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Unelected Power

Unelected Power PDF Author: Paul Tucker
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691196303
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 662

Book Description
Tucker presents guiding principles for ensuring that central bankers and other unelected policymakers remain stewards of the common good.

Unelected Power

Unelected Power PDF Author: Paul Tucker
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691196303
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 662

Book Description
Tucker presents guiding principles for ensuring that central bankers and other unelected policymakers remain stewards of the common good.

Rules, Discretion, and Central Bank Independence

Rules, Discretion, and Central Bank Independence PDF Author: Bernhard Eschweiler
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Banks and banking, Central
Languages : en
Pages : 51

Book Description


Central Bank Independence

Central Bank Independence PDF Author: Jan Kleineman
Publisher: BRILL
ISBN: 9004481303
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 238

Book Description
In December 1999, prior to the forming of a Stockholm Centre for Commercial Law, an international symposium entitled Central Bank Independence was held at the Department of Law at Stockholm University in co-operation with the Swedish Central Bank (The Riksbank) and Queen Mary and Westfield College, London University. The participants were principally political, economic and legal specialists in the field, all with considerable international experience. This led to the topic being examined in detail from many different perspectives. This publication includes contributions by the participants and contains many important facts for those readers who wish to study and understand the different consequences of the yielding of control over financial policymaking by the traditional political organisations to a body of experts. For readers in some countries, who realise that the subject will revolutionise traditional Constitutional and Administrative Law, the topic and therefore this publication, cannot be ignored.

Central Bank Independence, Targets, and Credibility

Central Bank Independence, Targets, and Credibility PDF Author: Francesco Lippi
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 184

Book Description
Provides a welfare analysis of central banking, addressing such topics as imperfect monetary control, rational voters, distributional issues, and uncertainty about future policy objectives. The role played by the different institutional elements that contribute to the making of an independent central bank is assessed, as well as the distinction between central bank independence and targets. The final essay analyzes the links between central bank independence, policy strategies, and economic outcomes in a cross-section of 49 countries. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics

Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics PDF Author: Christopher Adolph
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139620533
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages :

Book Description
Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.

The Federal Reserve System Purposes and Functions

The Federal Reserve System Purposes and Functions PDF Author: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780894991967
Category : Banks and Banking
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
Provides an in-depth overview of the Federal Reserve System, including information about monetary policy and the economy, the Federal Reserve in the international sphere, supervision and regulation, consumer and community affairs and services offered by Reserve Banks. Contains several appendixes, including a brief explanation of Federal Reserve regulations, a glossary of terms, and a list of additional publications.

Institutions and Monetary Policy

Institutions and Monetary Policy PDF Author: Eric Schaling
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN:
Category : Banks and banking, Central
Languages : en
Pages : 288

Book Description
Central bank independence is a key issue for political and monetary authorities in many countries. In this text, the author looks at the impact of different central banks on price stability and macroeconomic performance, and their optimal degree of legislative independence.

The Political Economy of Central-bank Independence

The Political Economy of Central-bank Independence PDF Author: Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger
Publisher: International Finance Section Department of Econ Ton Univers
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 100

Book Description


Central Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation

Central Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation PDF Author: Mr.Kenichi Ueda
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1475502915
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 27

Book Description
We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the central bank is politically independent. We then consider the role of political pressures in the spirit of Barro and Gordon (1983). We show that if either the macro-prudential regulator or the central bank (or both) are not politically independent, separation of price and financial stability objectives does not deliver the social optimum.

Central Bank Governance and Oversight Reform

Central Bank Governance and Oversight Reform PDF Author: John Cochrane
Publisher: Hoover Press
ISBN: 0817919260
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 344

Book Description
A central bank needs authority and a sphere of independent action. But a central bank cannot become an unelected czar with sweeping, unaccountable discretionary power. How can we balance the central bank's authority and independence with needed accountability and constraints? Drawn from a 2015 Hoover Institution conference, this book features distinguished scholars and policy makers' discussing this and other key questions about the Fed.