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Author: Vincent Orange Publisher: Createspace Independent Pub ISBN: 9781478344575 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 140
Book Description
It was inevitable that the airman's perspective regarding the employment of airpower in an operational theater would surface in North Africa, the first major American offensive of World War II. The publication of Field Manuals (FM) 31-35, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces, and 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, was a manifestation of how airmen looked at the command of airpower, the selection of missions, and the assignment of priorities. The institutionalized conflict between soldiers and airmen over air employment that raised its head in Africa continues, regardless of the recorded combat experiences of, and the individual rapport among, field commanders. North Africa provided a stage to expose these deep-seated conflicting views of airpower. The soldier viewed the war in terms of brigades, divisions, corps, and armies; some saw the application of airpower as being in direct support of their own combat formations. The airman, on the other hand, saw the application of airpower in terms of the entire theater of operations; therefore, he saw it employed in situations and against enemy forces presenting the greatest threat in the theater. The establishment of three priorities for air missions-superiority, interdiction, and close air support- was a focus of his perspective of theater air operations. Historical experience greatly affected the advocacy of this theater-wide operational scheme, particularly the way airpower was initially commanded and employed in North Africa. Along with an air campaign needing a focus to gain control of the air and interdict the battlefield, there was a need to reorganize the command structure. In essence, the decision to establish a tactical and strategic air force under a single air commander (Northwest African Air Forces under Gen Carl A Spaatz) created a theater command structure with coequal air and ground commanders under Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower. By this arrangement, the air and ground component commanders received equal footing. Previously, tactical airpower was subordinated, thus limiting the ability of XII Air Support Command and RAF 242 Group to influence the determination of theater strategy, the employment of forces, and the assignment of priority in application. It is against this background that the long-standing ideas of airmen brightened, leading to the development and publication of FM 100-20 and, later, to revisions of the basic tactical doctrinal manual (FM 31-35). These manuals served the purpose, perhaps too shrilly in retrospect, of articulating what airmen believed about airpower and how their perspectives on its use related to the views of ground forces. These manuals continue even today to be the foundation of what airmen believe about airpower and its relationship to the other services in a combat theater. The North Africa experience provided a model for the organization and employment of tactical airpower in subsequent campaigns in Europe, Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. In each of these campaigns, planners have continued to refine, expand, and improve the effectiveness of tactical air support for all forces in a theater. The priorities for employment are a function of the most pressing threat and the greatest opportunity for imposing a major effect on the fighting ability of the opposing forces. The flexibility of tactical air (its greatest asset) permits a shifting focus between air superiority, interdiction, and close air support in accordance with the priority established by the overall commander. Differences in opinion on the employment of forces will continue among air, ground, and sea commanders in combat situations. However, when the overall commander in the theater makes a decision on the strategy and priority of operations, the air component commander must and will apply his forces in accordance with that decision.
Author: Vincent Orange Publisher: Createspace Independent Pub ISBN: 9781478344575 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 140
Book Description
It was inevitable that the airman's perspective regarding the employment of airpower in an operational theater would surface in North Africa, the first major American offensive of World War II. The publication of Field Manuals (FM) 31-35, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces, and 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, was a manifestation of how airmen looked at the command of airpower, the selection of missions, and the assignment of priorities. The institutionalized conflict between soldiers and airmen over air employment that raised its head in Africa continues, regardless of the recorded combat experiences of, and the individual rapport among, field commanders. North Africa provided a stage to expose these deep-seated conflicting views of airpower. The soldier viewed the war in terms of brigades, divisions, corps, and armies; some saw the application of airpower as being in direct support of their own combat formations. The airman, on the other hand, saw the application of airpower in terms of the entire theater of operations; therefore, he saw it employed in situations and against enemy forces presenting the greatest threat in the theater. The establishment of three priorities for air missions-superiority, interdiction, and close air support- was a focus of his perspective of theater air operations. Historical experience greatly affected the advocacy of this theater-wide operational scheme, particularly the way airpower was initially commanded and employed in North Africa. Along with an air campaign needing a focus to gain control of the air and interdict the battlefield, there was a need to reorganize the command structure. In essence, the decision to establish a tactical and strategic air force under a single air commander (Northwest African Air Forces under Gen Carl A Spaatz) created a theater command structure with coequal air and ground commanders under Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower. By this arrangement, the air and ground component commanders received equal footing. Previously, tactical airpower was subordinated, thus limiting the ability of XII Air Support Command and RAF 242 Group to influence the determination of theater strategy, the employment of forces, and the assignment of priority in application. It is against this background that the long-standing ideas of airmen brightened, leading to the development and publication of FM 100-20 and, later, to revisions of the basic tactical doctrinal manual (FM 31-35). These manuals served the purpose, perhaps too shrilly in retrospect, of articulating what airmen believed about airpower and how their perspectives on its use related to the views of ground forces. These manuals continue even today to be the foundation of what airmen believe about airpower and its relationship to the other services in a combat theater. The North Africa experience provided a model for the organization and employment of tactical airpower in subsequent campaigns in Europe, Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. In each of these campaigns, planners have continued to refine, expand, and improve the effectiveness of tactical air support for all forces in a theater. The priorities for employment are a function of the most pressing threat and the greatest opportunity for imposing a major effect on the fighting ability of the opposing forces. The flexibility of tactical air (its greatest asset) permits a shifting focus between air superiority, interdiction, and close air support in accordance with the priority established by the overall commander. Differences in opinion on the employment of forces will continue among air, ground, and sea commanders in combat situations. However, when the overall commander in the theater makes a decision on the strategy and priority of operations, the air component commander must and will apply his forces in accordance with that decision.
Author: Dr Donald J. Mrozek Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing ISBN: 1786250136 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 248
Book Description
Ultimately, this study is about a smaller Vietnam War than that which is commonly recalled. It focuses on expectations concerning the impact of air power on the ground war and on some of its actual effects, but it avoids major treatment of some of the most dramatic air actions of the war, such as the bombing of Hanoi. To many who fought the war and believe it ought to have been conducted on a still larger scale or with fewer restraints, this study may seem almost perverse, emphasizing as it does the utility of air power in conducting the conflict as a ground war and without total exploitation of our most awe-inspiring technology. Although the chapters in this study are intended to form a coherent and unified argument, each also offers discrete messages. The chapters are not meant to be definitive. They do not exhaust available documentary material, and they often rely heavily on published accounts. Nor do they provide a complete chronological picture of the uses of air power, even with respect to the ground war. Nor is coverage of areas in which air power was employed—South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam—evenly distributed nor necessarily proportionate to the effort expended in each place during the war. Lastly, some may find one or another form of air power either slightly or insufficiently treated. Such criticisms are beside the point, for the objectives of this study are to explore a comparatively neglected theme—the impact of air power on the ground—and to encourage further utilization of lessons drawn from the Vietnam experience.
Author: Air University Press Publisher: ISBN: 9781521100721 Category : Languages : en Pages : 146
Book Description
These four independent essays provide a perspective on airpower doctrine development that varies somewhat from the usual view. Essay 1 describes the organization, doctrine, operational practices, and personality of the air forces in the western desert from 1940 to 1943. Essay 2 describes and analyzes the events in northwest Africa during Operation Torch while the third analyzes the machination in policy development in Washington. Essay 4 analyzes the great tactical aviation exercise in northwest Europe, emphasizing the famous cooperation between George S. Patton and Otto P. Weyland. Contents: GETTING TOGETHER: Tedder, Coningham, and Americans in the Desert and Tunisia, 1940-43. Vincent Orange * A GLIDER IN THE PROPWASH OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE? Gen Carl A. Spaatz, the RAF, and the Foundations of American Tactical Air Doctrine - David R. Mets * THE LEGEND OF LAURENCE KUTER - Agent for Airpower Doctrine, Daniel R. Mortensen * PATTON AND WEYLAND: A Model for Air-Ground Cooperation, David Spires. Involvement in a joint world demands that Air Force people understand Air Force history. This basic requirement gives special purpose to the following commemorative account derived from four papers presented at the annual Military History Society conference that convened in April 1993 in Kingston, Canada. The first paper, Essay 1 in this book, describes the organization, doctrine, operational practices, and personality of the British-led air forces in the desert west of Cairo from 1940 to 1943. The second paper, Essay 2, describes and analyzes the events in northwest Africa during Operation Torch and the Battle for Tunisia in the winter and spring of 1942-43. The third essay analyzes policy development in Washington, showing, among other things, how policy is a product of headquarters thinking as much as a result of practical experience. Essay 4 analyzes the great tactical aviation exercise in northwest Europe, emphasizing the famous cooperation between George S. Patton and Otto P. Weyland. Some issues stand out.. Some of FM 100-20's concepts had a long history; some were new. The idea of coequality, for example, had been promoted successfully with the formation of US Air Force General Headquarters (GHQ Air Force) in 1935, the appointment of an assistant secretary of war for air in April 1941, the independent war planning of AWPD-l in mid-1941, and the autonomous and coordinate responsibilities associated with organizing the Army Air Forces in March 1942. 3 Indeed, formal doctrine, notably that in FM 31-35 (published in April 1942) and in Eisenhower's Operational Memo 17 (published in England in late 1942 for Operation Torch), acknowledged the independent basis of air-ground relations. In spite of much written to the contrary, Eisenhower promoted independent air command in Africa from the very beginning. The failures in Tunisia and, especially, at Kasserine Pass in March 1943 occurred not because of improper doctrine, particularly not because of decentralized air command, but because of logistical bottlenecks-getting troops with adequate guns, trucks, planes, fuel, and service people, to the right place, in the right portions at appropriate times. In truth, inadequately trained and equipped American forces faced a superior enemy. Even the senior American airman, Carl A. Spaatz, said existing doctrine was satisfactory; only practice was needed to produce successful operations.
Author: Major Gary C. Cox Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing ISBN: 1786250373 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 66
Book Description
This study examines the development and usefulness of US air attack theory and doctrine during the interwar period, 1919-1941. This period represents more than twenty years of development in US Air Corps attack theory and doctrine. It was the first peacetime period of such development. Attack aviation during this time was a branch of aviation used to provide direct and indirect combat support to ground forces in the form of machine gun strafing, light bombing, and chemical attacks. From the earliest origins, attack theory and doctrine evolved primarily along two paths direct and indirect support of ground and air force objectives. The direct support approach was based on fundamental beliefs by the Army that attack aviation was an auxiliary combat arm, to be used directly on the battlefield against ground forces and to further the ground campaign plan. The indirect support approach, or air interdiction, was derived from the fundamental beliefs by the Air Corps that attack aviation was best used beyond the battle line and artillery range, against targets more vulnerable and less heavily defended, to further both the Air Force mission and the ground support mission. As attack doctrine evolved, range and hardened targets became problematic for the single-engine attack plane. Thus, attack theory and doctrine in terms of the indirect support approach, was adequately developed to be useful at the start of WWII. The use of light and medium bombers in North Africa showed the effectiveness of air interdiction and the indirect approach. Attack aviation had, indeed, established itself before WWII. Attack aviation, in the form of close air support, would have to wait for the lessons of WWII.
Author: Ellwood P. Hinman IV Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1351959808 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 176
Book Description
The changed strategic landscape of the 21st century has driven a shift to more flexible, adaptable capabilities across the spectrum of conflict. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the validity of team warfare between air and land forces during open hostilities with an enemy. The time has come for innovative counter-air and counter-land concepts focused on medium- to large-scale conventional combat operations that will merge air and ground forces even more effectively into a single potent fighting force. Such is the focus of AirLandBattle21. A basic assumption in this study is that, during major combat operations, a relevant number of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) will conduct distributed operations in a non-linear, non-contiguous and geographically separated fashion. The study introduces a flexible counter-air framework that allows for the most efficient use of limited air assets and advocates only the necessary levels of air control in different areas across the theatre. The study also offers alternative views of strategic attack and explores the critical role tactical airlift will play in employing and sustaining the brigade combat team.
Author: Daniel R. Mortensen Publisher: ISBN: 9781410220936 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 148
Book Description
CONTENTS:DisclaimerForwardAbout the EditorIntroductionGetting Together - Vincent OrangeA Glider in the Propwash of the Royal Air Force? - David R. MetsThe Legend of Laurence Kuter - Daniel R. MortensenPatton and Weyland - David SpiresAppendixBibliography
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Airpower is not widely understood. Even though it has come to play an increasingly important role in both peace and war, the basic concepts that define and govern airpower remain obscure to many people, even to professional military officers. This fact is largely due to fundamental differences of opinion as to whether or not the aircraft has altered the strategies of war or merely its tactics. If the former, then one can see airpower as a revolutionary leap along the continuum of war; but if the latter, then airpower is simply another weapon that joins the arsenal along with the rifle, machine gun, tank, submarine, and radio. This book implicitly assumes that airpower has brought about a revolution in war. It has altered virtually all aspects of war: how it is fought, by whom, against whom, and with what weapons. Flowing from those factors have been changes in training, organization, administration, command and control, and doctrine. War has been fundamentally transformed by the advent of the airplane.
Author: Vincent Orange
Author: Vincent Orange
Author: Dr Donald J. Mrozek
Author: Air University Press
Author: Daniel R. Mortensen
Author: William W. Momyer
Author: 
Author: Major Gary C. Cox
Author: Ellwood P. Hinman IV
Author: Daniel R. Mortensen
Author: