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Author: Jamie L Carson Publisher: University of Michigan Press ISBN: 0472123750 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 216
Book Description
David Mayhew’s 1974 thesis on the “electoral connection” and its impact on legislative behavior is the theoretical foundation for research on the modern U.S. Congress. Mayhew contends that once in office, legislators pursue the actions that put them in the best position for reelection. The electoral connection is a post-World War II phenomenon, but legislative scholars now suggest that Mayhew’s argument applies to earlier congressional eras. To assess these claims, Carson and Sievert investigate whether earlier legislators were motivated by the same factors that influence their behavior today, especially in pursuit of reelection. They examine how electoral incentives shape legislative behavior throughout the nineteenth century by looking at patterns of turnover in Congress; the re-nomination of candidates; the roles of parties in recruiting candidates, and by extension their broader effects on candidate competition; and, finally by examining legislators’ accountability. The results have wide-ranging implications for the evolution of Congress and the development of various legislative institutions over time.
Author: Jamie L Carson Publisher: University of Michigan Press ISBN: 0472123750 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 216
Book Description
David Mayhew’s 1974 thesis on the “electoral connection” and its impact on legislative behavior is the theoretical foundation for research on the modern U.S. Congress. Mayhew contends that once in office, legislators pursue the actions that put them in the best position for reelection. The electoral connection is a post-World War II phenomenon, but legislative scholars now suggest that Mayhew’s argument applies to earlier congressional eras. To assess these claims, Carson and Sievert investigate whether earlier legislators were motivated by the same factors that influence their behavior today, especially in pursuit of reelection. They examine how electoral incentives shape legislative behavior throughout the nineteenth century by looking at patterns of turnover in Congress; the re-nomination of candidates; the roles of parties in recruiting candidates, and by extension their broader effects on candidate competition; and, finally by examining legislators’ accountability. The results have wide-ranging implications for the evolution of Congress and the development of various legislative institutions over time.
Author: Frances E. Lee Publisher: University of Chicago Press ISBN: 022640918X Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 277
Book Description
“[A] tour de force. Building upon her argument in Beyond Ideology, she adds an important wrinkle into the current divide between the parties in Congress.” —Perspectives on Politics As Democrats and Republicans continue to vie for political advantage, Congress remains paralyzed by partisan conflict. That the last two decades have seen some of the least productive Congresses in recent history is usually explained by the growing ideological gulf between the parties, but this explanation misses another fundamental factor influencing the dynamic. In contrast to politics through most of the twentieth century, the contemporary Democratic and Republican parties compete for control of Congress at relative parity, and this has dramatically changed the parties’ incentives and strategies in ways that have driven the contentious partisanship characteristic of contemporary American politics. With Insecure Majorities, Frances E. Lee offers a controversial new perspective on the rise of congressional party conflict, showing how the shift in competitive circumstances has had a profound impact on how Democrats and Republicans interact. Beginning in the 1980s, most elections since have offered the prospect of a change of party control. Lee shows, through an impressive range of interviews and analysis, how competition for control of the government drives members of both parties to participate in actions that promote their own party’s image and undercut that of the opposition, including the perpetual hunt for issues that can score political points by putting the opposing party on the wrong side of public opinion. More often than not, this strategy stands in the way of productive bipartisan cooperation—and it is also unlikely to change as long as control of the government remains within reach for both parties.
Author: Gary C. Jacobson Publisher: Longman Publishing Group ISBN: Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 296
Book Description
Among the new class of inductees into the "Longman Classics in Political Science" series, this completely revised and updated edition continues to offer readers an authoritative and engaging account of what goes on in congressional elections. Bringing everything up-to-date, this Sixth Edition of Gary Jacobson's classic work analyzes recent electoral trends in Congress and demonstrates how electoral politics reflect and shape other basic components of our political system.
Author: David R. Mayhew Publisher: Yale University Press ISBN: 9780300130010 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 220
Book Description
"Any short list of major analyses of Congress must of necessity include David Mayhew’s Congress: The Electoral Connection." —Fred Greenstein In this second edition to a book that has achieved canonical status, David R. Mayhew argues that the principal motivation of legislators is reelection and that the pursuit of this goal affects the way they behave and the way that they make public policy. In a new foreword for this edition, R. Douglas Arnold discusses why the book revolutionized the study of Congress and how it has stood the test of time.
Author: R. Douglas Arnold Publisher: Yale University Press ISBN: 9780300056594 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 298
Book Description
Congress regularly enacts laws that benefit particular groups or localities while imposing costs on everyone else. Sometimes, however, Congress breaks free of such parochial concerns and enacts bills that serve the general public, not just special interest groups. In this important and original book, R. Douglas Arnold offers a theory that explains not only why special interests frequently triumph but also why the general public sometimes wins. By showing how legislative leaders build coalitions for both types of programs, he illuminates recent legislative decisions in such areas as economic, tax, and energy policy. Arnold's theory of policy making rests on a reinterpretation of the relationship between legislators' actions and their constituents' policy preferences. Most scholars explore the impact that citizens' existing policy preferences have on legislators' decisions. They ignore citizens who have no opinions because they assume that uninformed citizens cannot possibly affect legislators' choices. Arnold examines the influence of citizens' potential preferences, however, and argues that legislators also respond to these preferences in order to avoid future electoral problems. He shows how legislators estimate the political consequences of their voting decisions, taking into account both the existing preferences of attentive citizens and the potential preferences of inattentive citizens. He then analyzes how coalition leaders manipulate the legislative situation in order to make it attractive for legislators to support a general interest bill.
Author: Jamie L Carson
Author: Jamie L Carson
Author: Jamie L. Carson
Author: Frances E. Lee
Author: Gary C. Jacobson
Author: David R. Mayhew
Author: Gary C. Jacobson
Author: R. Douglas Arnold
Author: Alan S. Gerber
Author: Sean M. Theriault
Author: David R Jones