Author: Amitai Etzioni Publisher: Transaction Publishers ISBN: 9781412819114 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 364
Book Description
This work is a quality analysis of the problems posed by Political Action Committees in American life. As the author notes in his new introduction: "Political corruption, as measured by campaign contributions of special interests to elected officials, increased significantly in the few years since the first publication of Capital Corruption. The number of PACs rose from 2,551 in 1980 to 4,175 by 1986. The percentage of PAC contribution of total campaign costs increased from 31.4 percent in 1980 to 41.9 percent (House) and 24.5 percent to 27.0 percent (Senate) in 1986." Such data only begin to tell the story of a book which has grown in stature during the decade. Etzioni characterizes Washington as a marketplace where deals are struck, where a special interest group can buy single pieces of legislation or long-run commitments or a whole slew of legislation. Because such purchases are not direct, but elliptical, they fall within the legal system, but for Etzioni, they are beyond the pale of moral or political worthiness. The book provides policy answers to vexing political dilemmas of mass politics today. The volume has been described as "a devastating indictment of our present system of financing elections" (John Anderson); Etzioni has been called "arguably the best political sociologist writing today" (Warren Bennis); and the founder of Common Cause has termed this "a powerful and important book. If it is widely read and understood the nation will benefit" (John Gardner).
Author: Publisher: World Bank Publications ISBN: 9780821346006 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 180
Book Description
Much of the devastation caused by the recent earthquake in Turkey was the result of widespread corruption between the construction industry and government officials. Corruption is part of everyday public life and we tend to take it for granted. However, preventing corruption helps to raise city revenues, improve service delivery, stimulate public confidence and participation, and win elections. This book is designed to help citizens and public officials diagnose, investigate and prevent various kinds of corrupt and illicit behaviour. It focuses on systematic corruption rather than the free-lance activity of a few law-breakers, and emphasises practical preventive measures rather than purely punitive or moralistic campaigns.
Author: Kenneth Sebastian León Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 0429589379 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 235
Book Description
This book offers a deep dive into the social, political, and economic forces that make white-collar crime and corruption a staple feature of the nightlife economy. The author, a former bouncer-turned-bartender of party bars and nightclubs in a large U.S. city, draws from an auto-ethnographic case study to describe and explain the routine and embedded nature of corruption and deviance among the regulators and the regulated in the nightlife environment. This text offers a contemporary and incisive theoretical framework on the criminogenic features and structural contradictions of capitalism. The author both describes and explains how the dominant political economy is rife with structural contradictions that, in turn, generate various manifestations of white-collar crime, organizational deviance, and public corruption. The author uses the bar and nightlife environment to empirically anchor these claims. Methodologically, the research is innovative in advancing inquiry into ethically and logistically challenging environments. The style of writing and framing of the text is one that punches upward and avoids the voyeuristic and reductionist tropes historically associated with "dangerous fieldwork." Through a range of disciplinary perspectives, Corrupt Capital offers both scholarly rigor and inviting prose to advance our understanding of crimes of the relatively powerful and powerless alike. An accessible and compelling text, this book will appeal to readers in criminology, sociology, law and society, political science, and all those interested in learning about the relationship between power, law, and routinized corruption in the nightlife economy.
Author: Richard Lawless Publisher: Outskirts Press ISBN: 1977211445 Category : True Crime Languages : en Pages : 283
Book Description
Richard Lawless's Capitol Hill's Criminal Underground: The Most Thorough Exploration of Government Corruption Ever Put in Writing is a no-holds-barred tell-all about the bad guys of Capital Hill and Wall Street, including the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission. After Lawless became a victim of these crimes, he used his decades as a senior and executive banker, backed by an MBA with a focus on finance and law, to break down the evidence in Capitol Hill's Criminal Underground. No names have been changed to protect the innocent because there are no innocent-except for the tens of millions of Americans who, like Lawless, had massive amounts of money stolen from them. Capitol Hill's Criminal Underground is a story about one of the longest-running government-protected criminal enterprises in the history of the United States country. This is Lawless's attempt find justice for what happened to him-and to many readers as well.
Author: Mr.V. Hugo Juan-Ramon Publisher: International Monetary Fund ISBN: 1451850816 Category : Social Science Languages : en Pages : 30
Book Description
Reforming economies have typically placed little attention on the impact of illegal activities on the success of reform/stabilization packages and optimal policy design. This paper aims at developing a framework in which to assess an economy’s response to alternative stabilization/reform packages as a function of the scope of corruption activities. The framework developed herein is a basic one in which only the most fundamental questions (such as the effects of anti-corruption government policies on output and welfare) are examined. The more interesting questions of the optimal design of stabilization and economic reform policies remain to be addressed in future extensions of the model. The framework also accommodates political-economy analysis, and is able to explain why, even when able to eliminate corruption activity altogether, governments may choose not to do so. Our framework differentiates between developing and developed economies according to the income share accruing to capital, as is common in the literature. In equilibrium, the effect of anti-corruption penalties on the economy’s capital stock is greater in developing countries; in particular, we find that the elasticity of the steady state average per capita stock of capital with respect to increases in anti-corruption penalties is increasing in the income share accruing to capital. The model also shows that reductions in public good output, as a fraction of the economy’s total expenditure, lead to larger welfare decreases when in the presence of corruption.
Author: Willeke Slingerland Publisher: ISBN: 9789462368804 Category : Social Science Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Corruption is generally referred to as bribery. This books deals with a different form of corruption: corruption caused by networks. Network corruption is the form of corruption in which the interaction of multiple actors within a social network results in corruption but in which the individual behaviour as such is not necessarily corrupt. The main reason for this research is that a gap appears to exist in the available theories on corruption: very little research is available on corruption by a network, nor does the network theory thoroughly discuss the risks or pitfalls of networks or how such a collective can become corrupt. As such this books offers a 'new layer' by clearly defining what distinguishes network corruption from corruption networks. The other reason for this research is the observation that policies and investigations appear to be limited in dealing with corruption in network-like structures. This book deals with the question how corruption is linked to the functioning of social networks. The available literature of both corruption and networks was reviewed. Some theories support the idea of collective acting and collective responsibility which can be used in cases of corruption by a network. The conceptual analysis results in one assessment frame which helps in distinguishing when networks are a form of social capital and when they deteriorate into corruption. The assessment frame was applied to three case studies from developed western societies in which corruption was brought in connection with a network (the international FIFA case, the News of the World International phone-hacking scandal from the United Kingdom and the Dutch city of Roermond). This allowed for a better understanding of the mechanisms and characteristics of networks. The findings on the link between networks and corruption gained from this book call for alternative routes for policy development and for a greater network awareness. This book concludes with policy recommendation and ways to ensure networks remain the essential Social Capital needed in our society.
Author: Chong-En Bai Publisher: World Bank Publications ISBN: Category : Administracion publica Languages : en Pages : 40
Book Description
The extent of bureaucracy varies extensively across countries, but the quality of bureaucracy within a country changes more slowly than economic policies. The authors propose that the quality of bureaucracy may be an important structural determinant of open economy macroeconomic policies - especially the imposition or removal of capital control. In their model, capital controls are an instrument of financial repression. They entail efficiency loss for the economy but also generate implicit revenue for the government. The results show that bureaucratic corruption translates into the government's reduced ability to collect tax revenues. Even if capital controls and financial repression are otherwise inefficient, the government still has to rely on them to raise revenues to provide public goods. Among the countries for which the authors could get relevant data, they find that the more corrupt ones are indeed more likely to impose capital controls, a pattern consistent with the model's prediction. To deal with possible reverse causality, they use the extent of corruption in a country's judicial system, and the degree of democracy, as the instrumental variables for bureaucratic corruption. The instrumental variable regressions show the same result: more corrupt countries are associated with more severe capital controls. The results suggest that as countries develop and improve their public institutions, reducing bureaucratic corruption over time, they will choose to gradually liberalize their capital accounts. Removing capital controls prematurely when forced by outside institutions to do so could reduce rather than improve their economic efficiency.
Author: Shang-Jin Wei Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 28
Book Description
Corruption affects the composition of capital inflows in a way that may raise the likelihood of a currency crisis.Crony capitalism and international creditors' self-fulfilling expectations are often suggested as rival explanations for currency crises. A possible link between the two has not been explored.Wei shows one channel through which crony capitalism can increase the chance of a currency/financial crisis by altering the composition of capital inflows.Using data on bilateral foreign direct investment and bilateral bank loans, Wei finds clear evidence that in corrupt countries the composition of capital inflows is relatively light in foreign direct investment.Earlier studies indicated that a country with a capital inflow structure is more likely to run into a currency crisis down the road (partly through international creditors' self-fulfilling expectations).Therefore, crony capitalism, through its effect on the composition of a country's capital inflows, makes the country more vulnerable to currency crises brought about by self-fulfilling expectations. Corruption may also weaken domestic financial supervision, with a subsequent deterioration in the quality in banks' and firms' balance sheets.This paper - a product of Public Economics, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the connection between corruption and international capital flows. This study was supported in part by a grant from the OECD Development Center. The author may be contacted at [email protected].
Author: Edward L. Glaeser Publisher: University of Chicago Press ISBN: 0226299597 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 398
Book Description
Despite recent corporate scandals, the United States is among the world’s least corrupt nations. But in the nineteenth century, the degree of fraud and corruption in America approached that of today’s most corrupt developing nations, as municipal governments and robber barons alike found new ways to steal from taxpayers and swindle investors. In Corruption and Reform, contributors explore this shadowy period of United States history in search of better methods to fight corruption worldwide today. Contributors to this volume address the measurement and consequences of fraud and corruption and the forces that ultimately led to their decline within the United States. They show that various approaches to reducing corruption have met with success, such as deregulation, particularly “free banking,” in the 1830s. In the 1930s, corruption was kept in check when new federal bureaucracies replaced local administrations in doling out relief. Another deterrent to corruption was the independent press, which kept a watchful eye over government and business. These and other facets of American history analyzed in this volume make it indispensable as background for anyone interested in corruption today.
Author: Amitai Etzioni
Author: 
Author: Kenneth Sebastian León
Author: Richard Lawless
Author: Shang-Jin Wei
Author: Mr.V. Hugo Juan-Ramon
Author: Willeke Slingerland
Author: Chong-En Bai
Author: Shang-Jin Wei
Author: Edward L. Glaeser