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Author: Bernard Salanie Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 0262534223 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 257
Book Description
A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Praise for the previous edition: “The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models. Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up-to-date. Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer.”—Jean Tirole, Institut D'Économie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France “Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory. Salanié has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner.”—Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Author: Bernard Salanie Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 0262534223 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 257
Book Description
A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Praise for the previous edition: “The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models. Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up-to-date. Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer.”—Jean Tirole, Institut D'Économie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France “Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory. Salanié has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner.”—Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Author: Bernard Salanié Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 0262195259 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 257
Book Description
A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition.
Author: Patrick Bolton Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 9780262025768 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 746
Book Description
A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.
Author: Bernard Salanie Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 0262297817 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 249
Book Description
A concise and rigorous text that combines theory, empirical work, and policy discussion to present core issues in the economics of taxation. This concise introduction to the economic theories of taxation is intuitive yet rigorous, relating the theories both to existing tax systems and to key empirical studies. The Economics of Taxation offers a thorough discussion of the consequences of taxes on economic decisions and equilibrium outcomes, as well as useful insights into how policy makers should design taxes. It covers such issues of central policy importance as taxation of income from capital, environmental taxation, and tax credits for low-income families. This second edition has been significantly revised and updated. Changes include a substantially rewritten chapter on direct taxation; a discussion of recent research in the chapter on mixed taxation; the replacement of the chapter on capital taxation with a chapter on the “new dynamic public finance”; and considerations of environmental taxation in both theory and policy chapters. The book is aimed at graduate students or advanced undergraduates taking public finance classes as well as economists who want to learn more about the topic. It combines discussion of theory, empirical work, and policy objectives in compact form. Appendixes provide necessary background material on consumer and producer theory and the theory of optimal control.
Author: Bernard Salanie Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 0262257874 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 257
Book Description
A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Praise for the previous edition: “The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models. Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up-to-date. Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer.”—Jean Tirole, Institut D'Économie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France “Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory. Salanié has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner.”—Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Author: Oren Bar-Gill Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 019966336X Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 297
Book Description
Seduction by Contract explains how consumer contracts emerge from market forces and consumer psychology. Consumers' predictable mistakes - they are short-sighted, optimistic, and imperfectly rational - compel sellers to compete by hiding the true costs of products in complex, misleading contracts. Only better law can overcome the market's failure.
Author: William Sims Curry Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1315536439 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 353
Book Description
The second edition of Government Contracting: Promises and Perils picks up where the first edition’s mission left off: exposing fraud, incompetence, waste, and abuse (FIWA) and analyzing corruption, mismanagement, and ineptitude that defile government contracting. The first edition thoroughly outlined procurement throughout the contracting cycle including initial planning, contractor selection, contract administration, contract closeout, and auditing. This significantly revised new edition provides additional much-needed guidance on contracting documents, management tools, and processes for addressing negative influences on government contracting, including an improved approach to evaluating proposals. Specific guidance for avoiding FIWA is provided for government officials and employees, government agencies, and government contractors, and practical solutions to problems faced by individuals and organizations involved in government contracting are intended for both practitioner and pedagogical applications. The "Government Procurement Corruption Wall of Shame" that was introduced in the first edition to illustrate contracting perils such as conflicts of interest, duplicity, favoritism, incompetence, kickbacks, and protests is continued in the second edition, and cases illustrating the existence of FIWA in government contracting have been thoroughly updated. Contracting documents and contract management tools are provided on a website designed to accompany the book. Written at the graduate level and specifically intended for state, local, federal, and international government procurement activities, this textbook is required reading for public procurement, contract management, business, and public administrations courses.
Author: Douglas J. Cumming Publisher: Academic Press ISBN: 0124095968 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 781
Book Description
Other books present corporate finance approaches to the venture capital and private equity industry, but many key decisions require an understanding of the ways that law and economics work together. This revised and updated 2e offers broad perspectives and principles not found in other course books, enabling readers to deduce the economic implications of specific contract terms. This approach avoids the common pitfalls of implying that contractual terms apply equally to firms in any industry anywhere in the world. In the 2e, datasets from over 40 countries are used to analyze and consider limited partnership contracts, compensation agreements, and differences in the structure of limited partnership venture capital funds, corporate venture capital funds, and government venture capital funds. There is also an in-depth study of contracts between different types of venture capital funds and entrepreneurial firms, including security design, and detailed cash flow, control and veto rights. The implications of such contracts for value-added effort and for performance are examined with reference to data from an international perspective. With seven new or completely revised chapters covering a range of topics from Fund Size and Diseconomies of Scale to Fundraising and Regulation, this new edition will be essential for financial and legal students and researchers considering international venture capital and private equity. An analysis of the structure and governance features of venture capital contracts In-depth study of contracts between different types of venture capital funds and entrepreneurial firms Presents international datasets from over 40 countries around the world Additional references on a companion website Contains sample contracts, including limited partnership agreements, term sheets, shareholder agreements, and subscription agreements
Author: Gerrit de Geest Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing ISBN: 1849806640 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 497
Book Description
This unique and timely book offers an up-to-date, clear and comprehensive review of the economic literature on contract law. The topical chapters written by leading international scholars include: precontractual liability, misrepresentation, duress, gratuitous promises, gifts, standard form contracts, interpretation, contract remedies, penalty clauses, impracticability and foreseeability. Option contracts, warranties, long-term contracts, marriage contracts, franchise contracts, quasi-contracts, behavioral approaches, and civil contract law are also discussed. This excellent resource on contract law and economics will be particularly suited to contract law scholars, law teachers, policy makers, and judges. For experts in and practitioners of contract law this will be a key book to buy.
Author: Beatriz Armendariz Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 0262265516 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 361
Book Description
An accessible analysis of the global expansion of financial markets in poor communities, incorporating the latest thinking and evidence. The microfinance revolution has allowed more than 150 million poor people around the world to receive small loans without collateral, build up assets, and buy insurance. The idea that providing access to reliable and affordable financial services can have powerful economic and social effects has captured the imagination of policymakers, activists, bankers, and researchers around the world; the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize went to microfinance pioneer Muhammed Yunis and Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. This book offers an accessible and engaging analysis of the global expansion of financial markets in poor communities. It introduces readers to the key ideas driving microfinance, integrating theory with empirical data and addressing a range of issues, including savings and insurance, the role of women, impact measurement, and management incentives. This second edition has been updated throughout to reflect the latest data. A new chapter on commercialization describes the rapid growth in investment in microfinance institutions and the tensions inherent in the efforts to meet both social and financial objectives. The chapters on credit contracts, savings and insurance, and gender have been expanded substantially; a new section in the chapter on impact measurement describes the growing importance of randomized controlled trials; and the chapter on managing microfinance offers a new perspective on governance issues in transforming institutions. Appendixes and problem sets cover technical material.
Author: Bernard Salanie
Author: Bernard Salanie
Author: Bernard Salanié
Author: Patrick Bolton
Author: Bernard Salanie
Author: Bernard Salanie
Author: Oren Bar-Gill
Author: William Sims Curry
Author: Douglas J. Cumming
Author: Gerrit de Geest
Author: Beatriz Armendariz