Operation Rolling Thunder: Strategic Implications Of Airpower Doctrine PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Operation Rolling Thunder: Strategic Implications Of Airpower Doctrine PDF full book. Access full book title Operation Rolling Thunder: Strategic Implications Of Airpower Doctrine by Colonel John K. Ellsworth. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Colonel John K. Ellsworth Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing ISBN: 1782896899 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 30
Book Description
This SRP examines Operation ROLLING THUNDER (1965-1968) bombing campaign in the context of military Principles of War and their applications. It analyzes accomplishment of strategic objectives and future implications for applications of airpower doctrine. It reviews the pre-Vietnam strategic situation, discussing its military, political, social, global, and doctrinal characteristics. It then analyses Operation ROLLING THUNDER by phases, focusing on its controversial aspects. This analysis concludes that Operation ROLLING THUNDER failed to accomplish most of its strategic objectives. It offers several contributing factors to account for this failure. This SRP concludes with examination of the lessons learned about airpower doctrine and of the strategic implications of Operation ROLLING THUNDER for the overall war effort in Vietnam.
Author: John K. Ellsworth Publisher: ISBN: Category : Aeronautics, Military Languages : en Pages : 24
Book Description
This SRP examines Operation ROLLING THUNDER (1965-1968) bombing campaign in the context of military Principles of War and their applications. It analyzes accomplishment of strategic objectives and future implications for applications of airpower doctrine. It reviews the pre-Vietnam strategic situation, discussing its military, political, social, global, and doctrinal characteristics. It then analyses Operation ROLLING THUNDER by phases, focusing on its controversial aspects. This analysis concludes that Operation ROLLING THUNDER failed to accomplish most of its strategic objectives. It offers several contributing factors to account for this failure. This SRP concludes with examination of the lessons learned about airpower doctrine and of the strategic implications of Operation ROLLING THUNDER for the overall war effort in Vietnam.
Author: Colonel John K. Ellsworth Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing ISBN: 1782896899 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 30
Book Description
This SRP examines Operation ROLLING THUNDER (1965-1968) bombing campaign in the context of military Principles of War and their applications. It analyzes accomplishment of strategic objectives and future implications for applications of airpower doctrine. It reviews the pre-Vietnam strategic situation, discussing its military, political, social, global, and doctrinal characteristics. It then analyses Operation ROLLING THUNDER by phases, focusing on its controversial aspects. This analysis concludes that Operation ROLLING THUNDER failed to accomplish most of its strategic objectives. It offers several contributing factors to account for this failure. This SRP concludes with examination of the lessons learned about airpower doctrine and of the strategic implications of Operation ROLLING THUNDER for the overall war effort in Vietnam.
Author: Mark Clodfelter Publisher: U of Nebraska Press ISBN: 9780803264540 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 338
Book Description
Tracing the use of air power in World War II and the Korean War, Mark Clodfelter explains how U. S. Air Force doctrine evolved through the American experience in these conventional wars only to be thwarted in the context of a limited guerrilla struggle in Vietnam. Although a faith in bombing's sheer destructive power led air commanders to believe that extensive air assaults could win the war at any time, the Vietnam experience instead showed how even intense aerial attacks may not achieve military or political objectives in a limited war. Based on findings from previously classified documents in presidential libraries and air force archives as well as on interviews with civilian and military decision makers, The Limits of Air Power argues that reliance on air campaigns as a primary instrument of warfare could not have produced lasting victory in Vietnam. This Bison Books edition includes a new chapter that provides a framework for evaluating air power effectiveness in future conflicts.
Author: Dr Donald J. Mrozek Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing ISBN: 1786250136 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 248
Book Description
Ultimately, this study is about a smaller Vietnam War than that which is commonly recalled. It focuses on expectations concerning the impact of air power on the ground war and on some of its actual effects, but it avoids major treatment of some of the most dramatic air actions of the war, such as the bombing of Hanoi. To many who fought the war and believe it ought to have been conducted on a still larger scale or with fewer restraints, this study may seem almost perverse, emphasizing as it does the utility of air power in conducting the conflict as a ground war and without total exploitation of our most awe-inspiring technology. Although the chapters in this study are intended to form a coherent and unified argument, each also offers discrete messages. The chapters are not meant to be definitive. They do not exhaust available documentary material, and they often rely heavily on published accounts. Nor do they provide a complete chronological picture of the uses of air power, even with respect to the ground war. Nor is coverage of areas in which air power was employed—South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam—evenly distributed nor necessarily proportionate to the effort expended in each place during the war. Lastly, some may find one or another form of air power either slightly or insufficiently treated. Such criticisms are beside the point, for the objectives of this study are to explore a comparatively neglected theme—the impact of air power on the ground—and to encourage further utilization of lessons drawn from the Vietnam experience.
Author: Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Publisher: DIANE Publishing ISBN: 1428992812 Category : Air power Languages : en Pages : 387
Book Description
This collection of essays reflects the proceedings of a 1991 conference on "The United States Air Force: Aerospace Challenges and Missions in the 1990s," sponsored by the USAF and Tufts University. The 20 contributors comment on the pivotal role of airpower in the war with Iraq and address issues and choices facing the USAF, such as the factors that are reshaping strategies and missions, the future role and structure of airpower as an element of US power projection, and the aerospace industry's views on what the Air Force of the future will set as its acquisition priorities and strategies. The authors agree that aerospace forces will be an essential and formidable tool in US security policies into the next century. The contributors include academics, high-level military leaders, government officials, journalists, and top executives from aerospace and defense contractors.
Author: Air University Press Publisher: ISBN: 9781549993596 Category : Languages : en Pages : 188
Book Description
American military professionals, especially the US Air Force, have had a difficult time understanding their role in this nation's defeat in Vietnam. Dr Tilford provides a critical self-analysis and questions the underlying assumptions of the Air Force's strategy in Southeast Asia. He argues that we must understand what went wrong in Vietnam and why and not manipulate the record and paint failure as victory. He explains what led to the "setup," which not only resulted in a failure for airpower but also contributed to the fall of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to Communist forces in 1975. Tilford-a retired Air Force officer and a widely respected historian in his own right-is not squeamish about demolishing the myths that abound concerning the air war in Southeast Asia. He is forthright in challenging both the USAF's strategic tunnel vision and the cherished misconceptions of many civilian historians whose criticisms of the air war in Vietnam are long on politics and short on facts. The integrity of Dr. Tilford's research, his knowledge of air power theory and technology, and his expertise as a historian all contribute to a high quality effort that proves, among other things, that neither the Air Force nor its civilian critics have yet secured a monopoly on truth. In his analysis of the air war against North Vietnam, Tilford presents one overwhelming lesson: that USAF strategic bombing doctrine is ethnocentric and Eurocentric, and is conceived utterly without regard to important cultural and political variations among potential adversaries. This lesson, more than any other, is one that today's Air Force must learn if it is to establish any relevance in a post-cold war world in which the global, superpower war for which it has planned almost exclusively since 1945 becomes an ever more remote possibility. Whatever the Air Force's operational role in the twenty-first century turns out to be, it seems likely that an air technocracy geared toward fighting a general war against a modern, industrialized major power will become even less relevant than it proved to be in Korea and Vietnam. At the very least, the Air Force of the future will do well to heed Dr. Tilford's other major conclusion that because war is more than sortie generation and getting ordnance on targets, statistics are a poor substitute for strategy. Contents * FOREWORD * PREFACE * 1 IN THE TIME OF ATOMIC PLENTY * Air Power Fulfilled * The Road to a Separate Service * The Atomic Bomb and the New Air Force * Preludes to Vietnam * The "New Look" and the Air Force * Notes * 2 SITUATIONS OF A LESSER MAGNITUDE * The Kennedy Administration, the Cold War, and the Air Force * The Laotian Factor * In at the Beginning * At War with the Army * Notes * 3 ROLLING THUNDER AND THE DIFFUSION OF HEAT * The Dark before the Storm * The Air Force that Flew Rolling Thunder * Rolling Thunder Begins * Bombing the North * The Bombing Escalates * Rushing to Meet Our Thunder * Switch in Strategy or in Targets? * Toward a Bombing Halt * Tet and the Bombing Halt * Notes * 4 "HOWEVER FRUSTRATED WE ARE" * Shifting Gears in 1968 * Search for Tomorrow * Operation Commando Hunt * Productivity as Strategy * The Air War in Northern Laos * Cambodia * Back to Laos * Lam Son 719 Fallout * Frustrations Continue * Proud Deep Alpha * Notes * 5 "IT WAS A LOSER" * Marking Time along the Ho Chi Minh Trail * Spring in the Air * The Shoe Falls * Deciding to Go North Again * Linebacker One * Bombing and Diplomacy * Linebacker One as a Tactical Success * Saigon Balks * Linebacker Two * Notes * 6 COMPLETING THE SETUP * Laos: Coming Full Circle * Cambodia * Mayaguez as a Microcosm of the War * The Setup Completed * Why Did Air Power Fail? * History * Doctrine * Technology * Management * Decreased Intellectual Acumen * Some Generic Reasons * Unhealthy Myths * Notes
Author: Jacob Van Staaveren Publisher: DIANE Publishing ISBN: 1428990186 Category : Languages : en Pages : 400
Book Description
Of the many facets of the American war in Southeast Asia debated by U.S. authorities in Washington, by the military services and the public, none has proved more controversial than the air war against North Vietnam. The air war s inauguration with the nickname Rolling Thunder followed an eleven-year American effort to induce communist North Vietnam to sign a peace treaty without openly attacking its territory. Thus, Rolling Thunder was a new military program in what had been a relatively low-key attempt by the United States to win the war within South Vietnam against insurgent communist Viet Cong forces, aided and abetted by the north. The present volume covers the first phase of the Rolling Thunder campaign from March 1965 to late 1966. It begins with a description of the planning and execution of two initial limited air strikes, nicknamed Flaming Dart I and II. The Flaming Dart strikes were carried out against North Vietnam in February 1965 as the precursors to a regular, albeit limited, Rolling Thunder air program launched the following month. Before proceeding with an account of Rolling Thunder, its roots are traced in the events that compelled the United States to adopt an anti-communist containment policy in Southeast Asia after the defeat of French forces by the communist Vietnamese in May 1954.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Airpower is not widely understood. Even though it has come to play an increasingly important role in both peace and war, the basic concepts that define and govern airpower remain obscure to many people, even to professional military officers. This fact is largely due to fundamental differences of opinion as to whether or not the aircraft has altered the strategies of war or merely its tactics. If the former, then one can see airpower as a revolutionary leap along the continuum of war; but if the latter, then airpower is simply another weapon that joins the arsenal along with the rifle, machine gun, tank, submarine, and radio. This book implicitly assumes that airpower has brought about a revolution in war. It has altered virtually all aspects of war: how it is fought, by whom, against whom, and with what weapons. Flowing from those factors have been changes in training, organization, administration, command and control, and doctrine. War has been fundamentally transformed by the advent of the airplane.
Author: Colonel John K. Ellsworth
Author: John K. Ellsworth
Author: Colonel John K. Ellsworth
Author: Mark Clodfelter
Author: Dr Donald J. Mrozek
Author: Earl H. Tilford
Author: Robert L. Pfaltzgraff
Author: Air University Press
Author: Robert A. Doughty
Author: Jacob Van Staaveren
Author: