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Author: Belinda Helmke Publisher: GRIN Verlag ISBN: 3640952057 Category : Languages : en Pages : 37
Book Description
Seminar paper from the year 2003 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Region: USA, grade: 1, Macquarie University, language: English, abstract: "Look, Mr. President, everything that the Secretary of Defense has been telling you this morning, I used to listen to with my French friends. They talked about the fact that there was always a new plan, and (...) that was going to win the day. And they believed it just as much as we're believing it sitting around the table this morning. I can tell you, however, that in the end, there was a great disillusion. And there will be one." - George Ball, 1971 - In spite of the advice given to him by his Under Secretary of State, George Ball, United States President Lyndon B. Johnson decided on the 27th July 1965 to push ahead and increase military forces from 75,000 to 125,000 in Vietnam. With this decision, Johnson escalated the American intervention in Vietnam and made what has been seen as the "formal decision for a major war" . The inability and, to an extent unwillingness, to foresee that the conflict was going to be as catastrophic as it turned out to be is what lead Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defence, to say that the Johnson administration's "greatest failure of all was Vietnam." It was not until April 1975 and then under President Gerald Ford that the United States would finally withdraw from Vietnam, following a defeat of the South Vietnamese forces and a reunification of the country under the leadership of Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. With approximately 58,000 American casualties, not to mention the estimated 1,5 million Vietnamese killed, this military intervention continues to be seen as a sore point of American history .
Author: Belinda Helmke Publisher: GRIN Verlag ISBN: 3640952057 Category : Languages : en Pages : 37
Book Description
Seminar paper from the year 2003 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Region: USA, grade: 1, Macquarie University, language: English, abstract: "Look, Mr. President, everything that the Secretary of Defense has been telling you this morning, I used to listen to with my French friends. They talked about the fact that there was always a new plan, and (...) that was going to win the day. And they believed it just as much as we're believing it sitting around the table this morning. I can tell you, however, that in the end, there was a great disillusion. And there will be one." - George Ball, 1971 - In spite of the advice given to him by his Under Secretary of State, George Ball, United States President Lyndon B. Johnson decided on the 27th July 1965 to push ahead and increase military forces from 75,000 to 125,000 in Vietnam. With this decision, Johnson escalated the American intervention in Vietnam and made what has been seen as the "formal decision for a major war" . The inability and, to an extent unwillingness, to foresee that the conflict was going to be as catastrophic as it turned out to be is what lead Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defence, to say that the Johnson administration's "greatest failure of all was Vietnam." It was not until April 1975 and then under President Gerald Ford that the United States would finally withdraw from Vietnam, following a defeat of the South Vietnamese forces and a reunification of the country under the leadership of Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. With approximately 58,000 American casualties, not to mention the estimated 1,5 million Vietnamese killed, this military intervention continues to be seen as a sore point of American history .
Author: Belinda Helmke Publisher: GRIN Verlag ISBN: 3640952278 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 13
Book Description
Seminar paper from the year 2003 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Region: USA, grade: 1, Macquarie University, language: English, abstract: ”Look, Mr. President, everything that the Secretary of Defense has been telling you this morning, I used to listen to with my French friends. They talked about the fact that there was always a new plan, and (...) that was going to win the day. And they believed it just as much as we're believing it sitting around the table this morning. I can tell you, however, that in the end, there was a great disillusion. And there will be one.” - George Ball, 1971 - In spite of the advice given to him by his Under Secretary of State, George Ball, United States President Lyndon B. Johnson decided on the 27th July 1965 to push ahead and increase military forces from 75,000 to 125,000 in Vietnam. With this decision, Johnson escalated the American intervention in Vietnam and made what has been seen as the ”formal decision for a major war” . The inability and, to an extent unwillingness, to foresee that the conflict was going to be as catastrophic as it turned out to be is what lead Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defence, to say that the Johnson administration’s ”greatest failure of all was Vietnam.” It was not until April 1975 and then under President Gerald Ford that the United States would finally withdraw from Vietnam, following a defeat of the South Vietnamese forces and a reunification of the country under the leadership of Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. With approximately 58,000 American casualties, not to mention the estimated 1,5 million Vietnamese killed, this military intervention continues to be seen as a sore point of American history .
Author: Lyndon Baines Johnson Publisher: ISBN: Category : United States Languages : en Pages : 936
Book Description
The recent declassification of "top secret" Vietnam War papers of the Johnson administration provides an unusually intimate portrait of presidential decision making and fills an important gap in the literature on presidents and on the Vietnam War. For years, the Pentagon Papers served as the most influential published collection of Vietnam-era policy making documents. However, as Vietnam scholar George McT. Kahin has written, the Pentagon Papers are "generally very sketchy and inadequate with respect to the political dimension; and for the critical years, 1964–1968, the gaps are particularly extensive." Drawing upon the newly declassified documents and many other Vietnam papers, David Barrett's Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam Papers fills the need for a one-volume collection detailing interaction and confrontations concerning the dilemmas of Vietnam policy. He chronologically presents notes of meetings and phone calls between President Johnson and advisers, as well as meetings with some war critics; memoranda to and from the president; and notes and letters written by friends and associates of Johnson describing his thinking and concerns about the war. This volume offers a first-hand documentation of how and why the United States fought in Indochina in the 1960s; an introduction to the archival holdings for future researchers; and documentary evidence of the major players and their roles in making policy.
Author: Michael H. Hunt Publisher: Hill and Wang ISBN: 1429930683 Category : Biography & Autobiography Languages : en Pages : 146
Book Description
The Hill and Wang Critical Issues Series: concise, affordable works on pivotal topics in American history, society, and politics. Using newly available documents from both American and Vietnamese archives, Hunt reinterprets the values, choices, misconceptions, and miscalculations that shaped the long process of American intervention in Southeast Asia, and renders more comprehensible--if no less troubling--the tangled origins of the war.
Author: Jonathan Colman Publisher: ISBN: Category : United States Languages : en Pages : 248
Book Description
This book will offer a fresh, up-to-date, balanced overview of Johnson's policies across a range of theatres and issues with the aim of generating a proper understanding of his successes and failures in foreign policy.
Author: Jason Porterfield Publisher: Enslow Publishing, LLC ISBN: 0766085317 Category : Juvenile Nonfiction Languages : en Pages : 130
Book Description
Though Lyndon B. Johnson did not make the initial decision to enter the conflict in Vietnam, he accepted the burdens of the unofficial war when he took office. Through full-color and black-and-white photos, informative sidebars, and engaging text, readers sneak a peek into the Johnson administration and the people who advised him, gaining insight into the combat and political strategies of the war itself and its legacy. Understanding the pressures of this unpopular war and what went into the decision making to ramp up the conflict will give readers a new perspective on the frustrating struggle that took place in this small nation in Southeast Asia.
Author: George C. Herring Publisher: University of Texas Press ISBN: 0292749007 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 245
Book Description
“[A] compelling analysis . . . A solid addition to our understanding of the Vietnam War and a president.” —Publishers Weekly The Vietnam War remains a divisive memory for Americans—partisans on all sides still debate why it was fought, how it could have been better fought, and whether it could have been won at all. In this major study, a noted expert on the war brings a needed objectivity to these debates by examining dispassionately how and why President Lyndon Johnson and his administration conducted the war as they did. Drawing on a wealth of newly released documents from the LBJ Library, including the Tom Johnson notes from the influential Tuesday Lunch Group, George Herring discusses the concept of limited war and how it affected President Johnson’s decision making, Johnson’s relations with his military commanders, the administration’s pacification program of 1965–1967, the management of public opinion, and the “fighting while negotiating” strategy pursued after the Tet Offensive in 1968. This in-depth analysis, from a prize-winning historian and National Book Critics Circle Award finalist, exposes numerous flaws in Johnson’s approach, in a “concise, well-researched account” that “critiques Johnson's management of the Vietnam War in terms of military strategy, diplomacy, and domestic public opinion” (Library Journal).
Author: Lloyd C. Gardner Publisher: Ivan R. Dee Publisher ISBN: Category : Biography & Autobiography Languages : en Pages : 648
Book Description
Lyndon Johnson brought to the presidency a political outlook steeped in New Deal liberalism and the idea of government intervention for the public good--at home or abroad. Seeking to fulfill John Kennedy's pledge in Southeast Asia, LBJ constructed a fatal coupling of the Great Society and the anti-Communist imperative. Pay Any Price is Lloyd Gardner's riveting account of the fall into Vietnam; of behind-the-scenes decision-making at the highest levels of government; of miscalculation, blinkered optimism, and moral obtuseness. Blending political biography with diplomatic history, Gardner has written the first book on American involvement in the Vietnam War to use the full resources and newly declassified documents of the Johnson Library, and to tell whole the story of Johnson and Vietnam. The book is filled with fresh interpretations, brilliantly incisive portraits of the president and his men, and new perspectives on America's most divisive foreign war. Gardner describes for the first time how, as tragedy swirled around the deliberations in Washington, Clark Clifford and Dean Rusk struggled for the president's soul, culminating in the bombing halt of 1968 and the Johnson decision not to run. The war finally sundered the liberal cold war consensus, Gardner argues, and brought to an end the New Deal politics that had dominated American political life since 1933. Pay Any Price is a major work of history by one of our most distinguished historians.
Author: Daniel Rother Publisher: GRIN Verlag ISBN: 3638634604 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 14
Book Description
Essay from the year 2006 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Region: USA, grade: A+ (1,0), Cardiff University (School of Humanities ), course: American Government and Politics in the 20th Century, language: English, abstract: The executive power of the US President in respect of the limits of this power set by the US Congress has changed dramatically since the first President George Washington in 1789. There has been a general shift towards the strengthening of the President, especially in the 20th century. Also in times of national and international crisis and wars, Americans tend to rally around the flag and around their leading figure – the President. In this time the power of the President increased significantly, an example being during the Civil War (1861-65), during the Blockade of West Berlin (1948/49) or since 9/11 (2001). The Vietnam War especially changed America in many ways, not only politically, but also economically and socially. The American engagement in the conflict in South-East-Asia lasted over two decades, four Presidents were involved and a huge amount of human and financial resources were invested to win the war. Results were for example stagflation in the US and in Europe, and a great distrust within American society towards their President. In this essay I will try to focus on the actions of President Johnson and in particular President Nixon, both of which altered the executive powers of the presidency during the time of the Vietnam War. I will also take a look at some of the actions the Legislature took to limit the power of the Executive. The essay starts with the increase of power of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s “Gulf of Tonkin Resolution” in 1965, and will continue with the increasing presidential power during the presidency of Richard Nixon. Finally it will end with some of the actions Congress took to limit the power of the President through the “War Powers Act” of 1973. The book by Melvin Small “At the Water’s Edge” serves as the main source for this essay. Small describes the domestic issues of the Johnson and Nixon administration, and how the two Presidents were involved in fighting the war. The book “The Presidents” by Stephen Graubard gave me good information for a better understanding of the actions of Johnson and Nixon. Furthermore the books “American Government” by Dunn and Slann, “Government and Politics of the United States” by Bowles, “The basics of American Politics” by Wassermann and Ashbee’s and Ashford’s “US Politics Today” gave me a good understanding of American politics during the Vietnam Era.
Author: Belinda Helmke
Author: Belinda Helmke
Author: Belinda Helmke
Author: Lyndon Baines Johnson
Author: Michael H. Hunt
Author: Jonathan Colman
Author: Jason Porterfield
Author: George C. Herring
Author: Lloyd C. Gardner
Author: Kathleen J. Turner
Author: Daniel Rother