. State is making efforts to improve the timeliness of such updates in response to a prior GAO recommendation. In addition, while federal internal control standards state that policy standards should be clear and consistent to support good decision making, State's standards and other security-related guidance for residences have gaps and inconsistencies, complicating posts' efforts to determine and apply the appropriate security measures and potentially leaving some residences at risk. State addresses security vulnerabilities at residences by installing various upgrades intended to help residences meet security standards, but 38 of the 68 residences GAO reviewed did not meet all applicable standards. For example, 8 residences did not meet the standards for perimeter barriers. When residences do not and cannot meet all applicable security standards, posts are required to request exceptions, which identify steps the posts will take to mitigate vulnerabilities. However, State had an exception on file for only 1 of the 38 residences that did not meet all applicable standards. As a result, State lacks key information that could provide it with a clearer picture of security vulnerabilities at residences and enable it to make better risk management decisions. State manages risks to schools and other soft targets overseas in several ways, but its efforts may be constrained by limited awareness of relevant guidance and tools. In fiscal years 2010 through 2015, State awarded almost 400 grants in total for security upgrades at schools and other soft targets. While federal internal control standards call for timely communication of relevant information to staff responsible for program objectives, officials at most of the posts GAO visited were unaware of some guidance and tools for securing schools and other soft targets. As a result, State may not be fully leveraging existing programs and resources for addressing security needs at these facilities. Why GAO Did This Study Since the 1998 East Africa bombings, U.S. diplomatic personnel working overseas have faced increasing threats to their safety and security. State has built many new embassies and consulates since 1998 and enhanced security measures at others. Increased security at such facilities has raised concerns that residences, schools, and other places where U.S. diplomatic personnel and their families congregate may be viewed by terrorists as more attractive “soft targets.” GAO was asked to review the security of residences and other soft targets overseas. GAO evaluated (1) how State assesses risks to U.S. diplomatic residences overseas; (2) the timeliness, clarity, and consistency of residential security standards; (3) how State addresses security vulnerabilities at residences; and (4) how State manages risks to other soft targets. GAO reviewed agency documents; met with officials in Washington, D.C.; and conducted fieldwork at a judgmental sample of seven higher-threat, higher-risk posts in four of State's six geographic regions. This is the public version of a sensitive but unclassified report issued in June 2015. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that State, among other things, institute procedures to ensure residential security surveys are completed as required, clarify its standards and security-related guidance for residences, develop procedures to ensure residences either meet standards or have exceptions on file, and take steps to ensure posts are aware of existing guidance and tools regarding the security of schools and other soft targets. State concurred with all of GAO's recommendations.
Author: Michael J. Courts Publisher: U.S. Government Accountability Office ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 47
Book Description
What GAO Found The Department of State (State) conducts a range of activities to assess risks to residences overseas. For instance, State tracks information on overseas residences in its property database, establishes threat levels at overseas posts, develops security standards for different types of residences and threat levels, and requires posts to periodically conduct residential security surveys. However, 17 of the 68 surveys for residences GAO reviewed were untimely or missing. Without up-to-date security surveys of all its overseas residences, State's ability to identify and address vulnerabilities or make informed decisions about where to allocate resources for security upgrades is limited. State has taken steps to update its residential security standards; however, these updates have not been timely, and the standards are difficult to use. According to State officials, updating residential security standards should take about 75 days, but all three updates since 2005 took more than 3 years each. State is making efforts to improve the timeliness of such updates in response to a prior GAO recommendation. In addition, while federal internal control standards state that policy standards should be clear and consistent to support good decision making, State's standards and other security-related guidance for residences have gaps and inconsistencies, complicating posts' efforts to determine and apply the appropriate security measures and potentially leaving some residences at risk. State addresses security vulnerabilities at residences by installing various upgrades intended to help residences meet security standards, but 38 of the 68 residences GAO reviewed did not meet all applicable standards. For example, 8 residences did not meet the standards for perimeter barriers. When residences do not and cannot meet all applicable security standards, posts are required to request exceptions, which identify steps the posts will take to mitigate vulnerabilities. However, State had an exception on file for only 1 of the 38 residences that did not meet all applicable standards. As a result, State lacks key information that could provide it with a clearer picture of security vulnerabilities at residences and enable it to make better risk management decisions. State manages risks to schools and other soft targets overseas in several ways, but its efforts may be constrained by limited awareness of relevant guidance and tools. In fiscal years 2010 through 2015, State awarded almost 400 grants in total for security upgrades at schools and other soft targets. While federal internal control standards call for timely communication of relevant information to staff responsible for program objectives, officials at most of the posts GAO visited were unaware of some guidance and tools for securing schools and other soft targets. As a result, State may not be fully leveraging existing programs and resources for addressing security needs at these facilities. Why GAO Did This Study Since the 1998 East Africa bombings, U.S. diplomatic personnel working overseas have faced increasing threats to their safety and security. State has built many new embassies and consulates since 1998 and enhanced security measures at others. Increased security at such facilities has raised concerns that residences, schools, and other places where U.S. diplomatic personnel and their families congregate may be viewed by terrorists as more attractive “soft targets.” GAO was asked to review the security of residences and other soft targets overseas. GAO evaluated (1) how State assesses risks to U.S. diplomatic residences overseas; (2) the timeliness, clarity, and consistency of residential security standards; (3) how State addresses security vulnerabilities at residences; and (4) how State manages risks to other soft targets. GAO reviewed agency documents; met with officials in Washington, D.C.; and conducted fieldwork at a judgmental sample of seven higher-threat, higher-risk posts in four of State's six geographic regions. This is the public version of a sensitive but unclassified report issued in June 2015. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that State, among other things, institute procedures to ensure residential security surveys are completed as required, clarify its standards and security-related guidance for residences, develop procedures to ensure residences either meet standards or have exceptions on file, and take steps to ensure posts are aware of existing guidance and tools regarding the security of schools and other soft targets. State concurred with all of GAO's recommendations.
Author: United States Government Accountability Office Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform ISBN: 9781981761241 Category : Languages : en Pages : 48
Book Description
DIPLOMATIC SECURITY: State Department Should Better Manage Risks to Residences and Other Soft Targets Overseas
Author: Michael J. Courts Publisher: ISBN: 9781457869709 Category : Languages : en Pages : 47
Book Description
Since the 1998 East Africa bombings, U.S. diplomatic personnel working overseas have faced increasing threats to their safety and security. The Department of State (State) has built many new embassies and consulates since 1998 and enhanced security measures at others. Increased security at such facilities has raised concerns that residences, schools, and other places where U.S. diplomatic personnel and their families congregate may be viewed by terrorists as more attractive "soft targets." This report evaluated (1) how State assesses risks to U.S. diplomatic residences overseas; (2) the timeliness, clarity, and consistency of residential security standards; (3) how State addresses security vulnerabilities at residences; and (4) how State manages risks to other soft targets. Tables and figure. This is a print on demand report.
Author: Michael J. Courts Publisher: U.S. Government Accountability Office ISBN: Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 58
Book Description
In response to increasing threats to U.S. personnel and facilities at overseas diplomatic posts since 1998, the Department of State (State) has taken a number of steps to enhance its risk management and security efforts. State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security) leads many of these efforts with assistance from other bureaus and U.S. government agencies. Given the ongoing threats and the amount of resources needed to counter them, GAO has identified 11 key issues regarding Diplomatic Security that warrant significant Congressional oversight to monitor the cost, progress, and impact: Diplomatic Security Funding: Diplomatic Security funding has increased considerably in reaction to a number of security incidents overseas and domestically. In fiscal year 2016, total funding for Diplomatic Security operations--which includes its bureau managed funds as well as other funding such as personnel salaries--was almost $4.8 billion. Diplomatic Security Staffing Challenges: Diplomatic Security's workforce--including 3,488 direct-hire, 1,989 other U.S. government, and 45,870 contract personnel--continues to grow. However, potential challenges exist regarding the distribution of domestic and overseas positions, posting fully qualified individuals in the assignments with the greatest needs, and ongoing efforts to fill language-designated positions. Physical Security of U.S. Diplomatic Facilities: Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations collaborate to meet safety standards when constructing new embassies and mitigating risks at existing facilities. However, GAO made recommendations to address gaps in State's security related activities and processes. Physical Security of Diplomatic Residences and Other Soft Targets: State has taken steps to address residential security vulnerabilities and manage risks at schools and other soft targets overseas. However, GAO recommended actions to address weaknesses in State's efforts. Security Training Compliance: While State has robust security training requirements, it lacks consistent monitoring and enforcement processes, particularly for its Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training and for security refresher briefings at posts. Embassy Crisis and Evacuation Preparedness: Gaps in State's implementation and monitoring of crisis and evacuation preparedness could endanger staff assigned to overseas posts and the family members accompanying them. GAO has recommended actions to address these issues. Department of Defense (DOD) Support to U.S. Diplomatic Missions: Following the Benghazi attacks, DOD increased its support to U.S. diplomatic missions by creating dedicated military forces to respond to crises and expanding the Marine Security Guard program at overseas missions. However, State and DOD reported that they have experienced some logistical and other challenges. Dissemination of Threat Information: State has processes for communicating threat information to post personnel and U.S. citizens in-country. However, post personnel--including locally employed staff--have not always received important information in a timely manner. GAO has recommended steps State needs to take to address this concern. Countering Human Intelligence Threats: Foreign intelligence entities from host nations and third parties are motivated to collect information on U.S. operations and intentions. State has established measures to counter the human intelligence threat and works with other U.S. government agencies to identify and assess this threat. Ensuring Information Security: GAO has designated federal information security as a government-wide high-risk area and made recommendations to address these issues. State faces evolving threats and challenges to maintaining obsolete technology, defining clear roles and responsibilities for information security, and overseeing technology contractors. Status of Recommendations Made in Reports following the Benghazi Attack: In response to the Benghazi attack, State formed interagency teams to evaluate the security at 19 dangerous posts, convened an Accountability Review Board (ARB) to investigate the attack, and established panels to conduct further assessments. As of June 2017, State reported having addressed recommendations as follows: 268 of 287 made by the interagency teams, 26 of 29 by the ARB, and 64 of 75 by the panels. Terrorist attacks against U.S. diplomats and personnel overseas have led to increased attention of State's diplomatic security efforts. In this special publication, GAO identifies key issues affecting Diplomatic Security for Congressional oversight. These issues were identified from a body of related GAO work and State and other reports. GAO also interviewed U.S. officials from State and other agencies to obtain their views on key issues, obtain updated information and data, and follow up on actions they have taken on past GAO and other oversight report recommendations. What GAO Recommends: While State has taken steps to close recommendations made in past GAO reports, GAO identified 27 open recommendations from these reports (as of August 2017) that it believes should be given high priority for implementation. Of the 27 priority recommendations, 24 were related to diplomatic security.
Author: Michael J. Courts Publisher: U.S. Government Accountability Office ISBN: Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 47
Book Description
Is the State Department doing enough to keep U.S. personnel safe? U.S. personnel overseas can be targets of terrorism, violence, and crime—particularly while in transit. From 1998 to 2015, State Department personnel were attacked more than 100 times while traveling outside of embassy compounds, with many of the worst attacks occurring while victims were in motorcades, official vehicles, or other forms of transportation. The Department of State has taken steps to protect personnel in transit, but we found opportunities to enhance transportation policies, training, and communications, and made multiple recommendations to that end. What GAO Found The Department of State (State) has established policies related to transportation security for overseas U.S. personnel, but gaps exist in guidance and monitoring. GAO reviewed 26 posts and found that all 26 had issued transportation security and travel notification policies. However, policies at 22 of the 26 posts lacked elements required by State, due in part to fragmented implementation guidance on what such policies should include. State also lacks a clear armored vehicle policy for overseas posts and procedures for monitoring if posts are assessing their armored vehicle needs at least annually as required by State. These gaps limit State's ability to ensure that posts develop clear policies that are consistent with State's requirements and that vehicle needs for secure transit are met. While State provides several types of training related to overseas transportation security, weaknesses exist in post-specific refresher training. Regional security officers (RSO) receive required training related to transportation security in special agent courses, and nonsecurity staff reported receiving relevant training before departing for posts—including on topics such as defensive driving and the importance of taking personal responsibility for one's security—as well as new arrival briefings at posts. At most of the 9 posts GAO visited, however, staff had difficulty remembering key details covered in new arrival briefings or described the one-time briefings as inadequate. State's requirements for providing refresher briefings are unclear, potentially putting staff at greater risk. State uses various systems at overseas posts to communicate time-sensitive information related to transportation security, but several factors hinder its efforts. RSOs and other post officials are responsible for communicating threat information to post personnel. However, at 4 of the 9 posts it visited, GAO learned of instances in which staff did not receive important threat information in a timely manner for various reasons. In one case, this resulted in an embassy vehicle being attacked with rocks and seriously damaged while traveling through a prohibited area. In addition, while all 9 of the posts GAO visited require that personnel notify the RSO before traveling to certain locations, personnel at more than half of the 9 posts said they were unaware of these requirements or had difficulty accessing required travel notification systems. Timely communication is critical for managing transportation security risks, and failure to communicate important transportation-related information and receive such information promptly could leave overseas personnel facing avoidable security risks. Why GAO Did This Study U.S. diplomatic personnel posted overseas continue to face threats to their security. According to State, personnel and their families are particularly vulnerable when traveling outside the relative security of diplomatic work facilities or residences. In many serious or fatal attacks on U.S. personnel over the last three decades, victims were targeted while in motorcades, official vehicles, or otherwise in transit. GAO was asked to review how State manages transportation-related security risks to U.S. diplomatic personnel overseas. For this report, GAO evaluated the extent to which State, with regard to transportation security at overseas posts, has (1) established policies, guidance, and monitoring; (2) provided personnel with training; and (3) communicated time-sensitive information. GAO reviewed agency documents and met with key officials in Washington, D.C. GAO also reviewed policies from a judgmental sample of 26 posts—primarily higher-threat, higher-risk locations—and conducted fieldwork and met with officials at 9 of these posts. This is the public version of a sensitive but unclassified report issued in September 2016. What GAO Recommends GAO is making eight recommendations in this report to help State improve its management of transportation-related security risks by enhancing associated policies, guidance, and monitoring; clarifying its requirements for refresher briefings; and better communicating time-sensitive information. State agreed to take steps for all but one recommendation—the need to clarify its requirements for refresher briefings. GAO continues to believe this is needed as discussed in the report.
Author: Michael J. Fagel Publisher: CRC Press ISBN: 1315451077 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 445
Book Description
Uniting the best of Michael Fagel and Jennifer Hesterman's books in the fields of homeland security and emergency management, the editors of this volume present the prevailing issues affecting the homeland security community today. Many natural and man-made threats can impact our communities—but these well-known and highly respected authors create order from fear, guiding the reader through risk assessment, mitigation strategies, community EOC planning, and hardening measures based upon real-life examples, case studies, and current research in the practice. As terrorist attacks and natural disasters continue to rock the world, Soft Targets and Crisis Management emphasizes the vulnerability of soft targets like schools, churches, and hospitals, and presents the methodology necessary to respond and recover in the event of a crisis in those arenas. Features: Based on ASIS award-winning texts Provides a multi-faceted look at crisis management principles Offers community-specific examples for diverse locales and threat centers Includes up-to-date case studies on soft target attacks from around the world A must-read for security, emergency management, and criminal justice professionals, Soft Targets and Crisis Management: What Emergency Planners and Security Professionals Need to Know is a crucial text for practitioners seeking to make the world a safer place for others.
Author: United States. Department of State. Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Training Center Publisher: ISBN: Category : Diplomatic and consular service Languages : en Pages : 126
Author: Jess T. Ford (au) Publisher: DIANE Publishing ISBN: 9781422301029 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 50
Book Description
U.S. government officials working overseas are at risk from terrorist threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy officials have been attacked -- 23 fatally -- by terrorists outside the embassy. As the State Dept. continues to improve security at U.S. embassies, terrorist groups are likely to focus on softÓ targets -- such as homes, schools, & places of worship. This report determines: whether the State Dept. has a strategy for soft target protection; assesses State's efforts to protect U.S. officials & their families while traveling to & from work; assesses State's efforts overseas to improve security at schools attended by the children of U.S. officials; & describe issues related to protection at their residences. Includes recommendations. Illustrations.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations Publisher: ISBN: Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 144
Author: Michael J. Courts
Author: Michael J. Courts
Author: United States Government Accountability Office
Author: Michael J. Courts
Author: Michael J. Courts 
Author: Michael J. Courts
Author: 
Author: Michael J. Fagel
Author: United States. Department of State. Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Training Center
Author: Jess T. Ford (au)
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations